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The Political Economy of Social Accountability in Nepal 
 
Executive Summary 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The World Bank has introduced a new Program for Accountability in Nepal (PRAN) to enhance the 
capacities of civil society and government actors to utilize social accountability approaches and 
tools.
1
 This political economy study seeks to inform the PRAN by identifying the strengths and 
opportunities as well as risks and obstacles for social accountability initiatives in Nepal. The study 
is based on primary and secondary research conducted from September 2010 to February 2011. 
 
II. Historical Legacies 
 
The Nepali state has historically been exclusionary and unaccountable. Until 1990, Nepal was ruled 
by Hindu, high-caste, autocratic rulers. Following the first Peoples’ Movement and the formal 
introduction of multi-party democracy in 1990, formerly banned and underground political parties 
leaders emerged to take control of state power with the monarchy sidelined.  However, just as the 
new democratic institutions were being put into place, they began to be actively weakened by 
emerging political party dynamics. In all, the first decade of multi-party democracy was marked by  
high levels of corruption and weakened formal control institutions. This impacted the credibility of 
rule of law and the regulatory functions of the state. There remains a serious gap between the ruling 
elites and the population at large. Problems of social and economic inequality are compounded by 
impunity and weak rule of law. The legacy of Panchayat nationalism continues to contour 
identities, economic and social relations and access to political space, even as historically excluded 
groups begin to find their voice and advocate for change.   
 
III. Legislative Framework For Social Accountability In Nepal 
Nepal’s Interim Constitution guarantees various levels of citizen and civil society participation and 
establishes a number of institutions for public accountability and oversight. The 2007 Right to 
Information Act grants citizens broad access to public information and is very progressive 
compared to the rest of South Asia. The 2008 Good Governance Act stresses the need for a public 
administration that is “pro-people, accountable, transparent, inclusive and participatory”.  Elected 
local bodies of self-governance are acknowledged as essential to “ensuring peoples’ participation in 
the country’s governance” and the government’s Three Year Interim Plan (2007/08 to 2009/10) 
specified decentralization as the key strategy for enhancing good governance and people’s 
empowerment. The new 2010/11 to 2012/13 Three Year Interim Plan continues to emphasize good 
governance, inclusion, and balanced and decentralized development planned around probable 
federal governance structures. A range of constitutional and legal provisions are also in place to:  
regulate public financial management and to ensure oversight and accountability mechanisms for 
political parties and civil society organizations. Several ministries have guidelines on the 
implementation of social accountability mechanisms including: citizens’ charters, social audits, 
public audits and public hearings. While there are important discrepancies between legal provisions 
and actual practice, the existence of these various constitutional and legal provisions nevertheless 
provides an enabling regulatory framework for social accountability in Nepal. 
 
                                                     
1
 Social accountability refers to the broad range of actions and mechanisms (beyond voting) that citizens can use 
to hold the state to account, as well as, (ii) actions on the part of government, civil society, media and other 
societal actors that promote or facilitate these efforts. 
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IV. Contextual Factors Influencing Social Accountability in Nepal 
 
Civic engagement and social accountability in Nepal are framed and influenced by a number of 
underlying contextual factors including: the effects of the recent conflict, political transformation, 
governance issues, the nature and history of relationships between citizens and the state, the 
specific characteristics of Nepali civil society and the media.  
 
a. Post-conflict context  
 
The fragile and uncertain nature of Nepal’s peace process has made more difficult the challenges of 
rebuilding the country’s economy, physical infrastructure and political institutions. The current 
prolonged political deadlock is tied to lack of progress in implementing the broader peace process. 
The rise of identity politics, especially following the Madhes Movement of 2007, has further 
complicated the rebuilding of social cohesion and trust following the conflict.  A key risk during 
this period is that the Constitution will not be written by the 28 May 2011 deadline, turning a 
potentially progressive historical moment into one of deep fracture.  
 
b. Political transformation  
 
Multi-party democracy is quite new in Nepal. Political parties continue to operate in a highly 
centralized manner and the predominance of the older generation in top positions of power limits 
the potential for change. Informal mechanisms continue to play prominent roles in the making of 
public policy. Sources of political power remain personalized rather than institutionalized and 
patrimonial traditions and patron-client relations dominate all political institutions. The absence of 
elected officials at the local level and the consequent introduction of the All-Party Mechanism 
(APM) has facilitated the spread of patronage systems. Current levels of political violence, 
insecurity and impunity are the result of competition over state and criminal resources which drive 
the patronage networks.  The interim post-conflict period with the focus on “consensus” among the 
leaders of the major political parties and the absence of locally elected bodies, has allowed the 
political parties to capture much of the political space. Problems of corruption and lack of 
accountability of political parties are recognized as a key concern and, for now, ‘buy in’ from 
within the political parties for enhanced financial transparency and downward accountability is low.  
 
c. Governance issues  
 
Global indicators on the status of governance in Nepal reveal several issues of concern.  In 2009, 
Nepal rated below the 50
th
 percentile in all six dimensions of the World Bank’s World Wide 
Governance indicators (i.e. political stability, the absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption).  The 2009 Global Integrity Report gave 
Nepal an overall rating of “weak” (67/100). Despite policy commitments to decentralization, 
meaningful devolution of power and authority to local bodies has yet to occur. Incentives for 
effective, accountable and responsive service delivery and for active citizen-state engagement are 
absent.  Analysts point out that the politicization of the civil service, a non-transparent evaluation 
system and, rewards and punishment unlinked to performance result in little incentive to bring 
about behavior change. Governance problems in today’s context are exacerbated by insecurity.  
Post-conflict restoration of security has been hampered by the lack of central political will and 
strategy to address the overall weak rule of law.  
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d. Citizen-state relations  
 
Nepal has a long history of feudalism and monarchy.  Neo-patrimonial relationships continue to 
structure the manner in which citizens relate to the state. A culture of hierarchy and deference to 
authority exists which makes citizens reluctant to question those in power. The deliberate 
withholding of information, unnecessary delays and inaction are seen as ways in which to make 
ordinary citizens “bow down” to the bureaucrats. This post-conflict transitional period is one in 
which citizens feel further distanced from the state. Unsurprising, this exclusion is especially felt by 
traditionally marginalized groups. The transition to the often quoted “new Nepal” offers a key 
opportunity for restructuring state-citizen relations. Social accountability tools can help to reframe 
more productive citizen-state relations as well as enable transparency and accountability. Social 
accountability interventions must aim, however, to both affirm the rights of citizens and, at the 
same time, strengthen the state’s capacity to respond to citizen demands.  
 
e. Civil society 
 
Nepal has a long and rich experience of community level associational life. Importantly, the 1990 
democratic freedoms enabled the rapid growth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 
Nepal, funded by international donors seeking to build “civil society”. A key constraint to the 
ability of civil society organizations (CSOs) to seek government accountability is the fact that their 
own credibility in the public eye has become suspect. NGOs are criticized for being elitist, for 
lacking transparency and accountability and for reporting only to donors. The fact that most NGOs 
tend to be politically aligned further constrains their credibility and legitimacy. Important steps 
have been taken to improve NGOs’ internal governance, accountability and social inclusion but 
significant challenges remain.  
 
Other civil society players in Nepal also need to be situated in the larger dynamics of politicization.  
For example, national trade unions (and their federations) are, in practice, wings of the major 
political parties. More “modern” community based organizations (CBOs) such as user groups, 
mother groups, self-helps groups, Tole Lane Organizations, small farmer cooperatives and saving 
and credit organizations face fewer allegations of partisan alignment, though in the current political 
climate, political party pressures on these groups is increasing. Many of these groups are also 
increasingly dependent on donor support and face problems such as limited capacity, elite capture 
and exclusion of the very poor and socially marginalized. Independent research centers and think 
tanks are another important category of CSOs. These groups seek to make a public impact by 
publishing reports and books and convening meetings between policy makers, academics, activists 
and political actors, but the extent to which such research and policy institutes actually succeed in 
impacting policy-making is unclear. There is no doubt that CSOs in Nepal have made important 
contributions to the emergence of a democratic culture in Nepal. There is a real need, however, to 
assist and support CSOs to become models of transparent, responsive and accountable governance.  
 
f. Media  
 
Independent media, another important dimension of civil society in Nepal, has played a critical role 
post-1990. Weaknesses in the media sector as it relates to civic engagement and social 
accountability include issues of political bias and lack of autonomy. In the current context, the 
media has become a target of criminal gangs. Self-censoring by journalists, due to security threats 
or a reluctance to offend local power-holders, has been identified as a constraint, as has the lack of 
representation of women and excluded groups in the media. Since Nepal’s first radio broadcasting 
license was issued in 1997, there has been a rapid growth in both private and not-for-profit radio. 
Community radio, which has played and continues to play key roles with regard to promoting 
democracy and social accountability nevertheless faces a number of important challenges including: 
inconsistent application of community radio principles, domination by elite groups, increased 
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politicization and loss of local control and content (as a result of networking and syndicated 
programming).   
 
 
V. Analysis of Key Elements of Social Accountability In Nepal  
 
a. Citizen access to information  
 
A fundamental element of social accountability is citizen access to information. There are no legal 
barriers to the obtaining of information for citizens in Nepal. However, there has been little 
progress in the implementation of the Right toInformation (RTI) Act. Contrary to the experiences of 
many other countries in the early implementation period of such acts, CSOs have not been 
important drivers of “demand” for information in Nepal (in part due to the current overall attention 
given to post-conflict and constitution writing imperatives).  Recommendations to overcome 
current obstacles include: establishing a central nodal agency within the government responsible for 
the implementation of the RTI Act; training and supporting public information officers (throughout 
the public service); creating a dedicated parliamentary committee on RTI, and; supporting and 
working with the media and NGO networks to make use of the RTI Act and to educate the public 
about its existence. 
 
Unsurprisingly, current levels of knowledge about governance processes and key public issues on 
the part of the general public remain low. Research found that media, especially FM and 
community radio (and television in urban areas), is the main source of public information for 
citizens. Research has revealed a number of examples of CSOs and NGOs collaborating with radio 
stations in the context of specific development or governance-oriented programs but, overall, civil 
society efforts to disseminate relevant public information and educate citizens about issues of key 
public concern in Nepal are lacking - a reflection of the current inaccessibility of information, the 
complex and non-user-friendly nature of data and limited CSO capacity for research and analysis. 
Despite these weaknesses, citizens’ growing thirst for information offers an important current 
opportunity. 
 
b. Citizen voice  
 
A second key element of social accountability is citizen voice. Democratization and the growth of 
the media in Nepal (including television, print and radio) has created spaces where citizens feel safe 
and empowered to voice their views. Locally based media serve as a particularly important platform 
for people to share information, opinions and concerns. Community radio has played a key role in 
giving voice to citizens. Of the many media-oriented donor interventions, a particularly important 
one is that of the BBC World Trust Service that works in partnership with a network of 2,500 
community-based organisations, more than 50 Nepali radio stations and the BBC Nepali Service to 
produce development, peace and governance-oriented drama and discussion programs.  A persistent 
obstacle to the expression of citizen voice is elite capture. Other obstacles, as discussed above, are 
increasing pressures on community radio including political influence and the growing need for 
community stations to compete for sources of revenue with commercial broadcasters.  
 
c. Citizen association and collective action  
 
Another key element of social accountability is citizen association and collective action. Nepal has 
a long history of collective action which serves as a strong foundation.  Over the past 25 years, 
Nepal has developed a vibrant practice of social mobilization for group-based action. However, the 
manner in which state-citizen relations have evolved in Nepal – including the period of conflict and 
autocratic rule post-1990 – has resulted in an emphasis on unilateral strategies of criticism and 
protest. There is much less history of citizens and civil society organizations engaging in 
constructive dialogue or “critical collaboration” with state actors.  
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d. Donor support for social accountability in Nepal 
 
While state building is a central objective both for multilaterals and bilateral donors, NGOs 
continue to receive large amounts of funds from international donors. Many donor initiatives 
support democratic governance (including elections) and citizen participation, but few of these go 
beyond advocacy to support specific mechanisms for strengthening relations of accountability 
between state and citizens. Most current initiatives have focused on awareness building and 
strengthening citizens’ voice (i.e. promoting the expression of citizen’s views, opinions and 
preferences) as opposed to actively promoting accountability (i.e. actions aimed at enhancing the 
transparency, responsiveness and answerability of the government and their exposure to sanctions). 
There has also been relatively less attention paid by donors to the “supply” side of the social 
accountability equation – enhancing the will and capacity of government actors to be responsive to 
citizen demands and building constructive state-citizen relations especially at the district and local 
levels.  
 
There have been some important initiatives by CSOs to directly help the government be more 
effective and accountable by engaging in policy dialogue, monitoring and evaluating government 
actions, and providing feedback and “constructive criticism”.  One example is the activities of 
FECOFUN in advocating for participatory forest management, securing and defending the rights of 
Community Forest User Groups and contributing to the development of forest sector policy.  
Among donor-supported social accountability initiatives in Nepal, it is probably the larger 
international NGOs - such as ActionAid, CARE Nepal and Save the Children - that have gone 
furthest in integrating social accountability tools into their work. These organizations have sought 
both to amplify citizen voice and to work with government agencies to respond in a responsible and 
transparent manner. Overall, public hearings appear to be the most widespread social accountability 
method used in Nepal, followed by public audits. There is, however, a high level of variation and 
inconsistency in the definition and use of such methods by donors and NGOs. Donors and NGOs 
tend to use their own tools and processes – each of which are defined and applied in different ways. 
Furthermore, while many donor agencies require social accountability practices in the projects they 
support, these are not always applied to their own activities nor to those of their partner 
organizations.  
 
VI. Analysis of Conditions for Social Accountability in PRAN’s Three Focal Areas 
 
a. Public financial management   
 
The 2009-2011 Nepal Interim Strategy of the World Bank notes a number of weaknesses in the 
field of public financial management (PFM) in Nepal. Key issues include the lack of effectiveness 
of both internal and external audits and the need to accelerate the adoption of internationally 
accepted accounting and auditing standards. Identified shortcomings with regard to the budget 
process include: the absence of sectoral targets and indicators; a disconnect between budget 
allocations and sectoral priorities, and; weak monitoring and evaluation. At the national level, the 
absence of an Auditor General for almost four years  (due to the inability of political parties to 
agree on a candidate) has affected already weak oversight mechanisms. Lack of public access to 
information about national and local-level government accounts and contracts further reduces the 
potential for external scrutiny and audit. Overall, public demand for information on public finances 
is weak, linked to a lack of “budget literacy” on the part of citizens and limited expertise on 
financial and budgetary analysis among CSOs.  
 
At the local level, effective PFM is constrained by the government’s failure to operationalize fiscal 
decentralization policy. Additional PFM challenges at the local level include: lack of transparency; 
excessive involvement of political parties in the selection and implementation of projects, and; a 
general lack of capacity to manage PFM protocols. Local bodies lack proper procurement plans, 
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manuals and trained procurement officers. Structural weaknesses are exacerbated by transitional 
political instabilities - for example, the absence of elected local authorities and the appointment of 
local bureaucrats assisted by the All Party Mechanism (APM), has rendered ineffective existing 
accountability mechanisms at the local level.  
 
At the community level, much more emphasis has been given to participatory planning than to 
participatory budget monitoring and oversight. Obstacles to such initiatives stem from the general 
reluctance of state actors to divulge financial information, the consequent basic lack of knowledge 
of government budgetary allocations, the absence of demand for such information and the low 
capacity of organizations to analyze budgets and accounts. 
 
b. Municipal governance 
Participatory governance at the local level is circumscribed by the unfinished process of 
decentralization. Consequently, the governance of municipalities, as with other local bodies, is 
complicated by the dominance of central bodies and their line agencies, as well as overall financial 
dependence on central transfers.  The institutional framework for urban planning and management 
is unclear and complex. Although the Local Self-Governance Act empowers municipalities to 
prepare their own plans and programs, in practice a multitude of other actors intervene. The 
Ministry of Local Development, as the central oversight ministry for local bodies, has long been 
critiqued for its weak capacity.  
Presently, in the absence of local elected bodies, all executive and decision-making responsibilities 
are in the hands of the centrally appointed Executive Officer, assisted by the APM in an advisory 
role.  Research has found that, in general, the APM plays a powerful and interventionist role at the 
municipal level, and that neither the Executive Officer nor the unelected members of the APM are 
accountable to citizens. There is a widespread perception of lack of accountability in the current 
municipality arrangements, with little recourse for citizens. As a result of the interim governing 
arrangements, current political instability and lack of information, mechanisms intended to promote 
transparency and citizen participation (such as government websites, suggestion boxes, citizen 
charters and public audits) have had little impact. 
 
Despite current weaknesses and challenges, the fact that CSOs and municipal authorities continue 
to engage with each other in various capacities, including in the context of compulsory participatory 
planning processes, represents an important opportunity. Notwithstanding problems of limited 
capacity and politicization, the roles that User Groups and Tole Lane Organizations (TLOs) play in 
promoting citizen participation and social accountability are particularly important.  
 
c. Community-based monitoring and evaluation of public services   
Established provisions for decentralization and participatory development planning provide an 
important opportunity for citizen engagement in decision-making and enhanced social 
accountability at local level. The implementation of the Local Self-Governance Act was initiated in 
2001 with decentralization of certain public services, including basic health care, primary education 
and agricultural extension. In practice, however, the central government has not yet handed over 
sector line agencies to DDCs and it retains strong control over the decentralized sectors. In addition, 
the absence of elected local authorities, the “upwards” accountability of government staff to their 
line agencies and the lack of “downwards” accountability mechanisms are current obstacles to 
meaningful participatory governance. 
While local bodies and public service providers are legally required to implement a range of social 
accountability practices (such as citizen charters, social audits and public hearings), very often these 
mechanisms are not effectively applied in practice. The failure to effectively implement these 
practices is linked to a number of factors including: lack of understanding on the part of public 
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officials and bureaucrats of the purpose and utility of these mechanisms; limited technical 
knowledge, capacity and skills to implement them; lack of clear guidelines; inadequate 
training/technical support, and; lack of dedicated resources. The current lack of incentives, rewards 
and enforcement mechanisms also serve to diminish both the will and capacity of authorities to 
implement these processes. 
 
There are, however, successful examples of CSOs facilitating community-based monitoring and 
evaluation of public services and working directly with local authorities to reinforce and 
complement the implementation of existing governmental mechanisms (such as the participatory 
planning process, citizen charters and public audit requirements). Such initiatives have achieved 
important results and have succeeded in simultaneously: enhancing social accountability, improving 
public service delivery, empowering citizens and strengthening citizen-state relations.  
 
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
At this current critical juncture in Nepal’s political development, there is both clear opportunity and 
urgent need for enhanced citizen empowerment and social accountability. Although the Nepali state 
has historically been exclusionary and unaccountable and even though the country still faces 
enormous governance challenges linked to recent conflict, ongoing political instability, 
underdevelopment, insecurity and corruption, the current transition towards peace and democracy 
offers great opportunity for positive change. Paradoxically, the current lack of accountability and 
high levels of dissatisfaction and frustration among citizens offer important entry points for social 
accountability initiatives.  
 
Recommendations include: 
 
1)  Take practical steps to enhance citizens’ demand for and access to relevant public information.  
a) At local level, give priority to ensuring that access to information directly relevant to 
citizens’ immediate well-being is enhanced.  This includes, for example, making publicly 
available information on local-level planning, budgets and expenditures, as well as details 
on decentralized services (including entitlements and fees). 
b) At both national and local levels, conduct campaigns to raise awareness of information 
rights, and educate citizens about how and where to access public information.  
c) Undertake similar information campaigns to educate government officials, bureaucrats and 
NGOs about their obligations and responsibilities under the Right to Information Act.   
d) Support joint learning and skills-building events for key actors (such as the National 
Information Commission, public information officers, the media, research organizations, 
NGOs and CSOs) in order to enhance both “supply” and “demand-side” capacity for public 
information dissemination while, at the same time, strengthening working relationships 
between these different actors.  
e) In collaboration with these same actors, support the identification and introduction of (both 
formal and informal) incentives and sanctions to promote enhanced transparency and public 
information sharing.  
2) Develop the capacities of CSOs, at all levels, to empower citizens, facilitate more productive 
citizen-state relationships and promote social accountability approaches. 
a) At the local level, train and support CBOs and CSOs to help ordinary citizens to: advocate 
on their own behalf, apply social accountability approaches and tools at the community 
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level, and establish working relationships with local bodies in order to help the state to 
become more effective and accountable.  Pay special attention to enhancing the capacity of 
civil society organizations to function as facilitators between citizens and government 
authorities, to nurture emerging community leaders to become drivers of change for state-
citizen relations and to empower excluded groups.  
b) At the national level, enhance the capacity of CSOs to understand public/government 
issues, undertake independent research and analysis, and implement social accountability 
approaches that are people-centered, evidence-based and solution-oriented.  
c) Encourage and support collaboration and alliance building among different types of CSOs 
(e.g. community groups, advocacy NGOs, research organizations and media) for social 
accountability purposes. Place special emphasis on those organizations and networks that 
have the capacity to establish linkages between local and national level actors and reach out 
to marginalized groups.  
d) Invest in enhanced budget literacy among ordinary citizens and CSOs and support skills 
building for budget analysis, advocacy and tracking at local and national levels.  
3) Encourage and support CSOs and donor organizations, to become models of social 
accountability. 
a) In order for CSOs to play an effective role in holding the government accountable, they 
must themselves become transparent, accountable and legitimate actors. Support expanded 
efforts by the CSO community to enhance transparency and accountability across the 
sector. Encourage CSOs to systematically make their financial information publicly 
available and to standardize the use of social accountability tools such as social audits. All 
donors should encourage and require transparent reporting procedures and make readily 
available in various formats (not just websites) the funds they give to their CSO partners.  
 
b) Encourage and offer support and technical assistance to CSOs to enhance their internal 
democratic governance, participatory decision-making and “downwards reporting” to their 
members, targeted beneficiaries and the public at large. 
 
c) Encourage and assist donor organizations to set an example by applying social 
accountability principles and practices in the context of their own operations. 
4) Work with civil society and state actors to expand and enhance existing government-mandated 
social accountability requirements and practices. 
a) Work together to develop common definitions, standards and guidelines for social 
accountability practices already mandated by the state (such as participatory planning 
processes, citizen charters, public audits and social audits).  
b) Organize campaigns to ensure that relevant state actors at local and national level, and the 
public at large, are aware of their rights and responsibilities with regard to these practices 
and understand their purpose and expected outcomes.  
c) Document and disseminate examples of successful social accountability initiatives, in order 
to build confidence and demonstrate the benefits of such approaches.  
d) Advocate for the provision of adequate resources, training, technical assistance and follow-
up to ensure that mandated social accountability practices are implemented in a meaningful 
and effective manner. 
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The Political Economy of Social Accountability in Nepal 
 
By Seira Tamang and Carmen Malena 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
1. The World Bank has introduced a three-year Program for Accountability in Nepal 
(PRAN) in Nepal. The program will support capacity development of civil society 
and government actors and the development and piloting of innovative tools of 
social accountability
2
. Particular emphasis will be placed on three priority thematic 
areas: public financial management, municipal governance and community-based 
monitoring and evaluation of basic public services. 
 
2. It has now become widely accepted that politics and the political economy
3
 
influence the attitudes and behaviors of state and non-state actors and whether and 
how reforms happen, impacting development interventions in intended and 
unintended ways. This political economy paper seeks to identify the strengths and 
opportunities as well as risks and obstacles for social accountability initiatives in 
Nepal.  It also includes recommendations for managing and addressing these issues. 
a) Research Methodology 
3. The research methodology utilized for this study was three-fold.  First, a literature 
review was undertaken including in-country laws, policies and regulations, as well 
as a range of studies and articles on issues of relevance to social accountability in 
Nepal.  A bibliography of these materials is attached as Annex I. Second, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with key civil society leaders, NGO staff, 
journalists, academics, government officials and citizens. A list of people 
interviewed and guiding questions are attached as Annex 2.  Third, the research 
team made field visits to the eastern and western regions of the country to observe 
social accountability initiatives and interview local stakeholders. In total 75 people 
were interviewed, including 12 civil society leaders. Focus group discussions with 
citizens were also conducted in Ilam, Dhankuta, Itahari and Palpa.  
 
 
                                                     
2
 Social accountability refers to the broad range of actions and mechanisms (beyond voting) that citizens can use 
to hold the state to account, as well as actions on the part of government, civil society, media and other societal 
actors that promote or facilitate these efforts.   
3
 Political economy refers to interdisciplinary studies that draw upon economics, law, political science and 
social studies in explaining how political institutions, the political environment, the economic system and 
society, influence each other. 
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b) Overview 
4. The first section of the paper provides a brief historical overview of political development 
in Nepal, and highlights how these historical legacies influence current day citizen-state 
relations and accountability relationships.  Section two analyzes the legislative and 
institutional framework for social accountability in Nepal. It concludes that while an 
enabling legal and policy framework does exist in Nepal, non-observance of laws and non-
implementation of policies remains a key obstacle.  The third section of the paper analyzes 
a range of contextual factors influencing social accountability in Nepal.  These include the 
effects of recent conflict, political transformation, governance issues, socio-cultural factors, 
the nature and history of relationships between citizens and the state, and the specific 
characteristics of Nepali civil society and the media.  Section four identifies citizen 
information, citizen voice and collective action as three key elements of social 
accountability in Nepal, and discusses current strengths and weaknesses with regard to each 
of them. This section also includes an overview of donor support to social accountability in 
Nepal. Section five of the paper looks at each one of the PRAN’s three focal areas  - public 
financial management, municipal governance and community-based monitoring and 
evaluation of public services – in each case, discussing opportunities and challenges and 
providing examples of current social accountability initiatives. Finally, section six of the 
paper outlines conclusions and recommendations for promoting social accountability in 
Nepal. 
 
SECTION I - HISTORICAL LEGACIES 
5. The Nepali state has historically been exclusionary and unaccountable. Until 1990, 
Nepal was ruled by Hindu, high-caste, autocratic rulers in the form of Rana rulers (up until 
1950) and then Shah kings during what is known as the Panchayat period (1960 to 1990).   
The Panchayat period is important in that it was during this time that a nation-building 
process was started in which the triumvirate of Hinduism, the monarchy and the Nepali 
language were central.   While officially defunct, a 1854 Country Code which ranked all 
inhabitants – including Dalits and non-Hindu indigenous groups (now self-identified as 
Adivasi Janajatis
4
) – into a caste system, served to structure social, political and economic 
relations.  In addition to caste discrimination faced by Dalits, homogenizing Panchayat 
nationalism saw the repression of the linguistic, cultural and religious diversity of Janajatis.  
For women in an officially defined Hindu nation-state, unequal gender relations had 
multiple consequences.  Constitutionally and legally mandated inequality impacted all 
spheres of women’s lives, including opportunities, decision making and access to, and 
control over, resources.  Furthermore, as the Panchayat construction of “the Nepali” was 
centered on the hills, this had several exclusionary consequences for the Madhesi 
population living in the south eastern part of the Tarai. With language, customs and 
cultures similar to that of north India, despite having a long history of origin and habitat 
within Nepal, the Madheshi community was viewed by the state as not being “real 
Nepalis,” if not “Indian.”  Consequently, for the historically marginalized, the Nepali state 
                                                     
4
  For ease of reference, in the rest of the paper Adivasi Janajatis will be referred to as Janajatis.    
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has either been seen as predatory, or a distant governing institute for the elites.  (Lawoti 
2007) 
 
6. Following the first Peoples’ Movement and the formal introduction of multi-party 
democracy in 1990, formerly banned and underground political parties leaders emerged to 
take control of state power with the monarchy sidelined.  However, just as the new 
democratic institutions were being put into place, they began to be actively weakened 
by emerging political party dynamics.  Starting with the first post-1990 elected Nepali 
Congress (NC) led government, parties sought to expand their influence through the 
distribution of patronage. Party members tended to see power, position, and privileges as 
their right given the struggles and sacrifices of the past (Hachhethu 2008: 155).  Increasing 
election costs and unstable governments - from 1990 to 2002 there were twelve 
governments - resulted in parties in power accelerating accumulation, less certain of their 
tenure in government.  In all, the first decade of multi-party democracy was marked by 
high levels of corruption and weakened formal control institutions. This impacted the 
credibility of rule of law and the regulatory functions of the state.   
7. The failure of the new Constitution and the governments of the 1990s to bring 
development, good governance and remedy structured inequalities, including regional 
economic disparities, provided fertile ground for the “People’s Movement” started by 
Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist (CPN-Maoist)5 in 1996. The inability of political 
parties to initially garner public support for its rallies against the king’s takeover of power 
in 2002 and more overt coup in 2005, was indicative of the loss of faith in political parties 
by citizens.   It was only after the signing of the November 2005 agreement with the CPN-
Maoist in Delhi that general citizens, hitherto only attending civil society rallies in large 
numbers, came to the streets at the call of political parties. This resulted in the April 2006 
Peoples’ Movement. 
8. Importantly, relations between citizens and the state in Nepal have also historically 
centered around the role of international donors and Nepal’s geo-political location.  
Since the fall of the Rana regime in 1950 and Nepal’s official “opening up” to the rest of 
the world, Nepal has been dependent on aid for its development.   From initial bilateral aid, 
especially during the Cold War period, to the multilateral aid of the later periods, many 
have argued that state accountability mechanisms are oriented to donors more than citizens 
(Panday 2000; Mahat 2005).   In the context of a historical lack of relations of 
accountability with the state, there is a widespread public perception that Nepali state elites 
focus on accountability only to foreign donors.   
 
9. This brief history of political development has been presented to provide a context for the 
present challenges of accountability in Nepal.  While historical developments have not been 
linear, a number of current day issues and challenges can be traced to the country’s 
historical legacy. For example: 
   
                                                     
5
 Since early 2009 smaller parties have now combined with the CPN-Maoist to form the Unified CPN-
Maoist – UCPN-Maoist.  We have used both CPN-Maoist and UCPN-Maoist according to pre-and 
post unification periods. 
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 There remains a serious gap between the ruling elites and the population at large.  
The state is seen as distant if not predatory and historical grievances around inequalities 
and perceived wrongdoings have not been addressed.   
 Problems of social and economic inequality are compounded by impunity. 
Although official reports and public investigations commissioned by the Government 
of the day have found evidence of corruption and violence against Nepali citizens by 
senior leaders, there have been very few trials, and even fewer convictions.   
 
 The legacy of Panchayat nationalism continues to contour identities, economic and 
social relations and access to political space, even as historically excluded groups 
begin to find their voice and advocate for change.   
 
10. Taken together, these characteristics of Nepali political life have impacted the ability and 
capacity of the state to manage its resources in an efficient and responsible manner and to 
deliver quality services to the public.  It has also resulted in the undermining of the 
legitimacy of the state.   The oft-cited strengths of Nepal’s vibrant civil society, 
independent media and competitive, multi-party politics, have to date not been able to 
impact these larger dynamics.  The current challenge in Nepal is therefore to build on 
these important strengths while working to address the state’s systemic weaknesses in 
governance and accountability.  
  
SECTION II - LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEPAL 
11. The following section provides a brief overview of laws and policies in support of 
social accountability in Nepal. This includes an analysis of the current legal framework 
related to: public access to information, decentralization, citizen participation, 
accountability and anti-corruption. While an enabling legislative and institutional 
framework for social accountability does exist in Nepal, many of these laws and 
policies are not adhered to in practice. The numerous challenges related to 
operationalizing and enforcing existing laws and policies are discussed throughout the 
remainder of the paper.   
a. Access to Information 
12. At the most basic level, the 2007 Interim Constitution of Nepal has guaranteed 
Nepalis’ fundamental rights including the freedoms of opinion, expression, assembly 
and to form political parties, organizations and unions.  The Interim Constitution has 
specified anti-censoring stipulations in the Right regarding Publication, Broadcasting and 
Press. The Right to Information has been constitutionally guaranteed, as has been the Right 
to Religion and Right to Privacy.  Other relevant statutes and acts include: the Citizens’ 
Rights Act (1955); Press and Publication Act 1991; National Broadcast Act 1993; Working 
Journalists Acts 1995; The Press Council Act 1991; the Defamation Act 1959; National 
News Service Act 1962; Radio Act 1958 and the Gorkhapatra Corporation Act.
6
   
                                                     
6
  For important critiques of the manner in which the IC introduces caveats against the freedom to speech, in 
contradiction with international laws, see Freedom Forum and Article 19, February 17, 2007.  
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Protections for journalists exist via the 2007 Working Journalist Act and the Right to 
Information (RTI) Act.  Mandatory registration of the media (via the Company Act 2006 
and the Institution Registration 1977) ensures that information on the ownership of media 
houses is public.  Furthermore, legal access to information has been formulated by the 
Right to Information Act 2007, supported by a Regulation on the Right to Information 2009 
and the creation of a Nepal National Information Commission.   
 
13. Nepal’s constitutional and legal guarantees for the right to information are very 
progressive compared to the rest of South Asia and given Nepal’s short history of 
democracy. The 2007 Right to Information Act grants citizens broad access to public 
information.  While not made explicit under sui moto terminology,  proactive disclosure 
requirements also exist.  Public bodies must respect and protect the right of information of 
citizens and make public simple, accessible and updated information.  Time frames within 
which citizens must be given requested information – special instances exempted – are 
included, as are complaint mechanisms and clearly stated protection and other provisions 
for whistleblowers.   The Act also stipulates the establishment of the National Information 
Commission that gives further institutional backing to citizen’s rights to information.  
While the both the Act and Commission are relatively new and not yet fully 
operationalized, given the historically secretive nature of Nepali governments, these 
provisions provide a critically important opportunity for citizens to access information and 
work with the government to make it more accountable.    
14. The enabling environment created by the Right to Information Act is particularly 
important given the current overall lack of access to financial information.  The Open 
Budget Survey 2010 gave Nepal an overall score of 45 out of 100; indicating that the 
government provides some information to the public on the central government’s budget 
and financial activities but that there is considerable room for improvement.   The budget 
information made public is incomplete - for example, it does not include the year-end 
report, making it very difficult to assess what was budgeted compared to what was actually 
collected and spent.  Compared to the Open Budget Survey of 2008, which gave Nepal a 
rating of 43, there has been slight improvement. With regard to the effectiveness of 
oversight mechanisms, however, the 2010 report noted that the role of the legislature in 
providing oversight had weakened since the previous period, a reflection of the political 
tumult.  
b. Decentralization and Citizen Participation 
15. The Interim Constitution guarantees various levels of citizen participation.   Citizens 
aged 18 and above have the right to vote and all citizens have the right to form political 
parties.  For the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, parties were instructed to ensure the 
proportional representation of women, Janajatis, Dalits, Madhesis, people from backward 
regions and others in the Proportional Representation election list.  Furthermore, the 
Directive Principles of the Interim Constitution  (34:2) specifies that the state will “create 
opportunities for maximum participation of the people through self-governance, while 
maintaining a system where people can reap the benefits of democracy.”   
 
16. The preamble to the 2008 Good Governance Act 2008 stresses the need to make public 
administration “pro-people, accountable, transparent, inclusive and participatory” 
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and to transform “the administrative mechanism into a service delivery mechanism 
and facilitator”.  Strategies include the empowerment of women and promotion of gender 
justice and the upliftment of ethnic, Dalit and economically and socially backward classes.  
 
17. The participatory framework also importantly includes civil society and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).  The Interim Constitution guarantees the freedom 
of association and assembly
7
 and numerous government plans and statutes provide a 
legislative framework for the work of civil society and NGOs in local self-government as 
well as the broader development process.  These include the 1992 Social Welfare Act, the 
Ninth (1997-2002), Tenth  (2002-2007) and Interim (2007-2010) Plans as well as the 1998 
Local Self Governance Act and the 2008 Good Governance Act.  
 
18. The 2007 Interim Constitution is the first Nepali constitution to have a separate section for 
local government.
8
  Provisions for elected local bodies of self-governance are clearly 
stated “thereby ensuring maximum peoples’ participation in the country’s 
governance, to provide services to the people at the local level and for the institutional 
development of democracy” (139:1).  Article 140 emphasizes the sharing of 
accountability and resources between the centre and the local self-governing bodies “in an 
equitable and judicious” manner.  The 1999 Local Self-Governance Act and the 2000 Local 
Self-Governance Regulation specify the powers, responsibilities and structures of local 
bodies. These are backed by various policy initiatives, including the creation of the Local 
Bodies Fiscal Commission that is responsible for the fiscal aspects of decentralization.   
 
19. Beyond the Interim Constitution, the government’s Three Year Interim Plan (2007/08 
to 2009/10) specified decentralization as the main means for enhancing good 
governance, development, people’s participation and people’s empowerment.9 The 
focus was on strengthening the local self-governance system and ensuring specific, demand 
driven, results-oriented programs.  Chapter 8 of the Plan focused on women and 
marginalized groups and included objectives such as ensuring at least 33% representation 
of women in policy and decision-making processes at all levels; eliminating constraints to 
Dalit upliftment; increasing access of Janajatis, Madhesis and Muslims to administrative, 
social and economic resources and ensuring a disability-friendly environment.  The new 
2010/11 to 2012/13 Three Year Interim Plan continues emphasis on good governance, 
inclusion, and balanced and decentralized development planned around probable federal 
governance structures. Strategy 1 under Chapter 8 for decentralization, autonomous 
governance and local development is to  “Establish and operate autonomous, responsive 
and accountable local body [sic] by carrying out devolution of political and administrative 
                                                     
7
  The Interim Constitution 2007 has for the first time stated the right of Nepalis to organize labor unions.  
8
  There are two levels of local government with 75 District Development Committees (DDCs), in addition to 58 
Municipalities and 3915 Village Development Committees (VDCs) (also known as local bodies) at the 
grassroots level.  
 
9
 With decentralization as key to good governance, a Decentralization Implementation and Monitoring 
Committee has been set up under the chair of the Prime Minister and other high-level representatives.  A 
previous committee (under the Chair of the Ministry of Local Development) already prepared and started to 
implement in 2000 a Decentralization Implementation Plan. 
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rights to local bodies, on the basis of federal structure and in accordance to the principle of 
inclusive democracy.” 
 
c. Accountability and Anti-Corruption 
20. The Interim Constitution has specified the establishment of a number of institutions 
for public accountability and oversight. These include: the Commission for the 
Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), the Auditor General, Public Service 
Commission, Election Commission and the National Human Rights Commission.  Other 
institutions include the National Vigilance Center, a statutory body established in 2003 
under the Prime Minister’s Office to monitor asset declaration of officials and conduct 
audits of projects and operations for service delivery weaknesses.  A Special Court also 
exists, as a separate bench of the judiciary to deal with corruption cases.  The CIAA uses 
this court to prosecute corruption cases, but it also hears appeals against the rulings of the 
CIAA.  Within the Legislature-Constituent Assembly, the Finance Committee and, more 
importantly, the Public Accounts Committee provide oversight of public funds.    
 
Table 1: List of state anti-corruption agencies in Nepal 
 Anti-Corruption 
Agencies 
Type Major Focus 
1 Commission for the 
Investigation of Abuse of 
Authority (CIAA) 
Constitutional 
body 
Investigation and prosecution 
of cases of corruption and 
improper conduct 
2 National Vigilance 
Centre  
Prime 
Minister’s 
Office 
Awareness raising and 
corruption prevention 
3 Special Court Judiciary Adjudication of corruption 
cases 
4 Office of Attorney 
General 
Constitutional Public prosecutor 
5 Judicial Council Constitutional Combating corruption in 
judiciary 
6 Revenue Investigation 
Department 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Detection of revenue leakage 
7 Independent Review 
Committee 
Committee 
under Public 
Procurement 
Act 
Corruption related to public 
procurement over Rs. 30 
million. 
8 Central Arrear Collection 
Office 
Financial 
Comptroller/M
Collection of government dues 
and arrears 
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 Anti-Corruption 
Agencies 
Type Major Focus 
inistry of 
Finance 
9 Parliamentary 
Committees including 
Public Accounts 
Committee and State 
Affairs Committee 
Parliament Parliament oversight agencies 
1
0 
Office of Auditor 
General 
Constitutional Auditing of books of accounts 
1
1 
Offices of Regional 
Administrators (5 
offices) and Chief 
District Officers (75) 
Ministry of 
Home 
Handling regional and district-
level corruption cases 
remaining within the 
authorities delegated by CIAA 
1
2 
Office of Financial 
Comptroller  
Ministry of 
Finance 
Government budgetary control  
Source:  Dhakal and Nirola 2008: 1 
 
21. The legal framework on accountability and anti-corruption centers on the 2002 Corruption 
Control Act, which criminalizes corruption, bribery, extortion
10
 and fraud, and the 2008 
Good Governance Act, which stresses the need to be corruption-free. The 2008 Strategy 
and Action Plan Against Corruption is the most recent anti-corruption initiative. It 
includes important goals such as reforming existing laws on corruption and supporting 
capacity building and public awareness strategies.   
22. Specific regulations relating to Public Financial Management (PFM) include: the 2007 
Public Procurement Act and Public Procurement Regulations (under which the Public 
Procurement Monitoring Office was established under the direct supervision of the PM); 
the 2007 Banking Offence Act, the 2008 Anti-Money Laundering Act, and the 1993 
Revenue Leakage (Investigating and Control) Act.
11
 While the Corruption Control Act 
includes a provision (section 56) that appears to provide for the  protection of whistle-
blowers, the 2010 Global Integrity Report argues that no specific provisions actual exist in 
the Act and that the section is “largely confined to breaches of secrecy, and is basically 
meant for discouraging false reporting rather than encouraging accurate 
                                                     
10
  The actual term extortion is not used; the clause reads “punishment for exerting illegal pressures” (2:18).  
According to the 2010 Global Integrity Report for Nepal, prosecutions are currently under the Public Offense 
Act.   
11
 Other relevant acts include: the 2008 Customs Acts, the 2002 Excise Duty Act, the 1966 Value Added Tax 
Act and the 1963 Foreign Exchange Regulating Act. 
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disclosure.”However, the Right to Information Act Section 29: 4, 5 offers protection and 
compensation for any recriminatory action that may take place for whistleblowers.  
Furthermore, a permanent Gender Responsive Budgeting Committee has been 
established within the Ministry of Finance to undertake gender audits regarding budget 
allocations above 50 million rupees in select pilot ministries (Sharpe et al 2009: 3-4) 
23. Political parties and their finances are regulated by the Interim Constitution and five 
other acts, including the 2002 Act Related to Political Parties.  In terms of institutions, 
the Interim Constitution has delegated the Election Commission to register, regularize and 
monitor the activities of political parties as well as to ensure free and fair elections.  The 
Act Related to Political Parties requires parties to report all forms of income and sanctions 
exist for non-conformity.  Political parties must also conform to the 2007 Political Party 
Registration Rules in order to be registered with the Election Commission.  The rules 
include: adherence with the democratic provisions outlined in the Interim Constitution; 
provisions in the party statute for the election of office bearers at all levels at least every 
five years; the inclusion of women, Dalit and deprived and oppressed people in executive 
committees and provisions in the party statute for the discipline of members. 
 
24. Oversight and accountability mechanisms for civil society organizations (CSOs) and 
NGOs also exist. All NGOs and INGOs must register with the Social Welfare Council 
(SWC) in order to receive funds and/or technical expertise from the Government of Nepal 
or foreign donors.  The SWC requires that all registered NGOs undertake annual audits. 
Furthermore, NGOs are registered under the Institution Registration Act of 1977, and must 
also submit their audit reports to the District Administration Office (DAO).  Subject to 
DAO monitoring, annual financial disclosures are necessary in order to renew their 
registration.  The Chief District Officer is authorized to delegate officers to inspect NGOs 
and legal actions against financial misappropriation and abuse of authority can be initiated 
under the Institution Registration Act.    
 
25. There are, importantly, various ministerial level guidelines on the implementation of 
social accountability mechanisms including: citizens’ charters, social audits, public 
audits and public hearings.  The Policy and Program of the Nepal Government 2006/7 
made public auditing mandatory in public works carried out by communities and stated that 
public hearings and citizen charters would be made more effective. The three-year Interim 
Plan 2007/8 – 2009/10 and policies stated that citizen charters and public hearings would 
be extended to other NGOs, the private sector and consumer goods involved in public 
services.  The Local Authority Financial Administration Regulation 2007 states that that 
public audits should be carried out in all types of programs conducted by local authorities 
after the completion of the project and before final clearance.  It also stipulates that local 
authorities conduct social audits of all their programs, and that these be completed within 
four months of the completion of the fiscal year.  The Good Governance Act 2008 requires 
that citizens’ charters be put in every office (with stipulations on the information to be 
provided); the holding of public hearings with local stakeholders, civil society and local 
body officials and the placement of complaint boxes.  The Strategy and Action Plan 
Against Corruption 2008 has, among other things, provisions for citizen charters and 
monthly public hearings to be held by service providers for public complaints.  It also 
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suggests legal provisions for the monitoring of construction works by local consumers or 
residents.   The Ministry of Education regulatory framework provides for social audits and 
has a separate committee chaired by the Director of Administration and Physical Service 
Division to oversee social and financial audits of schools.  The Ministry of Health and 
Population has included social audits in its 2007 Policy on quality of health care services.  
The Ministry of Local Development has directives for social and public audits and citizen 
charters as well as a manual on public hearings, review and auditing. All local bodies have 
to keep public boards with prescribed minimum information at project sites with cost 
estimates.  The Minimum Conditions and Performance Measure which measures the 
performance of local bodies includes indicators for the regular conducting of public 
hearings and social audits and the provision of a citizen charter.   Importantly, the MLD has 
recently finalized an implementation strategy for accountability procedures covering public 
audits, social audits and public hearings (GoN/MLD 2067vs). 
 
26. Of course, having the relevant laws, rules, and regulations in place, does not 
guarantee that they are observed or implemented. The current discrepancy between 
legal provisions and actual practice, as evidenced for example in the 2010 Nepal Global 
Integrity Report, is discussed in the following section. While implementation practices 
vary greatly, the existence of these various constitutional and legal provisions 
nevertheless provide an enabling regulatory framework for social accountability in 
Nepal. 
 
 
SECTION III – CONTEXTUAL FACTORS INFLUENCING SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEPAL 
 
27. Civic engagement and social accountability in Nepal are framed and influenced by a 
number of underlying contextual factors.  These include the effects of the recent 
conflict, political transformation, governance issues, the nature and history of 
relationships between citizens and the state, the specific characteristics of Nepali civil 
society and the media. The following is an overview of each of these factors as they relate 
to the themes of civic engagement and social accountability. It is important to note that 
Nepal is in a very fluid political, economic and social situation, and as such these factors 
are also in a state of flux.  
 
a. Post-conflict Context 
 
28. The fragile and uncertain nature of Nepal’s peace process has made more difficult the 
challenges of re-building the country’s economy, physical infrastructure and political 
institutions. There has been a move away from political consensus to confrontation among 
the main signatories to the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement following the 
unforeseen level of success of the CPN-Maoist and the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum in 
the Constituent Assembly elections of April 2008.  After the resignation of the UCPN-
Maoist Prime Minister Pushpa Kamlal Dahal and his successor, Communist Party of Nepal 
– United-Marxist-Leninist Leader (CPN-UML) Madhav Kumar Nepal in June, 2010, the 
country faced over seven months without a new Prime Minister until the February 2011 
election of CPN-UML leader Jhalanath Khanal. With little investment in trust-building 
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mechanisms and a climate of confrontational politics, the formation of a new 
government has been difficult.  
 
29. The prolonged political deadlock is tied to lack of progress in implementing the 
broader peace process. Limited progress has been made in key issues of integration of the 
armed forces, security sector reform and the return of land seized during the conflict. Peace 
support institutions specified in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, such as the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission and the High Level Commission on Disappearances, which 
would help reconciliation and rebuild social trust as well as bring justice to victims, have 
yet to be established.  Apart from the general lack of consensus, political parties have 
shown little interest in dealing with past crimes; there has not been a single prosecution for 
abuses in the civilian courts.  Neither the recommendations of the Malik Commission of 
1990 (formed to investigate excesses of the Panchayat regime), nor the recommendations of 
the Rayamajhi Commission (established to investigate human rights violations during the 
April 2006 movement) have been implemented.  
30. The failure of the CA to complete the constitution writing process by the initial deadline (of 
May 2010) has led to a further decrease in faith in the political leadership (Dixit 2010).  
While the CA has been extended for another year (until May 2011), key issues such as the 
naming and numbering of boundaries and provinces, structure of government and the forms 
of election to central and provincial institutions remain unresolved (Martin Chautari 2010).  
Much has been made of the “betrayal” by political leaders of the “People’s Mandate” of the 
April 2006 democracy movement. (Republica 2010) 
31. The rise of identity politics, especially following the Madhes Movement of 2007, has 
further complicated the rebuilding of social cohesion and trust following the conflict. 
The new forms of identity politics see a hardening of previously more flexible identities. 
While the impact of such politics varies considerably across the country, it is generally 
recognized as being more prevalent in the Central Eastern Tarai and Eastern hill regions.   
 
32. Overall, the lack of political leadership at the center has resulted in weak governance 
and low government capacity on the ground.  The focus on “consensus” in the post-
conflict period has shifted power from the elected CA to the leaders of the main political 
parties.  The limited progress on forming a new government, writing the Constitution, and 
advancing the overall peace process is widely seen as a result of “politics as usual” – the 
struggle over control of the government by unaccountable party leaders – at the expense of 
the needs and demands of citizens.    
33. A key risk during this period is that the Constitution will not be written by the 28 May 
2011 deadline, turning a potentially progressive historical moment into one of deep 
fracture.  The current political stalemate is linked to the high political stakes of contouring 
the Constitution and heading government and key ministries when the extended mandate of 
the CA expires.  Even if another extension to the CA is agreed upon, which analysts have 
pointed to as a possibility (Jha 2011), increased frustration among citizens in general and 
marginalized communities in particular, will pose risks to political stability     
34. However, the International Crisis Group (ICG) September 2010 report states that neither 
the army nor UCPN-Maoist are likely to go back to war easily and the desire for peace and 
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stability is strong in the general public (ICG 2010). It is clear, however, that delays in the 
formation of a new government will impact political and legislative initiatives and 
implementation efforts.  An important challenge in planning for accountability initiatives at 
various levels is the overall lack of clarity on the forms of state to come, and more 
specifically, the fact that the current drafts do not envisage districts.  To add to this, the 
current draft of the Constitution contains many stipulations that appear to be more 
regressive than progressive.
 12
    
b. Political Transformation  
 
35. Multi-party democracy is quite new in Nepal.  Officially a multi-party democracy since 
1990, factoring in the former king Gyanendra’s takeover from 2002 to early 2006, this 
democracy has only really been functional for a total of 16 years, four of which have been 
in the post-2006 period of transition and flux. For fear of being too “political,” political 
party reform has not historically figured prominently in the landscape of donor funding.  
However, the problems of Nepal’s political transformation is clearly linked to the evolving 
nature of Nepal’s political parties.  
 
36. As with the UCPN-Maoist today, the two largest parties that dominated the first decade of 
democratic politics, the NC and the CPN-UML, were historically trained in anti-
establishment movements and operated in a highly centralized manner (Haccheteu 2002).  
This continues today; lower units of the parties continue to function to relay messages and 
party commands to the people, as opposed to articulating and championing their needs.  
Reflecting the hierarchal nature of Nepali society, the political parties are dominated by 
older, high caste men and are personality-driven. Excluded groups figure in lower echelons 
of power and political parties are not held accountable to implement the inclusive 
provisions in their manifestos (GSEA 2005: 31). The continuing predominance of the 
older generation in top positions of power limits the potential for change.  For 
example, the recently held Nepali Congress 12
th
 General Assembly saw the election of the 
older familiar faces into the central committee – with only five members under the age of 
40
13
 – an improvement however from the preceding committee that had no members under 
40 (Adhikari 2067 v.s).  The prolonged age of “youth” in political parties furthermore 
increases resistance to change: having waited and worked up the political hierarchy for 
years to reap the benefits of power, new leaders are unlikely to institute democratic reforms 
                                                     
12
  The drafts appear to have incorporated many of the problematic clauses of the IC and included other 
restrictions on such fundamental rights as free expression, assembly, and association with caveats that allow the 
government to define vaguely defined notions of threats to “harmony,” “the interest of the general public,” “law 
and order” “public purpose” etc. International law applicable to Nepal requires that any such restrictions be 
precisely prescribed for reasons accepted under international law and strictly and demonstrably necessary in a 
democratic society.  Further, the current drafts of “the local” appear weaker than the standing Local Self 
Governance Act stipulations and the “local” level of government appears as a clear subsidiary to the province, 
as opposed to a constitutionally mandated level of government in a federal system (Martin Chautari 2010).  
13
  Efforts to decrease the age of ‘youth’ in Nepal preceding International Youth Year 2010, were thwarted by 
the dominance of political parties representatives in the planning committee.  Despite efforts by non-party 
members of the committee, the age of youth in Nepal has been defined as up to 40 – a decrease from 45 – but 
still much broader than the UN definition that identifies youths as people from 15 to 24 years (Personal 
communication with a committee member, 23 September, 2010). 
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within the party that may hinder their new found power.   In all, the dependency of local 
leadership on the center cements and polices hierarchy and loyalty (Kumar 2008).  Backing 
from top leaders and the support from factions of the party - all of the major parties are 
divided into personality driven factions - are key to the political success of individuals.  
These intra-party dynamics, have had and continue to have, important consequences for 
inter-party and thus national level politics.
14
  Informal mechanisms continue to play 
prominent roles in the making of public policy. Political scientist Dr. Dhruba Kumar has 
long argued that backstage negotiations are more important than legislative debates in 
policy-making, with active political interests undermining and manipulating the role of the 
parliament (Kumar 2009). 
37. Further, patrimonial traditions and patron-client relations dominate all political 
institutions, a legacy of long feudal rule and the inability and unwillingness to 
institutionalize sources of power.  From the first post-1990 government, inter-personal 
relations between ministers and party leaders were largely dominated by a tendency of the 
party leaders to insist on using government resources for their personal and political 
interests and more so in the distribution of patronage, i.e. for appointments, transfers, and 
promotions, and for granting thekka (contracts) to persons they wished to favor (Hachhethu 
2008: 155). This became a deliberate strategy. The CPN-UML tried to institutionalize the 
government’s patronage distribution functions; it had formed a State Affairs Department 
within the party at both central and district level  “to prepare a profile of civil servants and 
to control the appointment, transfer, and promotion in bureaucracy and corporations from 
the lowest to the highest posts” (Hachhethu 2008: 156).  The transitional period has seen 
the UCPN-Maoist seeking to “mainstream” into this political culture, attempting to achieve 
in the immediate post-conflict period what the other parties had had over a decade to do.  
For all political parties, the expansion of party building has been achieved through the 
distribution of patronage.  
38. The absence of elected officials at the local level and the consequent creation of the 
All-Party Mechanism (APM)
15
  to assist bureaucrats at the Village Development 
Committee (VDC), municipality and District Development Committee (DDC) level, 
has facilitated the spread of the patronage system.  At the local level, varying degrees of 
misappropriation of resources occurs with connivance: there is no functioning opposition 
party.  However, the politics of patronage has also increased conflict over resources at the 
local level.  VDC and DDC budgets, public contracts, humanitarian relief payments and 
local appointments (for example school management and forest user committees) have 
become central for patronage purposes.    
 
39. Current levels of political violence, insecurity, impunity are the result of competition 
over state and criminal resources which drive the patronage networks.   A network of 
                                                     
14
   For example, the dissolution of parliament in 2002 (which led to the then king’s covert coup in October 
2002) by then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba was inextricably linked to the factional politics within his 
own NC party.   The current political stalemate is also linked to the differences within the factions of the various 
political parties. 
15
  The APM is based on one party one representative of political parties as mentioned in the Interim 
Constitution, and other political parties who have obtained more than 10 percent of votes (either in proportional 
or first-past-the-post election of the CA election) at the district level (MLD/GON 2008: 8-9). 
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ties exists: armed groups and gangs responsible for extortion depend on politicians and 
police to operate under protection with near impunity; politicians need gangs for election 
and they in turn help protect gangs from the law; and increasing competition over local 
power and resources results in the expansion of ties to criminal elements and an increase in 
political violence (ICG 2010). Unsurprisingly, in Transparency International’s 2010 
Corruption Perceptions Index, Nepal’s ranks 146th out of 178 countries surveyed.   Slipping 
down three positions from the previous year, Nepal, as in the year before, is perceived as 
the most corrupt country in South Asia.  
 
40. The interim “post-conflict” period with the focus on “consensus” among the leaders of 
the major political parties and the absence of locally elected bodies, has allowed the 
political parties to capture much of the political space. For the reasons noted above, and 
due to the fact that elections (and thus increased need for resources) are to directly follow 
the promulgation of the new Constitution, the likelihood of ‘buy in’ from within the 
political parties for principles of financial transparency and downward accountability 
and general reform of political parties will be low.     
41. Problems of corruption and lack of accountability of political parties are explicitly 
acknowledged in the 2008 Strategy Action Plan against Corruption   The proposed 
provisions to make the financial activities of political parties transparent, including 
expanding oversight into “sister organizations” are positive.  The plan, however, is unclear 
on monitoring and sanctions; and the general failure of political actors to abide by existing 
policies and plan does not bode well for the implementation of the strategy.  The 2002 Act 
Related to Political Parties already requires parties to report all forms of income, but neither 
donor names nor amounts have ever been fully disclosed.  Annual income and expenditure 
statements and electoral expenditure reports are not sent by the parties to the Electoral 
Commission (Transparency International 2010).  Consequently, the government and the 
Election Commission remain unclear about sources of political party funding.  However, 
sanctions have never been applied and neither the existing laws nor the proposed Strategy 
Action Plan against Corruption have provisions obliging legislative candidates to report on 
the sources of income for election expenses.   
c. Governance issues 
 
42. Despite decades of international aid, Nepal remains one of the poorest countries in the 
world with a GDP per capita average of US$ 470 and adverse, but improving, social 
indicators (World Bank 2009).  The promotion of capable state structures and systems, 
accountable institutions as well as sustainable, inclusive and equitable economic growth 
continues to be challenging.  Building the new state in Nepal involves attending to the 
broader governance and anti-corruption agenda (World Bank 2009: 47).  
43. Global indicators on the status of governance in Nepal reveal several issues of 
concern.  In 2009, Nepal rated below the 50
th
 percentile in all six dimensions of the World 
Bank’s World Wide Governance indicators (i.e. political stability, the absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption). Lack 
of political stability was clearly reflected, as were declining rates of government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption as compared to 2004 
ratings.  Apart from an incremental improvement in political stability (from 3.4 to 5.2), 
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only voice and accountability showed improvement in the indictors – from 18.3 to 30.8.   
However this increase is relative to 2004 when the king had taken over power (behind 
appointed governments).  The current 30.8 is still below the 1998 figure of 42.3, although 
the increase is encouraging.  
44. According to the Global Integrity Report that assesses strengths and weakness of 
national level anti-corruption systems, in 2009 Nepal had an overall rating of “weak” 
(67/100). Notably, while the legal framework scored 84/100, actual implementation scored 
only 50/100, resulting in a “very large” implementation gap of 34.  The report stated that, 
"While many corruption-related legal reforms were adopted in 2007, their implementation 
has been stalled as the government's focus shifted to peace building, conflict resolution, 
social inclusion and elections."  While all such ratings are subject to methodological debate, 
they highlight clear concerns relating to governance and accountability in Nepal. A 
summary of the 2010 Global Integrity Report for Nepal is attached as Annex III. 
45. Legal frameworks and past and current policy initiatives stress commitments to 
decentralization for good governance and meaningful state-citizen interactions.  However, 
despite the attention garnered by the decentralization process, meaningful devolution 
of power and authority to local bodies has yet to occur.  Furthermore, no serious 
attempt has been made to implement real decentralization.    
Central ministries continue to play a major role in determining the type and level of 
public goods provided to citizens. The local authorities suffer from weak capacity, 
both in terms of human resources and systems. The local officials in most cases are not 
trained in local level service planning, resource allocation or revenue generation. The 
reluctance of the government to decentralize more roles to the local level has resulted 
in a weak demand for skills from local officials. The unclear assignment of functions 
and the consequent weaknesses in local accountability further dampens it. Revenue 
mobilization systems are weak and undeveloped. In most cases the potential remains 
untapped. The intergovernmental transfers due to their sporadic nature have created 
incentives for negotiated increases diminishing reliance on own source revenue. Due 
to such reasons, local government has yet to emerge as a major player in providing 
public goods to citizens in accordance with their preferences determined through an 
electoral mechanism (ADB 2009a: 20-21). 
 
46. In all of this, incentives for effective, accountable and responsive service delivery and 
for active citizen-state engagement are absent.  The MLD developed a concept paper on 
local development and self-governance in July 2007 that called for “awareness raising to 
transform state machinery to become more participatory, responsive, accountable, inclusive 
and transparent to serve the people,” and prioritized a “change in mindset/thinking through 
awareness raising campaigns and structural policy reform” and the development of a code 
of conduct for both political representatives and bureaucrats (MLD/GoN 2008: 13-14). 
 
47. Many analysts have highlighted that the politicization of the civil service, a non-
transparent evaluation system and rewards and punishment unlinked to performance, 
have resulted in little incentive to bring about behavior change.  Civil servants state that 
“…while at work if you take special care of the powerful clients, your performance in 
terms of quality of service, non-delivery of services and non-responsive behavior to the 
clients – common people  - does not matter, it is excused.  It will not meet any punitive 
action” (Tiwari 2009: 22).  A former civil servant has made clear that there are no 
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incentives for civil servants to shoulder additional responsibilities or take initiatives to start 
innovative ways of doing things (Shakya 2009: 45). Ultimately “no amount of efforts [and] 
reforms will improve the efficiency, competency and productivity of the civil service unless 
appointments, transfers and promotions are completely delinked with the practice of 
political patronage and are made entirely based on merit” (Shakya 2009: 45).16  A recent 
article on government bureaucracy in Nepal has highlighted the high-caste, male, Hindu 
composition of most of the bureaucracy and the over-representation (more than 95%) of 
bureaucrats whose parents were from agricultural backgrounds. It argued that this may 
mean that traditional norms and values are likely to be strong in the bureaucracy, with an 
emphasis on hierarchy, ascription, rank and status (Jamil and Dangal 2009: 198-199).  This 
does not easily lend itself to service-oriented values and norms.  
 
48. Beyond the structural problems highlighted above, the absence of local elected bodies 
have posed further challenges to making local level governance participatory and 
transparent.  Currently, in the absence of elected officials, government employees have 
been in charge, assisted by the APM at the district and village level.
17
  All executive 
authority granted to elected representatives by the 1999 Local Self-Governance Act are 
now invested in civil servants from the Ministry of Local Development (MLD). At the 
district level, the local development officer (LDO) holds office in lieu of the District 
Development Committee (DDC) chairperson; at the municipality level, it is the executive 
officer of the municipality who holds office in lieu of the mayor; and at the village level it 
is the VDC secretary who holds power in lieu of the VDC chairperson.   In this situation, 
neither the political parties, nor the civil servants directly appointed by the MLD need to 
hold themselves accountable to local citizens.
18
 While the arrangement has facilitated the 
continuation of some development and state functioning, the unaccountable nature of this 
governing arrangement has widely been seen by the public as unsatisfactory. For example, 
according to the head of the Mechi Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, there is mistrust towards the party coordination mechanism and “everyone was 
dissatisfied with their working style.”  In the words of the General Secretary of the 
Municipal Association of Nepal, citizens are “absolutely not happy.”  Interviewees stated 
that there was a clear felt difference between having and not having elected officials in the 
local governments. 
 
49. Governance problems in today’s context are further inextricably tied to issues of 
security.  Post-conflict restoration of security has been hampered by the lack of 
central political will and strategy to address the overall weak rule of law.  The ICG 
September 2010 notes the variations in levels and types of insecurity in different regions of 
                                                     
16
  In a positive step, the Nepal Portfolio Performance Review 2009 calls for the establishment of a Performance 
Incentive System for government staff.  
 
17
  As noted above, in many instances, the All Party Mechanism serves to distribute funds among the political 
parties themselves. 
18
  Relative to political parties, civil servants appear to be more accountable. For example, in a case in Bara in 
which large amounts of money were distributed to party organizations, the LDO was held responsible by the 
MLD and suspended, despite his protestations that he was unable to escape political party pressure.  Adhikari 
writes “[a]s there is currently no rule or law with which to take action against representatives of political parties, 
who serve formally in an advisory capacity, it was the civil servant who got the rap” (Adhikari 2010).  
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Nepal: for example, with violence by armed groups and mafia (including killings, 
abductions and extortions) more prevalent in the eastern and central Tarai, and the western 
Tarai and eastern hills more affected by disruptive ethnic activism, more frequent bandas 
and clashes over tenders and other resources.  The special security initiatives initiated by 
the state have had varying degrees of success, some of which has come at the cost of 
human rights violations in the form of extra-judicial killings. This is especially so in the 
Tarai (OHCHR 2010).   
 
50. The security situation is exacerbated by longstanding problems of political 
interference in the police
19
 and an under-resourced, poorly paid and demoralized 
police force. Combined with the current overt impunity of state officials (Carter Center 
2009), these factors serve to further undermine the rule of law.  
 
Current insecurity is structured by informal relations between political parties, 
security forces, armed groups, criminals and youth wings. The result is impunity. The 
close connection of violence with established political forces makes a short-term 
escalation of violence unlikely. But the institutionalization of the criminal-political 
nexus bears significant mid-term risks and makes the patterns that are being 
consolidated much harder to uproot (ICG 2010: 24). 
 
51. Security risks have directly impacted governance at the local level. Extortion cases and 
abductions have centered around local administrators in charge of government funds at the 
local level in the absence of elected officials (Carter Center Nepal 2009: 3).
20
  To recall, 
VDC Secretaries are government civil servants and serve as the local interface and primary 
contact between the state and the citizens of Nepal.  According to a late 2009 OCHA 
survey, only 42% of VDC Secretaries were present as required; a 9% decrease compared to 
early 2008. “An additional 25% of the Secretaries provide services from District 
Headquarters and 14% are only partially present. The number of vacant posts and absent 
Secretaries has more than doubled from 8% in 2008 to 19% in 2009. Many of these absent 
or vacant VDCs (91%) are receiving services from secretaries covering up to five VDCs.”   
While a Carter Center November 2009 report stated that the number of incidents has 
decreased due in part to increased security measures, there have been periodic increases.  
For example, mid-2010 saw the mass resignation of VDC secretaries from districts such as 
                                                     
19
  The recent recruitment into the Nepal Police was no exemption.  Newspaper reports quoted an official at the 
Nepal Police headquarters stated that there was pressure from Ministers, CA members, government secretaries 
and political parties to recruit their candidates (Himalayan Times 2010a).  An interview with an editor of a left-
leaning magazine revealed that ultimately 110 police were recruited from the home district of the  home minister 
while, overall, powerful leaders of the parties in government were able to get recruits from their home districts.   
20
  Newspaper reports make clear that VDC secretaries face extortion, harassment and threats from various 
armed and unarmed groups because they now make political and financial decisions.    
http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/news-archive/2-political/7851-vdc-secretaries-ask-govt-to-relieve-
them-from-duty-of-vdc-chair.html Accessed 12 October, 2010. 
31 
 
Dhading, Rautahat, Bhojpur, Udayapur, and Sunsari,
21
 citing security threats and pressures 
from various quarters.  Interviews with members of the VDC Secretaries Rights Protection 
Forum, Ilam, revealed similar reasons for the 15 day strike held by all VDC secretaries in 
Ilam - demands for large donations by underground groups and political parties, with 
accompanying death threats. Assurance of special security measures for VDC secretaries 
by the government in all these cases resulted in their return to work. However, media 
reports abound of VDC secretaries remaining in district headquarters and/or with cell 
phones always switched off.
22
   VDC secretaries have long asked for the burden of 
responsibilities to be taken from them, given the security risks involved
23
  – especially 
since these interim measures were initially conceptualized as short-term. 
24
   
52. The absence of these VDC secretaries and/or the need for one VDC secretary to cover 
numerous VDCs, has impacted the ability of citizens to access local government.  The 
consequent need to travel to district headquarters to get documentation and other work is an 
additional burden, especially given Nepal’s difficult terrain – accessing the district 
headquarters can take days of walking and entails economic costs (including days of work 
lost).   There are clear accountability issues as well; respondents noted that the need to 
cover more than one VDC meant that VDC secretaries had a ready-made excuse for not 
being present and/or not fulfilling duties.   The security issues also impact national 
planning, performance and accountability measures.  For example, according to an under 
secretary at the fiscal commission secretariat of MLD, Mahottari district was unable to 
undertake Minimum Conditions reporting for the last two fiscal years, and problems remain 
in some other eastern Tarai districts, because of the activities of the underground armed 
groups.       
53. There is a risk that the prolonged absence of elected representation may undermine 
the spirit of decentralized governance and give continuation to the patronage systems 
currently undermining participation and accountability.   A 2009 review of the Local 
                                                     
21
  A July 2010 newspaper report estimated that more than 1500 VDC secretaries from over 20 districts have 
resigned en masse following threats from an ethnic outfit Samyukta Jatiya Mukti Morcha (SJMM) in recent 
months.  Assurances from the state for added security as well as provisions for working outside the VDC 
resulted in the return to work.  Government to provide special security to VDC secretaries. 31 July 2010.  
http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/news-archive/19-general/7982-govt-to-provide-special-security-
to-vdc-secretaries.html 
 
 
22
  The run-up to the important Dasain holidays results in an increase in demands for “donations” and threats if 
they are not met.  An October 2010 newspaper report noted the executive officer of the Itahari municipality 
telling a journalist that he had been staying away from the office because of the donation demands (Bastola 
2010: 5).  
 
23
 VDC secretaries ask government to relieve them from duty of VDC chair. 26 July 2010. 
http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/news-archive/2-political/7851-vdc-secretaries-ask-govt-to-relieve-
them-from-duty-of-vdc-chair.html accessed 5 September 2010.  
 
24
  According to the CA drafts, “given that local governments are to be formed via the establishment of 
commissions by the provincial government within a year of its own formation, it may take up to five years to 
establish local governments. This is a result of the fact that first the federal government will have to be formed, 
the provincial governments will have to be elected (for which no timeline is given), then a commission will have 
to be formed after only which preparations for elections can take place” (Martin Chautari 2010: 9). 
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Governance and Community Development Project (LGCDP) noted that “without elected 
representatives, it may not be appropriate to sharpen focus on the capacity building of the 
local bodies to enable them to assume responsibilities of sectoral functions” (Meier et al 
2009: 23).  There are growing voices for the need to hold local elections as the only way to 
ensure proper local governance and accountability.
25
   Further, it is clear that the overall 
security situation in certain parts of the country continues to detrimentally affect 
governance institutions and poses significant obstacles for social accountability – especially 
as it applies to the role of the media (as discussed below) and civic engagement.  
d. Citizen-state Relations 
 
54. Nepal has a long history of feudalism and monarchy.  Although 1990 saw the re-
establishment of democracy, the neo-patrimonial relationships mentioned above have 
structured the manner in which citizens relate to the state precisely during the period when 
“citizens”, as opposed to “subjects” of the king, were to establish relations with the state.  
Media and public references to leaders of political parties as the “new little Gyanendras” 
(referencing the deposed king) highlight perceptions of the autocratic nature of the leaders 
and their distance from citizens. In the words of one focus group member in Dhankuta, 
relations between party members and citizens are “seasonal” – i.e. limited to election 
periods.  There is a widespread feeling among citizens of being “used” via elections by 
politicians in order to access the state, and then being ignored by what one civil society 
leader termed the new “feudals”.   
 
55. Citizen-state relations at the level of the bureaucracy are equally problematic. For 
example, the 1998 UNDP Nepal Human Development Report stated that “government 
offices, even in Kathmandu, are generally a nightmare except for those that profit from 
them” (UNDP 1998: 154).  Twelve years later, little appears to have changed despite the 
introduction of various social accountability mechanisms. A popular journalist and political 
analyst commented on the unnecessarily time-consuming and bureaucratic processes 
involved in getting simple papers even for someone as famous as himself.   The lengthy 
processes, lack of full information as to what is required, which office to go to, what person 
to contact etc. were seen as bureaucratic hassles by respondents.  As the journalist noted, 
“ordinary citizens wish they need not have work to do with bureaucrats”.  Research 
conducted in 2006 on citizens interacting with the bureaucracy noted that the highest 
number of respondents agreed with the statement “Citizens often try to use personal 
connections and other sources before approaching public organizations for service” 
followed by “Personal connections, bribery, and political influence are major sources for 
getting things done in public organizations” (Jamil and Dangal 2009: 207).  Respondents in 
a focus group discussion in Ilam stressed that while Citizen Charters were visible in many 
offices, work does not proceed accordingly. Comments included that “it is more effective to 
have the recommendation of a person or party in order to get work done” and that “access 
to government services is dependent on a person’s personal power or personal relations 
                                                     
25
  For example, the ex-Mayor of Tansen municipality objected to the “unlimited” authority given to civil 
servants at the municipality and the consequent lack of a “bridge” to hear the voices of citizens.  Stating that 
there is no transparency in the municipality, he stressed that “it is necessary that elected officials must run the 
offices related to citizens” and local elections must take place.   
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with the bureaucrats”.  Furthermore, national government offices – such as those in Singh 
Durbar – are seen as highly inaccessible.   One internationally and nationally renowned 
female social activist remarked that she had made a journalist’s pass in order to access 
those offices.  
 
56. Interviewees expressed the sense that the current bureaucracy has inherited the 
legacy of the previous feudal order. The deliberate withholding of information, 
unnecessary delays and inaction are seen as ways in which to “make ordinary citizens 
bow down” to the bureaucrats.26  It is then not surprising, as a Dalit activist succinctly 
stated that “ordinary citizens take civil servants more as rulers than servants”. A culture of 
hierarchy and deference to authority exists which makes citizens reluctant to question 
those in power. The impact of “tulo manche”27 culture in which the powerful are able to do 
what they want has, on its flip side, the reluctance of ordinary citizens to call state and other 
power holders to account.  In today’s political context, the alienation of citizens from 
state structures combines with the historical power relations between state officials 
and the general public, to contribute to a reluctance of citizens to engage with the 
state and a sense of increased helplessness and frustration. 
 
57. This post-conflict transitional period is one in which citizens feel further distanced 
from the state, with the term “cooling” of relations between the state and citizen used 
often by respondents. As one Janajati civil society leader put it, “Truthfully speaking, 
those in the state are walking in one direction and citizens are walking in another 
direction…The relationship between the state and citizens is disrupted; it is cold”. Much of 
this has been linked with what is seen as a misuse of the “People’s Mandate” of April 2006 
- state power-holders have followed either their own selfish interests, or the goals of the 
party or their own group, and not the interests of the public at large. A member of the 
Women’s Commission stated, “The distance between citizens and leaders have increased. 
Mistrust towards leaders has increased”. Others refer to an overall lack of felt state 
presence – in terms of rule of law, delivery of goods and services and the normal 
functioning of government.  A CA member stated that “there is a feeling that citizens have 
no access to goods and services…the relation of state to citizen is not good”. Apart from 
stressing that services were only for the well-connected, interviewees noted that the quality 
of services has decreased.  For example, a Madhesi civil society leader stated, “There is a 
feeling, especially in the Madhes, that the state is an mechanism for oppression and it is 
neither capable of ruling nor delivering services but its capacity for oppression remains 
intact”. 
58. It is unsurprising that this exclusion is especially felt by traditionally marginalized 
groups. A recent study on citizens’ trust in local government which took Lalitpur 
municipality as a case study revealed that Janajatis were significantly less likely (50% less) 
to trust the municipality than the non-Janajati population (Pande 2010: 46).   A member of 
the Women’s Commission expressed frustration, in both her personal and institutional 
capacity, with the lack of interactions between women and the state bureaucracy; “you can 
                                                     
26
  Again, this links to the earlier argument that members of the bureaucracy are likely to hold to norms of 
hierarchy, ascription, rank and status (Jamil and Dangal 2009: 198-199). 
27
  “Tulo Manche” means “big person” relating to the power and authority held by certain individuals.  
34 
 
say that they ignore us”.  If the bureaucracy is difficult to negotiate for ordinary citizens, 
issues of language for the citizens of the Madhes, where most bureaucrats are hill people, 
only serve to exacerbate the problem.  Furthermore, while the Madhe Andolan resulted in 
more Madhesi bureaucrats, a Madhesi civil society leader stated that their behavior was no 
different from the Hill bureaucrats – ordinary citizens are treated as subjects.   
 
59. Ironically, for excluded groups, the current alienation from the state is in one sense less 
problematic.  Janajatis and Madhesis have long viewed the centralized Nepali state as 
predatory.  For the Janajatis, the Hindu Nepali State has always existed to serve the Bahun 
and Chhetri elites who dominate the political parties.  In the words of a Madhesi analyst, 
the State has always been the pahadis (hill peoples); the neglect of the Madhes is ‘natural.”   
In the same vein he added that given that local VDC budgets never benefitted Madhesi  
citizens anyway, and now only served as sources of corruption and criminalization, these 
VDC budgets could actually be removed without causing hardship.   For the Madhesi civil 
society leader, state-citizen relations as a whole are structured on mistrust, especially so in 
the Madhes – “the state will do nothing for citizens, and nothing can be expected from the 
state”.  
  
60. The transition to the often quoted “new Nepal” offers a key opportunity for 
restructuring state-citizen relations.  This is especially evident among members of 
excluded groups who see their citizenship status as being more in transition, towards the 
gaining of more rights.   The current interim period is thus seen as a “historic juncture” by a 
Dalit activist in the re-negotiation between state and citizens.   In this sense, it is the 
socially marginalized and excluded who are key drivers for changing citizen-state relations.   
Further, social accountability tools are particularly important given current levels of 
mistrust of the state (especially by marginalized citizens) and emerging forms of identity 
politics. Social accountability tools can help reframe citizen-state relations in a more 
productive manner for both parties, as well as enable transparency and 
accountability.   
 
61. However, social accountability interventions must aim to both affirm the rights of 
citizens and, at the same time, strengthen the State’s capacity to respond to citizen 
demands.  A difficult transition period has been made more so with the Interim 
Parliament’s decision to amend the interim constitution to make Nepal “federal” without 
consultations.  This has meant that unlike other large state-restructuring issues, the topic 
has been excluded from debates from within the elected CA process. A rising backlash to 
issues of federalism is evident, resulting in a weak state facing pressure from all sides of the 
ideological spectrum.   The deteriorating public security issues of the interim period 
combine with the tremendous ideological challenges to the old conceptions of identity, 
order and worldview, and the entrance of the marginalized into the public sphere, to invoke 
widespread fears of anarchy.  What many excluded groups have seen as a period of 
transition to a more democratic order where voices are not repressed and new relations can 
be made, others have seen as a period of negative instability and excessive and anarchic 
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demands.  This has been predominantly expressed
28
 in the form of  calls to counterbalance 
“rights” with “duties”.29   
 
e. Civil Society  
 
62. Nepal has a long and rich experience of community level associational life (Bhattachan 
2000).  Different communities in Nepal have historically had organizations for various 
purposes. For example, the  Guthi (religious and social organization) among the Newars, 
the Dhikuti (rotating credit associations) among the Thakalis, Dhukuti or Dhikuti (self-help 
saving and credit bank) among Bahuns, Chhetris and Newars, the Rodi (socio-cultural 
associations) among the Gurungs, and the Bheja (social, economic and political 
organizations) among the Magars (Dahal et al 2001: 82).  These traditional associations still 
function to varying degrees.  Analyses in the 1980s noted the well-established tradition of 
small groups of users coming together to collectively undertake productive activities, 
common property management or public works development in Nepal (Bhattachan 2000: 
117). 
 
63. Importantly, the 1990 democratic freedoms enabled the rapid growth of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in Nepal, funded by international donors seeking 
to build “civil society”.  Initially focused on service delivery, NGOs – now predominantly 
identified and self-identifying as civil society organizations – have also turned to more 
political endeavors such as awareness-raising, public education and social mobilization. 
The exact number of NGOs in Nepal is not known. Approximately 30,000 NGOs are 
registered with the Social Welfare Council
30
 but it is not clear how many of these are 
active. The NGO Federation has over 5,000 member organizations
31
, but this represents 
only a sub-section of the sector.  
 
64. While the legal framework has not constrained the role of NGOs in undertaking social 
accountability work, changes are necessary. The 1977 Institution Registration Act, 
which empowers Chief District Officers to register, guide, direct, control and supervise 
associational groups, reflects the Panchayat concern with controlling non-governmental 
organizations. Although these legal provisions have not been enforced in a repressive 
manner, that potential remains while the clauses remain in the books.    Other issues related 
to the regulatory framework for NGOs include: vagueness of legal provisions; lack of SWC 
capacity to regulate the increased number of affiliated NGOs/INGOs and lack of clarity in 
                                                     
28
  This is evident in the general public and also among donors.  For example, a 2009 ADB governance risk 
assessment states that, “Finally there is an increasing adherence in Nepal to the rights-based approach to 
development and political space; while this is necessarily good, it also poses constraints if it is not tempered by 
application of responsibilities, which does not seem to be the case in Nepal at the present moment” (2009: 8).  
 
30
 The SWC website (updated in mid 2010) states that 30, 284 NGOs are registered with the SWC. See 
http://www.swc.org.np/SWC_NGOs_Total.pdf accessed 12 February 2011. According to a SWC officer 
interviewed on 18 February 2011, the current number of registered NGOs is 31,706. 
31
  According to the NGO Federation website, there are currently 5227 affiliated NGOs. 
http://www.ngofederation.org/  accessed 12 February 2011. 
36 
 
the division of responsibilities between the Ministry of Women, Children and Social 
Welfare and the SWC for regulating NGOs (Dhakal 2007:70). 
 
65. A key constraint to the ability of civil society organizations to seek government 
accountability is the fact that their credibility in the public eye has, over the years, 
become suspect. While still recognized as positive alternatives to the state (Tamang and 
Rademacher 1993; Acharya 1997), more negative images of NGO and civil society culture 
currently dominate. NGO culture in Nepal have been described as “dollar farming,”32 a 
“begging and cheating bowl,” “slave of the foreigners,” “preventing revolution” 
(Bhattachan 2001: 67) and “family entrepreneurial endeavors” (Chintan 2000: 135).  Apart 
from nepotism issues, many NGOs are undemocratically structured and hierarchical with 
the founders retaining centralized control especially over finances. Critics have noted the 
manner in which NGOs are not publicly accountable, transparent or subject to 
monitoring except to their donors (Mishra 2001: 5, 7).
33
  Much of the emphasis has been 
on the financial accountability of NGOs and their apparent lack of impact or “bang for 
buck.”  Indeed, interviewees noted that while getting information from the government was 
a challenge, obtaining information from NGOs and donors was even more difficult.  
According to the executive director of Transparency International, “compared to donors 
and NGOs, the state is a little more transparent.”   Furthermore, a director of a research 
center stated “the information that a NGO gives is selective, biased and only that which 
will bring it benefit. Go and ask the big NGOs of this country about their working styles, 
their resources, their relations with citizens, financial transparency, you will come back 
after a beating.”  While perhaps exaggerated, the quote highlights the dominant perception 
of the general inaccessibility of NGOs to the public and the issues that have served to 
increasingly delegitimize them.   
 
66. The fact that most NGOs tend to be politically aligned further constrains their 
credibility and legitimacy.
 34
  Importantly, this also applies to the NGO Federation, to 
which not all NGOs are affiliated for numerous reasons.  The perception that NGO agendas 
are driven by donors and are thus not autonomous further hampers their legitimacy.   State 
distrust of NGOs is evident as well, even though the state acknowledges NGOs as 
important development partners. The MLD’s Program Document on LGCDP notes that 
“NGOs simply cannot operate to national scale, and are also not subject to local 
accountability pressure” (MLD/GON 2008: 15).   
 
67. Of key importance in the current political climate is the elite nature of NGOs.  This 
includes not only their distance from “reality” and the “grassroots” but also the fact that 
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 NGOs are usually accused of “dollar farming” or “dollar kheti” – i.e. of being established solely for the 
purpose of receiving foreign funding and reaping financial benefit.  
33
  A recent editorial in an English daily highlighted public concern with the lack of transparency of NGOs by 
calling upon CNN person of the year 2010 Anuradha Koirala to now step up on making her NGO more 
transparent and accountable.  See Ms. Koirala, Congratulations.  The Republica 23 November 2010.  
http://myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=25480 accessed 24 November 2010.  
34
  It is generally acknowledged that the CPN-UML has the greatest influence in the NGO sector.  A recent 
article has stated that the party holds direct or indirect influence in over 70% of Nepali NGOs (Jha 2010). 
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most NGOs are led by high-caste, Hindu men.  The elite nature of those in power in NGOs 
has long been recognized by donors.  A 2002 European Union Conflict Prevention 
Assessment Mission report made the following assessment:  
 
The problem of politicisation, caste and ethnic inequality are the context of civil 
society activity. For donors, civil society is a very small group of English speaking 
elite operating in Kathmandu. There has been little attempt to reach out to the 
regional partners or capitals to plumb deeper into the social strata of Nepalese 
society, for partners or informants (Van Loocke and Philipson 2002: 21). 
 
68. In the current political climate, awareness of these dynamics is very important.  The fact 
that in the Madhes a clear distinction is made between Madhesi civil society and Pahadi 
civil society speaks to the attention given to identity and the consequent perceived 
legitimacy of civil society based on such factors.  In the same vein, the legitimacy of local 
“branches” of Kathmandu NGOs working in various regions has also been questioned.  
Beyond issues of elite capture, the tendency of donors to repeatedly seek out the same 
“good” and “reliable” (mostly Kathmandu-based) NGOs that can deliver quick project 
results, rather than making longer-term investments in the emergence and capacity 
development of more locally rooted CSOs, is also a concern.
35
 Important steps have been 
taken to remedy NGO weaknesses by emphasizing social inclusion and diversity in 
partnership guidelines and donor harmonization on financial monitoring standards 
and procedures for NGOs (Singh and Ingdal 2007).  However, the above mentioned 
problems remain, especially in the larger and more powerful NGOs.  
 
69. Independent research centers and think tanks are another important category of 
CSOs. In Nepal, the notion of “think tanks” and “policy institutes” is recent, indicative of 
the historical lack of interest of donors in funding such institutions. Some current research 
institutions, such as New Era and the Institute for Integrated Development Studies, 
undertake research on development issues, much of it directly commissioned by donors. 
More academically oriented research organizations do exist, such as the Nepal Center for 
Contemporary Studies and Martin Chautari.  A few organizations have explicitly defined 
themselves as policy institutes, such as the Nepal Institute for Policy Studies and the 
Institute for Policy Research and Development.  These groups seek to make a public impact 
by publishing reports and books and convening meetings between policy makers, 
academics, researchers, activists and political actors The extent to which such research and 
policy institutes actually succeed in impacting policy-making is unclear.  In a discussion on 
the role of policy think tanks in Nepal,
36
 both Meena Acharaya, head of the Tanka Prasad 
Memorial Foundation and Rajan Bhattarai,
37
 head of the Nepal Institute of Policy Studies 
admitted that it was their own personal ties and reputations that enable them to both access 
                                                     
35
  A recent report on citizens’ voice and accountability in Nepal also raised this issue. “One matter of concern is 
the extent to which donors coordinate their support to CSOs… in discussions with various donors and in 
consulting available databases, it was noticeable that the same names of CSOs kept recurring. And it seems that 
the donors do not have a mechanism for reviewing which CSOs are receiving assistance from whom, for what 
activities, and to what extent” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2008:44). 
36
  Discussion at Martin Chautari, 10 October 2010. 
37
  Bhattarai was  also the political advisor to former Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal.  
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and influence key policy makers.   This is indicative of the current lack of mechanisms for 
formal and regular exchanges, dialogue and negotiation between state and non-state actors.   
Policy dialogues tend to be one-off sessions and there is an overall a lack of systematic and 
regular monitoring and evaluating of government actions.  
 
70. Other civil society players in Nepal need to be situated in the larger dynamics of 
politicization.  For example, national trade unions (and their federations) are in 
practice, wings of the major political parties.  The Nepal Trade Union Congress is 
Nepali Congress; the General Federation of Nepalese Trade Unions is CPN-UML and the 
All Nepal Trade Union Federation (Revolutionary) is UCPN-Maoist.  Smaller parties also 
have their own trade unions (Dahal 2001).  Teachers’ and civil servant associations are also 
similarly divided.  Other important categories of CSOs, such as women’s groups, anti-
trafficking networks (Sherchan 1997) and the Political Science Association of Nepal
38
 
(Hachhethu 2004: 245) are also organized along partisan lines.  The widespread 
politicization of associational groups, serves to weaken their institutional capacity and 
diminish their legitimacy. Business groups such as the Federation of the Nepalese 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the Nepal Chamber of Commerce have been 
more resistant to political infiltration and frequently voice opposition to political 
interventions in the spheres of business and economy (Himalayan Times 2010).
39
         
71. More “modern” community based organizations (CBOs) such as user groups, mother 
groups, self-helps groups, small farmer cooperatives and saving and credit 
organizations  (v. the more traditional association mentioned above) also face fewer 
allegations of partisan alignment. In dominant Nepali discourse, these organizations are 
not ordinarily thought of as “civil society”. However, they have played and continue to play 
key roles as associational groups.  Over the past two decades, the formation of member 
groups to support community-led development activities, in a variety of the sectors such as 
health,  non-formal education, savings and credit and forest conservation, has been a 
favored approach.   For example mothers’ groups, said to be rooted in practices of the 
Gurung women of western Nepal left behind by their British and Indian army husbands, are 
one of the most universalized traditional voluntary organizations in Nepal (Bhattachan 
2000).  They are involved in a range of activities including savings and credit, child 
nutrition and safe motherhood campaigns.   Traditional and informal community forest 
management groups, long established in Nepal (Adhikari 1990), were formalized via the 
1988 Master Plan for Forestry Sector, the 1993 Forest Act and the 1995 Forest Regulations, 
resulting in Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs).  Defined as autonomous, self-
governing and legal corporate bodies with perpetual succession, CFUGs have received 
national and international attention for best practices in local ownership and good 
governance of local resources. The development of federations of user groups – including 
those in forests – have further enhanced the networking capabilities and overall strength of 
these institutions.  Tole Lane Organizations (TLOs) - consisting of households in 
contiguous areas that raise funds through member contributions and engage in 
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 The Political Science Association of Nepal is now divided into three partisan factions.  
39
  This is not to say that the business community plays a non-political role.  The role of the business community 
in the non-transparent funding of political leaders and politicians is well known (Bhattarai 2010: 25) as is their 
influence in the media given the large advertizing revenues they generate. 
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neighborhood development activities  - are another important category of community level 
association in Nepal.  Institutionalized via the UNDP-supported Rural Urban Partnership 
Programme,
 40
 these TLOs are now engaged in the development of Tole Development Plans 
and Enterprise Development Plans at the grassroots level, and participate as partners in 
Participatory Municipal Development Planning (Adhikari and Shrestha 2007).  
72. It is important to note that many, if not most of these groups, are funded by various 
donors, INGOs and NGOs
41
 and are not completely independent.  Neither are they 
immune to problems such as elite capture and exclusion of the very poor and socially 
marginalized (Biggs et al. 2004, Jha et al. 2009).  In the case of CFUGs, for example, 
factors such as social discrimination, lack of information-sharing, low levels of literacy and 
accounting skills have been identified as important barriers to participation in the claimed 
“democratic” functioning of these organizations (Ojha 2009b).  The issue of inclusion has 
now been taken up as a top priority by the Federation of Community Forest Users 
(FECOFUN) while public audits initiatives by certain CFUGs have resulted in more 
women in leadership positions, increased accountability of executive committees, and the 
return of misappropriated funds (Gentle et al 2007).  Unofficial political affiliations and 
leanings are common among these groups as well.  For example, it is well known that the 
FECOFUN has CPN-UML leanings. Furthermore, in the current political climate, 
political party pressures on these groups, and other community-level group such and 
health facility and school management committees, have increased (Koirala 2010).  
User groups are increasingly prone to political party capture.  One of the key challenges 
highlighted by Ojha, activist and analyst of community forest user groups, is the ability of 
FECOFUN to resist the trend of increased political interference (Ojha 2009).  Similar 
challenges appear to be apparent in TLOs (Adhikari and Sijapati 2010: 26).  
 
73. Overall, there is no doubt that since 1990, civil society organizations in Nepal have 
contributed positively to the emergence of a democratic culture in Nepal.  However, 
there is a widespread perception that almost all organizations in Nepal, including 
CSOs, suffer from persistent problems of lack of transparency and accountability.  
Initiatives aimed at enhancing the accountability of CBOs and  NGOs  - such as the NGO 
Code of Conduct prepared by the NGO Federation and the Right to Information Act – have 
yet to bear fruit.  In the case of the latter, even organizations that actively advocated for the 
Act have yet to implement its requirements (Mendel 2010).    There is a real need to assist 
CSOs to become models of transparent, responsive and accountable governance.  In 
the current political climate and law and order situation, the risk is that greater 
transparency, especially with regard to finances, could make CSOs more vulnerable to 
demands for “donations” and other influences and pressures from various groups.  Even in 
Kathmandu, demands for “donations” from “above ground” organizations (such as the 
UCPN-Maoist Young Communist League) as well as other groups exist.  The risks are 
invariably heightened in other parts of the country, especially the eastern parts of the Tarai.     
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  The Rural-Urban Partnership Program, started in 1997 under the MLD with technical and financial support 
from UNDP, marked an important shift from traditional top-down centralized planning to much more 
participatory forms of urban governance.  Conceptualized as an urban-based and urban-led approach to rural 
development, the focus was on reducing the gaps between cities and rural regions by strengthening links 
between them and improving the conditions in poor urban communities (Pradhan 2004).    
41
  One study identified up to eleven different donors supporting one forest user group (Ojha et al. 2002) 
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f. Media 
 
74. Independent media, another important dimension of civil society in Nepal, has played 
a critical role post-1990. Much has been made about the strengths of the media in Nepal 
and its contributions towards strengthening the democratic sphere over the past two 
decades.  This includes for example, revealing and discussing in the public domain the 
misuse of public funds by state officials, publicizing the actions of democratic movements 
and actors during the king’s takeover and investigating and denouncing human rights 
violations by both the state and the UCPN-Maoist.   Since 1990, there has been a 
tremendous increase in dailies, weeklies, news analyses and public affairs magazines.  
There are currently 2038 registered newspapers in Nepal, and 514 that regularly publish.
42. 
 
In addition, there are 25 registered television channels
43
 and 285
44
  regularly functioning 
radio stations (out of a 364 licensed
45
).  Media analysts have noted an increase in quality as 
well as quantity.
46
 Analysts have highlighted the impressive growth of community radio in 
Nepal with “exceptional practices in programming, innovative strategies for sustainability, 
and sophisticated examples of networking”  (Pringle and Subba 2007: 4).  
 
75. However, weaknesses in the media sector as it relates to civic engagement and social 
accountability include issues of independence and autonomy.  According to the 1992 
National Broadcasting Act, licensing is left to the government and not an independent 
entity. The 1992 Press and Publications Acts contain problematic provisions that could be 
enforced in a repressive manner.  Members of the Nepal Press Council, established by the 
Press Council Act of 1992, are nominated and appointed by the Government even though 
the law states that the Council is to be autonomous (International Press Freedom 2008: 16).  
Inadequate legislation and non-implementation of existing laws have resulted in the 
unmanaged development of the sector. For example, the law does not cater to the 
broadcasting sector; no specific rules apply to the licensing of community broadcasters and 
there lacks a longer-term frequency allocation plan
47
 (International Press Freedom 2008: 
13, 15). 
 
76. In terms of credibility and professionalism, state-owned media has become more 
independent since 1990.  However, state-owned media continues to reflect the priorities of 
the government, and clear shifts in news coverage (as well as transfers of staff) occur with 
changes in government. While the private media has achieved much, profit-oriented 
newspapers have shown a reluctance to offend the government. This was evident in the 
period following the king’s October 2002 takeover when (unlike weeklies and magazines) 
dominant media houses did not take clear stances for citizen’s rights and press freedoms at 
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  http://www.presscouncilnepal.org/publishedpapers.php 
43
  http://www.moic.gov.np/pdf/tv-list.pdf 
44
  http://www.moic.gov.np/pdf/fm-regular.pdf 
45
  http://www.moic.gov.np/pdf/fm-list.pdf 
46
  This is a result of: overall increase in competition; increase in the capacity of journalists, especially with the 
availability of journalism classes starting in schools as well as colleges and universities; growth of media studies 
and analyses and technological advances (Parajuli 2064 vs: 2-5). 
47
  This is important in that, in the absence of such a plan, all frequencies in desirable locations – Kathmandu – 
may be allocated leaving no room for future developments, “regardless of the overall public interest” 
(International Press Freedom 2008: 15). 
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the beginning. The larger press houses only followed suit once a more enabling 
environment had been created through the early struggles of smaller publications (Parajuli 
2064 vs:7).
 48
  The absence of critical analysis of the business sector (that provides much 
advertizing revenue) and the propensity of media owners to directly intervene in news 
content to suit their purposes have also been highlighted as problematic (Parajuli 2064vs: 8-
9).   
 
77. The biggest obstacle to the role of media in social accountability initiatives is the 
widely held perception that it is politically biased.  Apart from the fact that there are 
many clearly political party affiliated newspapers (Onta 2006), the legacy of Panchayat 
style journalism – “mission journalism” based on party politics – continues even in 
mainstream publications (Parajuli 2064vs: 10).  This complicates, for example, media 
monitoring of political parties and their financing; the release of such information has 
hitherto been viewed as information released by political opponents. A recent review of the 
media in Nepal has reported increased politicized interference in media operations with in-
house unions – especially Maoist aligned ones – that appear less interested in representing 
workers, than intervening in media outputs (International Press Freedom 2008: 23).  
 
78. The lack of representation of women and excluded groups in the media sector is also 
of central concern (Onta 2006; UNDP 2009).  The overall low levels of education, skills, 
trainings, and analytical capacities of journalists, combined with their continuing focus on 
political leaders and their viewpoints, further serve to limit the quality of their analyses 
(Onta 2006).  Furthermore, apart from in the larger media houses, wages of journalists are 
relatively low.   This had led to journalists taking up other work to make ends meet, and 
becoming more vulnerable to corruption (Parajuli 2064vs: 12).
49
 Self-censoring by 
journalists, due to security threats or a reluctance to offend local power-holders has 
also been identified as a constraint.  For example, the secretary of the Federation of 
Nepalese Journalists in Dhankuta acknowledged that issues of corruption in local 
government were not sufficiently highlighted by journalists as a result of “not wanting to 
increase enemies.”   One journalist in Tansen noted that “this place is small, I have to live 
here too,” while another in the same city stated that, as his media organization gets funds 
from the VDC, he is restricted in his ability to criticize local body activities.       
 
79. In the current context, the media has become a subject of political patronage and a 
target of criminal gangs. This is especially true in the Tarai, where journalists work in a 
climate of fear, resulting in (political and/or criminal) censorship or self-censorship.  In the 
2009 Impunity Index of the Committee to Protect Journalists, Nepal ranked 9, making it 
one of the world’s worse for press.50    
 
                                                     
48
  This media section has borrowed heavily from Parajuli (2064vs) which provides a comprehensive overview 
of the major debates in the media drawing from numerous authors and studies in Nepali and English.  
49
  For example, an analysis of journalism in the border town of Birgung revealed the manner in which 
journalists avoided writing about corruption at customs, or wrote in favor of certain businesses in return for 
monetary rewards (Parajuli 2064vs:  12). 
50
  Committee to Protect Journalists. Attacks on the Press 2009: Nepal.  http://www.cpj.org/2010/02/attacks-on-
the-press-2009-nepal.php  accessed October 20, 2010.  
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80. In terms of radio, since Nepal’s first radio broadcasting license was issued in 1997 to 
the Nepal Forum of Environmental Journalists and Radio Sagarmatha was 
established, there has been a rapid growth in both private and not-for-profit radio.   
However, overall a few large broadcasters dominate and the process of licensing is prone to 
bribery and political influence (Pringle and Subba 2007:11).  There is no legal definition of 
“community radio”; this continues to be a self-definition, reinforced by the non-legal 
institutional affiliation with the Association of Community Radio Broadcasters, Nepal 
(ACORAB).
51
 
 
81. Apart from the lack of definition around community radio, inconsistent application of 
community radio principles abound and major policy gaps exist in ensuring the 
accountability of broadcasters to their public or stated missions (Pringle and Subba 
2007: 15).  The application and practice of community radio principles are remarkably 
inconsistent.  Many stations are community radios in name only.  Community radio is 
Nepal is poorly defined and there is no policy framework to guide the development of the 
sector.  Of particular concern are issues of limited ownership, ‘capture’ by the elite, poor 
representation of community groups, particular on gender, caste and ethnic lines.  There is a 
risk that community orientation and the focus on public interest programming will be 
weakened (Pringle and Subba 2007: 4). 
 
82. Domination by elite groups is especially problematic since community radio is 
generally understood to have an explicit mandate to empower and enable 
marginalized groups (Pringle and Subba 2007: 25).  Other challenges to the principles of 
community radio exist in the rising competition among radio stations which has led to 
greater market orientation and higher budgets.   This acts as a disincentive for truly public 
programming and challenges public service and community radio principles and practices 
(International Press Freedom 2008: 18).   
 
83. Other concerns are linked to networking and syndicated programming.  While the 
latter has many positive aspects including improved quality, access to knowledge and the 
diffusion and exchange of information and opinion between local and national perspectives, 
issues have been raised over the displacement of local content and the fact that its major 
appeal is as a source of funding (Pringle and Subba 2007: 6).   Centrally produced content 
in local stations varied from 70% to two to three hours a day, often in prime time (Pringle 
and Subba 2007: 21).  In debates over the pros and cons of networking, the founder and 
former executive director of Nepal’s first community radio, Radio Sagarmatha, among 
others, has stressed that radio networking is overshadowing “the local” and putting the 
community radio movement at peril (Parajuli 2064vs: 111).  
  
84. Another rising concern, linked to the advent of “Maoist” stations, is the increased 
politicization of FM radio (Pringle and Subba 2007:20).  Research has found that most 
radio station managers are post-holding political party members (Parajuli 2064vs: 12).  This 
is particularly problematic in a context where even self-declared “community radios” are 
rarely based on democratic ownership or guided by the objectives or needs of local 
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  According to Ashok Tuladhar, Program Director at ACORAB, the association has prepared a draft Law for 
Community Radio as well as a code of conduct for community radio.   
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stakeholders. As a result, the discretionary power of the station manager is large. (Pringle 
and Subba 2007: 19), In the current context of politicization, this works further to the 
detriment of community radio principles.  This is especially so given the rapid 
multiplication of small FM radios, with newly recruited workers who lack awareness about 
principles of good journalism and the critical role of independent media in a democratic 
society (International Press Freedom 2008: 24).  
 
85. Despite these constraints and challenges, community radio has played a key role in 
increasing the flow of information as a whole and enabling citizens to receive increased and 
more accurate information about the responsibilities, plans and budgets of national and 
local governments.  For example, Community Radio Madan Pokhara and Radio Lumbini 
have aired special programs on local governance, produced by ‘radio representatives’ 
located in the target VDCs. Bheri FM has conducted interactive programs in the target 
VDCs with the VDC secretaries and the local community regarding available local 
resources and service delivery.
52
  As well as increasing access to information, community 
radios have been important in building relations between citizens and the state by 
facilitating forums for the sharing of views and information.  For example, the community 
radio station Radio Lumbini began producing a program called Hamro Lumbini (‘Our 
Lumbini’) in 2007 as a means to reduce the conflict between the government-run Lumbini 
Development Trust and the local communities dissatisfied with the development around the 
World Heritage Site and its impact on their lives.  The program, produced by local people 
trained by the Lumbini Community Multimedia Centre (supported by UNESCO), included 
taking microphones to the villages to emphasize the voices of community members as well 
as listener surveys to contour future episodes of the program.  The popularity of the 
program stemmed from the demand for localized content that gave people a chance to 
engage in social issues prevalent in their daily lives.   The program enabled a new-found 
respect for local voices and one of the important changes that occurred as a result of the 
local program was the willingness of official parties to inform local people about the World 
Heritage Site and how it can contribute to local income generation (Martin and Wilmore 
2010).  
  
86. The post-conflict period in Nepal offers both challenges and possibilities for civic 
engagement and social accountability in Nepal.  A difficult political transition period has 
exacerbated long-standing issues of patronage, governance and rule of law.  Structured 
inequalities and a political culture of hierarchy continue.  This has heightened cynicism 
among citizens at the same time that the promise of a “New Nepal” offers hope for new 
accountable and democratic modes of citizen-state relations.  There is, however, a real 
demand among citizens for change in the dominant political culture and expectations for a 
re-structuring of power relations especially among the historically marginalized.  Combined 
with the strengths of associational life, access to information and citizen voice (discussed 
below), space and opportunities exist for social accountability initiatives to enable 
productive civic engagement with the state at all levels.   
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 Based on information given by Ramesh Adhikari, ActionAid Nepal.  
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SECTION IV - ANALYSIS OF KEY ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEPAL  
 
87. Social accountability encompasses a wide array of actions that citizens can take to hold 
government officials accountable.  Underpinning these action, however, are a few key 
elements. Access to information in order to build a evidence base for public engagement is 
necessary as is the ability of citizens to voice their opinions and concerns and to 
collectively work together to advance their common interests and goals (Malena et al. 
2004) The following section analyzes each of these key elements of social accountability in 
the Nepal context. 
 
a. Citizen Access to Information  
 
88. A fundamental element of social accountability is citizen access to information.  
Citizens require accurate and relevant public information about government policies, 
budgets, expenditures, programs and services in order to formulate and voice opinions, 
contribute to public debates, monitor government actions, and effectively negotiate with 
public officials.    
 
89. There are no legal barriers to the obtaining of information for citizens in Nepal.  As 
discussed above, the Right to Information Act, backed by the National Information 
Commission (NIC), provides widespread rights to information.   However, there has been 
limited progress in the implementation of the Right to Information Act (Mendel 2010). 
Obstacles to the implementation of the RTI Act include “an entrenched culture of secrecy” 
that “militates against openness;” (Mendel 2010: 4); as well as the current preoccupation 
with the preparation of the new Constitution and the current context of lack of rule of law 
and impunity.  Other challenges in implementation have included budget constraints, 
capacity deficits and problems in staff allocations, including the recruitment and retention 
of an NIC secretary.   The government has not played an active role and few formal steps to 
implement the law have been taken by public bodies.  For example, only 400 public bodies 
(out of 5 to 6,000) have appointed the required information officers (Mendel 2010: 9).    
 
90. From the “demand” side, contrary to the experiences of many other countries in the 
early implementation period of such acts, CSOs have not been important drivers of 
demand for information in Nepal.  While a recent review found “a natural reluctance on 
the part of NGOs to press too heavily for recognition of government obligations, since 
these will also apply to them” (Mendel 2010: 5), the focus by donors and therefore NGOs 
on post-conflict and transitional issues has also resulted in the relative sidelining of the RTI 
agenda Few citizens are aware of the existence of the RTI Act
53
 and, among those who are 
in the know, there is confusion about how to find information.  A CA member frustrated by 
the lack of transparency in terms of the funding of the CA, had no idea about how to access 
such information and wondered, “Who to ask?” 
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 For example, despite the fact that the Act had already been in existence for two years, an influential Nepali 
weekly resorted to bribery in order to collect attendance records of the CA. The same information was made 
available, albeit with some persistence, to a NGO after invoking the Act a few months later. (Personal 
communication with researcher who interviewed the editor of the weekly.)  
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91. A recent status report on the implementation of the Right to Information in Nepal 
make a number of recommendations to overcome current obstacles These include: 
establishing a central nodal agency within the government responsible for the 
implementation of the Act; training, educating and supporting public information officers 
(throughout the public service); drafting and implementing communication plans and 
creating a dedicated parliamentary committee. Working with the media and NGO networks 
to make use of the Act and to educate the public about its existence is also recommended 
(Mendel 2010, 18-23).    
 
92. Some of the most important obstacles to obtaining information in Nepal are socio-
cultural. As noted above, there is no culture of transparency and information-sharing at all 
levels of the government.  Interviewees repeatedly stressed the difficulties they faced in 
trying to obtain information from ministries and government offices. An interviewed CA 
member stressed how hard it was for them even in their professional capacities to obtain 
information from government offices.  The CA member stated, “It is not that they don’t 
know anything, but the truth is that nobody wants to tell you.”   In the words of a Dalit 
woman activist “there is a mindset to obstruct access to information.”   
 
93. Unsurprisingly, current levels of knowledge about governance processes and key 
public issues remain low.  An activist noted that in far off villages in Bajura for example, 
because of the lack of information, citizens had no idea of what local bodies and parties 
were doing. “Local bodies are miserly at sharing information. There are no mechanisms for 
sharing information between central and local bodies. People don’t know what initiatives to 
take against the government because they do not have information.”    
 
94. While word-of-mouth, notice boards outside government offices and traditional messengers 
in the hill areas (known as Katuwal, mostly from the Dalit community) are used for 
informing people
54
 respondents stated that the media is their main source of public 
information for citizens.  A broadcast audience survey conducted in 2006-7 by Equal 
Access Nepal revealed that in the rural areas, radio ranked as the most preferred 
information source (98 percent).  In urban areas, radio ranked second (96 percent) after 
television (99.3 percent) (UNDP 2010: 37).  FM and community radio, in particular, 
have played a critical role in disseminating information in a country in which the 
literacy rate is 57 percent.
55
   For example, Radio Sagarmatha, the first community radio in 
Nepal, is the largest community radio service in South Asia – available to a network of 10 
million people and reaching an estimated 2.5 million regular listeners.  It has 18 hours of 
daily broadcasting, including nine news bulletins every day and 90 programs per week on a 
range of issues including public health, rule of law, education, environment, sustainable 
development, gender equality and good governance. Importantly, Radio Sagarmatha also 
broadcasts in several local languages, such as Newari, Maithali and Tamang  
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  For example, in Malika VDC in Baglung, the Katuwal informed villagers about the then on-going VDC voter 
registration process. Personal communication with Shekhar Parajuli, Long Term Observer, Carter Center. 
55
  http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nepal_nepal_statistics.html accessed 14 October 2010 
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95. Furthermore, many CSOs and NGOs collaborate with radio stations in the context of 
specific development or governance-oriented programs. Among others, the National 
Press Institute and Pro-Public regularly run and/or enable such programs, while other 
initiatives are more sporadic.  For example, the Forum Against Corruption and Turmoil 
(FACT Nepal) ran a one year informative radio program on anticorruption and good 
governance with a focus on news, analyses, coverage of efforts by government and non-
government institutions to curb corruption, call-in sessions (vox pop) and interviews with 
prominent personalities.  The hour-long program “Hamro Chaso” (Our Concern) covered 
various topics including a corruption scandal in the Birjgung Municipality, with general 
citizens and even bureaucrats sharing examples to be aired for public discussion (FACT 
Nepal 2004). When FEDWASUN undertook budget initiatives in Ilam (as described in Box 
4), it worked closely with two radio stations to give live coverage of the public hearings 
they conducted.  This allowed more of the community to be involved in the process as well 
as reaching a much broader audience.   
 
96. Overall, however, in Nepal CSO efforts to disseminate relevant public information 
and educate citizens about issues of key public concern are lacking.  Nepal has a history 
of institutions generating and disseminating information from independent research.  
However, as noted above, these have either been academically oriented, or have been 
focused on generating commissioned research products for individual development 
organizations.
56
   There have been recent initiatives to inform the public about the 
constitution-writing process.  But systematic efforts to seek out, analyze and publicly 
share government information has been lacking - a reflection of  the inaccessibility of 
information, the complicated nature of data and information and limited capacity to 
research and analyze.
57
   
 
97. Despite these weaknesses, citizens’ thirst for information offers an important current 
opportunity. In interviews and focus group discussions, citizens stated that it is their 
“right” to have public information and that it is, “extremely important” that citizens be 
given information.    However, the hierarchical and exclusionary nature of Nepali society, 
the dominance of personalized power relations, the historical power relations between state 
officials and the general public has contributed to a reluctance to turn that thirst for 
information into active demand.  This is compounded by low levels of education and 
widespread illiteracy in the rural areas and the alienation of citizens from the state 
structures and agents at this political juncture.  
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 One area where there has been such analyses, expertise and sustained policy research and lobbying has been 
in the realm of human rights. There have also been a number of new initiatives connected to the Constitution 
writing process.  A number of NGOs have disseminated analyses and updates of the Constitutional drafts, in 
publications as well as in radio programs. 
57
  While radio programs are sometimes used, information dissemination continues to be mostly centered on 
print material with written reports, bulletins and website postings available only in Kathmandu or larger urban 
areas. The fact that many of the publications are also available in English – for example, Pro-Public’s Good 
Governance Magazine and MIREST Nepal’s information bulletins – has been critiqued as evidence of the 
continuing priority given by NGOs to donors as opposed to the larger Nepali public.  It is argued that resources 
spent on such publications could have been invested in publishing in other Nepali languages, or even simple 
basic Nepali to be distributed in rural areas.  
47 
 
b. Citizen Voice 
 
98. A second key element of social accountability is citizen voice.  Citizens should be able to  
express their opinions, needs and concerns in order to make the government authorities 
more aware of their priorities and know how to serve citizens better.  As noted above, the 
peoples’ movements of April 2006 and January-February 2007 have resulted in people 
generally feeling free to publicly express criticism of government actions and authorities.   
The growth of the media in Nepal, including television, print and radio, has created 
spaces where citizens feel safe and empowered to voice their views. Furthermore, while 
much of the press is Kathmandu-based, many newspapers are available outside of the 
capital, including in vernacular languages especially in the Tarai region. These locally 
based media serve as platforms to share opinions and concerns and also function as 
important information sources.  
 
99. In terms of print media, most newspapers offer readers the opportunity to send in 
their opinions, criticisms and views.  “Letters to the Editor” are very popular and have 
enabled very frank and vibrant discussions of topical events including highly critical 
comments on corruption, misuse of power, nepotism and the general lack of accountability 
of state officials.
58
   On-line versions of the larger papers include opinion polls as well as 
comment sections.  While these cater more to the elite with access to internet, they provide 
a further public space for the expression of citizen voices.  
 
100. Although all FM stations broadcast news and have current affairs programs where 
expert voices are heard, it is community radios that have been playing key roles in 
giving voice to citizens (Pradhan 2006).   According to media researcher Devraj 
Humagain, while there is no comprehensive research on this subject, a large and growing 
number of stations now engage in public hearings, the collection of opinions from people 
accessing local government services, public affairs-oriented talk shows and call-in 
programs.  The interactive nature of the programs and the active participation of ordinary 
citizens, has made these forms of radio programs very popular.   For example, MIREST 
(Media Initiative for Rights, Equity and Social Transformation) conducted a year-long 
radio program starting from July 2009, which provided an opportunity for citizens to give 
voice to their priorities and agendas for the constitution.  More than a thousand citizens 
called in and expressed opinions on 200 different constitutional issues, periodically joined 
by CA members and constitutional and other experts (MIREST Nepal 2010: 1).  
 
101. Of the many media-oriented donor interventions, an important one is that of the 
BBC World Trust Service that works in partnership with a network of 2,500 community-
based organizations, more than 50 Nepali radio stations and the BBC Nepali Service to 
produce drama and discussion programs to support the peace process and the writing of the 
new constitution. Sajha Sawal (‘Our Questions’), a weekly political debate program  
launched in 2007, is one of the most popular.  According to the BBC, the program is aimed 
at creating dialogue between those in power and communities which have traditionally 
been excluded, including rural communities and women, by encouraging people to share 
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 The popularity of this format is such that the largest Nepali daily Kantipur, extended its “Letter to the Editor” 
section to cover a full half page. 
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view with panelists.  Guests have included the then PM GP Koirala (the first guest of the 
show) as well as other political leaders including PM Madhav Kumar Nepal and Maoist 
leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal. According to the BBC, “[f]or the overwhelming majority of 
the invited audience, Sajha Sawal is the first time they have been given the chance to air 
their views in public and to directly challenge their leaders”. The program is aired 
nationwide on over 100 FM stations and on national TV and is heard or seen by an 
estimated 20 percent of Nepalis.
59
 
 
102. A key obstacle to the expression of citizens’ voice is “elite capture.”  For example, 
while the focus on the constitution has increased the number of public forums around the 
country, thereby allowing a greater number of people to voice their opinions, the great 
majority of workshops, seminars and other public meetings are centered in Kathmandu and 
continue to be limited to certain NGO elites. Many programs try to be socially inclusive, 
for example, by broadcasting in local languages (as does Radio Sagarmatha) or by 
recording programs across the country to reflect ethnic, cultural and caste differences (as 
does Sajha Sawal).   Furthermore, radio stations run by and for marginalized groups also 
exist with donor support.  However, a recent study has shown that Janajatis have relatively 
little access, voice and participation in the mainstream media which is owned and 
controlled by more economically and socially powerful groups or influenced by political 
parties. Janajatis and excluded groups continue to have low representation in the media as a 
whole (UNDP 2010). 
 
103. Another obstacle, as highlighted above in the media section, is the need for 
community stations to compete for sources of revenue with commercial broadcasters 
for their    sustainability.  The larger trend towards commercialization for survival comes 
as a trade-off with providing space for local voices and focusing on issues of grassroots 
development and social empowerment.  The networking trend and the displacement of 
local programming is also a challenge.  
 
c. Citizen association and collective action 
 
104. Another key element of social accountability is citizen association and collective action.  
Social accountability approaches are based on the collective efforts of citizens and their 
ability to work together to advance their common interests and needs. Nepal has a long 
history of collective action that serves as a strong foundation.  Over the past 25 years 
Nepal has developed a vibrant practice of social mobilization for group-based action.  
In 2004 there were an estimated 400,000 documented community groups in operation in 
rural Nepal (Jha et al 2009: xv).  NGOs have, as mentioned before, become firmly 
established as important development actors at the national as well as local level.   The 
potential for these groups to function as aggregators of citizen voice and facilitators of 
relations between citizens and various state institutions at different levels is therefore very 
strong. 
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/whatwedo/where/asia/nepal/2009/10/091028_nepal_sajha_sawal_100_
episode.shtml   accessed 3 September 2010.  
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105. One of the most successful recent examples of citizen mobilization and collective action 
was the passing in 2002 of amendments to the Muluki Ain (the National Country Code) 
which gave women many more rights including the right to abortion. The multi-layered 
(community and national level) networking and of advocacy involved in this campaign 
was historic.  It was also greatly assisted by the absence of significant opposition from both 
inside and outside parliament and by seizing the window of opportunity created by the 
public sector’s reform agenda. Originating in a decades-old struggle, the historic passing of 
the bill was made possible due to a number of factors including:  
…sustained advocacy for reform; the dissemination of knowledge, information and 
evidence; adoption of the reform agenda by the public sector and its leadership in 
involving other stakeholders; the existence of work for safe motherhood as the 
context in which the initiative could gain support; an active women’s rights 
movement and support from international and multilateral organizations; sustained 
involvement of local NGOs, civil society and professional organizations; the 
involvement of journalists and the media; the absence of significant opposition; 
courageous government officials and an enabling democratic political system (Thapa 
2004: 85). 
 
106. The great majority of advocacy work undertaken in Nepal, however, has not 
benefited from such enabling conditions.  Of the high profile policy debates of the 
1990s, the movement against the so-called “Black Laws” (proposed Anti-terrorist 
Act) is illustrative.   The Act, initially proposed in 1997 and then again in 1998, met with 
strong opposition from citizens at a time of Maoist conflict and an increasingly repressive 
state.  The draconian powers of the state and the concomitant severe restrictions of the 
basic citizen rights proposed in the Act, resulted in broad-based opposition which included 
donor-funded NGOs such as INHURED International, the Bar Association and two groups 
that formed as a result of the movement – the Movement to Save Democratic Rights and a 
coalition of leftist political parties.  The massive political pressure generated by the 
movement (which included a 40 day protest program), resulted in the non-introduction of 
the bill in parliament (Des Chene 1998). 
 
107. The movement to free Kamaiyas  (bonded laborers ) was another high profile case 
that was based on similar street-based pressure tactics on the government.  The 
Kamaiya Liberation Movement  began on 1 May 2000 and ended on 17 July 2000 when 
the Government declared the emancipation of up to 200,000 bonded laborers in western 
Nepal (Fujikura 2001: 31).  In this case, sustained collective action at the local level, was 
complemented by national level lobbying and networking by democratic allies, with 
overall efforts spear-headed by the local NGO Backward Society Education (BASE).  
 
108. The manner in which state-citizen relations have evolved in Nepal – including the 
period of conflict and autocratic rule post-1990 – has resulted in an emphasis on 
unilateral strategies of criticism and pressure. There is a continued widespread belief 
that the state is reluctant to hear the voice of citizens, and act upon their requests, unless 
people take to the streets.   The lack of information, environment of mistrust and the 
extended post-conflict transitional period has only added to this belief.  There is 
comparatively much less history of citizens and civil society organizations engaging in 
constructive dialogue with state actors.  Importantly, while there is a rich history of 
social mobilization in Nepal, most of this has focused on the economic dimensions of 
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empowerment and service delivery, as opposed to “empowering citizens to build their 
voice, claim assets and services and influence decisions, procedures and (eventually) the 
formal and informal rules of the game” (Jha et al. 2009: 35) Furthermore there have been 
relatively few programs that have sought to link citizens/CSOs with government actors and 
processes.  Functioning in isolation and parallel to government systems, these 
mobilizations have not served to support the development of citizen-state relationships 
(Jha et al. 2009: 134).  
 
d. Donor Support for Social Accountability in Nepal 
 
109. This current reality of support for social accountability initiatives in Nepal needs to 
be situated in a larger history of donor action in Nepal.  Since the beginning of the 
democratic post-1990 period, foreign donors have concentrated on poverty reduction 
through enhancing sustainable economic growth, social sector development as well as the 
reform of the state.  Decentralization, democratization and inclusion emerged as “cross-
cutting themes” during this period.  While multilateral organizations such as the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank and UNDP have continuously engaged with the state, 
the 1990s saw the trend of more aid channeled to NGOs rather than the state.  The 1998 
Nepal United Nations Human Development Report stated that the tendency of donors to 
circumvent the public sector was premised on the assumption that the public sector 
was corrupt and ineffectual, and alternative channels (such as NGOs and the private 
sector) would ensure better utilization of resources for beneficiaries (UNDP 1998: 
210).   
110. The escalation of the Maoist conflict, especially in 2000, resulted in three main donor 
initiatives.  One was an emphasis on social inclusion, good governance and 
marginalized groups. This stemmed from state and donor analyses that the root causes of 
the conflict lay in social exclusion, economic and regional inequalities, lack of 
opportunity, poor governance and the failure of the government to deliver expected 
development.  The second was conflict sensitive programs. At this time, donor country 
assistance and strategy papers highlighted conflict issues and proposed strategies for 
mitigating the negative impacts of the conflict on their development programs. Thirdly, 
donors began to channel a larger percentage of funds to non-state actors.  This occurred 
largely because the state was restricted to district headquarters in many parts of the country 
and local NGOs represented key partners for donors to continue development works.  
Especially for European donors, the shift to funding non-state actors and decreasing 
government budget support occurred not only due to lack of government effectiveness as a 
partner, but also the reluctance of the king from 2002 to 2006 to permit more participatory 
forms of governance and respect human rights.  
 
111. Donor initiatives on governance since the April 2006 movement and the official end 
of the conflict has seen the continuation of core themes of social inclusion and good 
governance as well as a central focus on assisting the peace process - including the 
successful realization of the CA elections and the writing of the new constitution.  Much 
attention has returned to the state, although as noted before, multilateral organizations have 
throughout this period continued to engage with the government in various governance 
initiatives aimed at improving public resource management and promoting civil service 
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reform, decentralized governance and people’s participation in the development process. 60    
While state-building now appears to be a central objective both for multilaterals and 
bilateral donors, such as DFID, NGOs continue to receive large amounts of funds 
from international donors.  
 
112. In the area of governance, in addition to a large number of individual donor 
initiatives. there are currently three large multi-donor programs, The Nepal Peace 
Trust Fund established in 2007 is a government-managed multi-donor trust fund set up to 
support the peace process including the management of combatant camps and integration, 
rehabilitation of internally displaced persons and strengthening law and order.  To 
complement the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, the United Nations Peace Fund was established 
to focus on tasks that cannot be funded or implemented via existing government 
mechanisms.  It too is financed by a range of international donors in Nepal including the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swiss Development 
Corporation (SDC), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the 
governments of Norway and Denmark.  Initiatives undertaken include supporting the 
Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction to formulate a capacity development strategy, based 
on the capacity assessment and the Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal 
project which provides technical assistance to the Constituent Assembly and promotes 
public involvement in constitution-making, especially via the Centre for Constitutional 
Dialogue. While the above two programs focus on what can be termed as transitional 
governance issues, the Local Governance and Community Development Program 
(LGCDP) builds upon the previous Decentralized Local Governance Support Programme 
and focuses on poverty reduction through inclusive, responsible and accountable local 
governance and participatory community-led development.   Initiated in 2008, this MLD-
managed program is supported by the UN system, ADB, CIDA, Danida, DfID, Norway, 
GTZ, JICA and SDC. 
  
113. Apart from the LGCDP and assistance to election related activities, however, relatively 
few donor initiatives go beyond advocacy to support specific mechanisms for 
strengthening relations of accountability between state and citizens.
61
 Funding given 
by the multi-donor Rights, Democracy and Inclusion Fund  (RDIF) is instructive.
62
 The 
overwhelming majority of activities supported by the RDIF have focused on advocacy, 
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 For example, UNDP and the Government of Norway jointly supported the Ministry of Local Development 
through the Decentralised Local Governance Support Programme started in 2004. The program built upon the 
experiences of prior initiatives and was designed to contribute to, among other things, decentralized governance 
with enhanced capacity of local government to plan, finance and implement development programs in an 
accountable and transparent manner and to enhance the effective participation of people in governance 
processes with special attention to excluded groups.  Importantly, the end-review of the program stated that it 
primarily supported the demand side through social mobilization at the village level (Meier et. al 2009).  
 
61
  For LGCDP donors, this is logical.  
62
 RDIF was started in 2006 with the goal “to bring about a strengthened and more sustainable system of 
democratic governance characterized by more respect for rights, democratic norms, and the political inclusion of 
all groups” (RDIF 2008: 1).  It is the first multi-donor mechanism in Nepal for support to democracy, human 
rights and political inclusion.  The original donor partners of DfID, SDC, AusAID and the Norwegian Embassy 
were joined by DANIDA in the second phase of RDIF launched in June of 2009. 
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lobbying and public debates.  These have included excellent initiatives for example, 
promoting local-level post-conflict  reconciliation structures and supporting the political 
inclusion of marginalized groups (including Janajati and Dalit women) at different levels. 
While four of the 24 organizations supported by the Fund used social accountability tools 
(three used public hearings, and one undertook public audits), these appeared to be 
ancillary activities to the core methods of advocacy.   Lobbying, awareness-building and 
training prefigured dominantly with relatively little attention to establishing 
constructive and regular engagement with state and political actors. 
 
114. These trends dominate in bilateral aid programs.63 For example, Norway’s governance 
and peace-building initiatives center on the CA, election support and media initiatives to 
promote citizen advocacy. A separate Women’s Fund supports women’s advocacy in the 
CA, as well as female ex-combatant work and UNICEF’s Decentralized Action for 
Children and Women (Ingdal and Holter 2010: 15-17). The European Union’s “Human 
Rights and Democracy” program focuses on human rights, conflict affected children and 
advocating for the rights of the marginalized, with links to the constitution-writing process. 
Among the bilateral donors, Denmark has historically emphasized issues of human rights 
and the development of an inclusive, accountable and democratic political system.  
DANIDA’s Human Rights and Governance Advisory Unit has established strategic 
partnerships with thirteen Nepali CSOs.  As in the case of the RDIF, activities undertaken 
by these partners have tended to focus on advocacy, although much more attention has 
been given specifically to justice and the promotion and protection for human rights.   The 
UK Department for International Development (DFID), now Nepal’s largest bilateral 
donor, spent the largest proportion of its budget (28%) in 2009-2010 on governance as 
well as growth. 
64
  Programs funded included the Nepal Peace Trust Fund, the RDIF, the 
LGDCP, the Community Support Program and the Enabling State Program (ESP) which is 
self-described as a pro-poor governance program.   Of these, the ESP has the largest 
budget. The second phase of the ESP’s program support began in 2009 and saw the 
continuation of funding to the UNDP-led Support to the Participatory Constitution-
building in Nepal program; as well as smaller funds for increasing the participation of 
Janajati women, Madheshis and Muslims in the constitution-writing process; promoting 
access to justice for the Madhes via community mediation projects;  evidenced-based 
lobbying by Dalit organizations; a weekly television program (that included televised 
public interaction forums) and a Public Financial Management Project – that provide 
technical assistance to the government (ESP 2010).   Apart from the latter, the principal 
focus has again been on citizen  “voice” and advocacy.65   
 
115. There are exceptions to this trend. One of GTZ’s three priority areas is local governance 
and civil society, and support is being provided for the enhancement of government, civil 
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  Japan is an exception here in that its governance program consists of technical support to the state in 
monitoring and evaluation, participatory watershed management and local governance, gender mainstreaming 
and social inclusion and reform of the civil code and related laws.  
64
  http://www.dfid.gov.uk/where-we-work/asia-south/nepal/?tab=2 
65
  However, DFID’s Livelihoods and Forestry Program, which promotes more equitable, efficient, and 
sustainable use of forests by rural communities, does utilize public audits. 
53 
 
society, democratic self-administration and the participation of local people in poverty 
reduction measures.  A key intervention is the Urban Development through Local Efforts 
program which seeks to enhance the capacities of municipalities to plan and control their 
development through multi-stakeholder cooperation, involving municipal administrations, 
line ministries and CSOs.   Among other ongoing governance programs, The US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) initiated in 2008 the Nepal Government Citizen 
Partnership Project that aims to promote effective governance in Morang District in the 
eastern Tarai. The goal is to improve the ability of local officials to work with 
communities in development planning, including through enhanced transparency and 
access to information.  Ward Citizen Forums have been established to increase citizen 
participation in the local government planning process an to engage members of 
marginalized communities in local development.
66
 The Swiss Development Corporation 
(SDC), apart from contributing to the LGCDP, is now supporting Phase Four of a Good 
Governance Project implemented by Pro-Public to raise citizen’s awareness of governance 
and to increase their capacity to demand more accountable, transparent and participatory 
government.  Importantly, it also works with public authorities to increase their 
knowledge, capacity and overall effectiveness.   The Sahakarya I project funded by CIDA 
seeks to build self-reliant communities and promotes equitable and representative CBOs 
capable of managing local resources and interacting with locally elected bodies and 
government agencies. 
116. Apart from assistance to the CA and larger government institutions associated with the 
peace process (such as the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction) and now the LGCDP, 
there has been relatively less attention paid by donors to the “supply” side of the 
equation – enhancing the will and capacity of government actors to be responsive to 
citizen demands and building constructive state-citizen relations especially at the 
district and local levels. A 2008 evaluation of citizens’ voice and accountability in Nepal 
by seven donor partners
67
 noted that most interventions have focused on strengthening 
citizens’ voice (i.e. promoting the expression of citizen’s views, opinions and 
preferences) as opposed to actively promoting accountability (i.e. actions aimed at 
enhancing the transparency, responsiveness and answerability of the government and 
their exposure to sanctions) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark: 2008.)
68
  
117. There have, however, been some important initiatives by CSOs to directly help the 
government be more effective and accountable by engaging in policy dialogue, 
monitoring and evaluating government actions, and providing feedback and “constructive 
criticism.”  One notable example is the important role that has been played by FECOFUN 
in advocating for participatory forest management, securing and defending the rights of 
CFUGs and contributing to the development of forest sector policy. Box 1 describes some 
of the important activities of FECOFUN and also discusses the obstacles and constraints 
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  For a review of the program, see http://nepal.usaid.gov/our-work/program-area/democracy-and-
governance/334-nepal-government-citizen-partnership-project-ngcpp.html 
67
  The evaluation was  one of five such evaluations being carried out by the Evaluation Core Group established 
by seven donor partners from Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.  
68
    It is interesting to note here that a review of citizen mobilizations in Nepal stated that most group 
mobilization programs and projects do not link with local body processes (Jha et al. 2009: xvii). 
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that they have faced in promoting citizen participation and social accountability in the 
forest sector. 
 
Box 1 - Promoting citizen participation and social accountability in the forest sector 
 
Consistently pushing for participatory forest management, FECOFUN has engaged at various 
levels (from local to national) and utilized the judiciary (they have filed many cases against the 
state) as well as engaging in policy discussions and feedback. They have, however, also faced a 
number of important obstacles and constraints. Despite the rhetoric of participatory development, a 
review of forest policy decisions from 1998 to 2004 found that, apart from two cases, actual policy 
decisions were made by forest officials on the basis of their claimed advantages of bureaucratic 
and scientific knowledge.  Agendas forwarded by forest bureaucrats were less likely to be opened 
up for policy debates and there was a tendency to exclude citizens from policy deliberations.  
Citizens were allowed to voice issues in consultative events, but not allowed to participate in 
defining agendas and the process of consultation  (Ohja et al.2007).   The review also noted that 
progressive laws prepared by parliament were “consistently distorted by the subsequent decisions 
on local forestry governance” (Ojha et al. 2007: 15). For example, the landmark Forest Act of 
1993 recognizes forest user groups as perpetually self-governed institutions to claim 100 percent of 
the benefits from the management of forest handed over to them.  However, the actual contract 
between local forest official and the CFUG includes the following provision “notwithstanding 
whatever is written in the previous clauses, the CFUG will follow written and verbal orders of 
forest officials and staff” (Ojha et al. 2007: 11).69    
 
In the current context of structural inequalities, institutional weaknesses and personalized power 
relations, formal mechanisms and laws are often sidelined.   For example, existing hierarchal and 
unequal power relations between CFUGs and forest officials allow District Forest Officers to take 
unnecessary and extra legal control (Ojha 2009) and contribute to the overall fear and reluctance 
of ordinary CFUGs members to deal with the warden and national park rangers.   According to 
one analysis, “Since the Warden is a one-person judge, people are indeed scared for he can do 
anything at any time” (Timsina and Paudel 2003: 12).  Overall, not only do villagers perceive 
forest officials as personally possessing the power and services attached to their offices, officials 
see their services to villages as personal favors rather than as their duty (Thoms 2004: 153). The 
situation lends itself to elite capture, as only the more educated and powerful are willing and able 
to negotiate with forest officials.  
 
Source: Ojha et al 2007; Ojha 2009; Timsina and Paudel 2003; Thoms 2004  
 
118. Among donor-supported social accountability initiatives in Nepal, it is probably the 
larger INGOs - such as ActionAid, CARE Nepal and Save the Children that have 
gone furthest in integrating social accountability tools into their work. These 
organizations have sought both to amplify citizen voice and to work with government 
agencies to respond in a responsible and transparent manner. Overall, public hearings 
appear to be the most widespread social accountability method used in Nepal, 
followed by public audits. Boxes 2 and 3 describe two examples of how public hearings 
and public audits have been used to enhance the performance of VDCs and to enhance 
governance in the forestry sector achieve results   Other social accountability tools used or 
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  This provision, contrary to the spirit of the law, was made possible by clauses inserted in the Forest Rules 
1995, ostensibly according to the Forest Act 1993.  As the DFO will not hand over the forest without the signing 
of the contract, local CFUGs are forced to comply (Ohja et al 2007: 11). 
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supported by these organizations include: social audits, community scorecards and citizen 
report cards,  
 
Box 2 - Public hearings make an impact at the VDC level 
 
The community radio station Radio Madan Pokhara in Palpa regularly conducts public hearings.   
Success stories from such endeavors include one VDC secretary repaying Rs 53,000 that he had 
taken and another who initiated public hearings in three election areas after being impressed by the 
community radio’s work.  Furthermore, according to Programme Manager Ramesh Aryal, while 
VDC secretaries are initially reluctant to undertake such public hearings, they often become 
positive after the experience.  One secretary, after undergoing the hearing and understanding the 
benefits, even apologized for consistently attempting to avoid holding the hearing and committed to 
initiating the hearing next year himself.   Furthermore, a public hearing on the fluctuating rates of 
jeep fares conducted last year resulted in a public commitment from jeep syndicates to maintain 
standardized prices.   This, according to the Aryal, was a very popular intervention as it directly 
impacted the daily lives of locals and demonstrated the effectiveness of such activities. 
 
Source: Madan Pokhara VDC, Palpa Field Notes, 2010 
 
 
Box 3 – Public audits bring results in Bardia District 
 
In the forest sector, CARE has implemented two USAID-funded projects with five Community 
Forest Users’ Groups in Bardia district aimed at ensuring good governance in the management 
and especially equitable distribution of natural resources.   Through the use of public audits of 
plans, progress and financial transactions, the CFUGS have been able to: recover misappropriated 
or misused funds reverse decisions made by the Executive Committees that were not in favor of 
general users; promote pro-poor activities; increase networking activities (through affiliation with 
FECOFUN) and; increase the number of women in key positions (Gentle et al 2007: 64-65).   
Furthermore, there has been a multiplier effect. CFUGS who began conducting public audits on a 
regular basis, have also demanded that VDC, school road work budgets and expenditures be made 
public (Gentle et al. 2007: 64).   
 
Source: Gentle et al 2007 
 
119. The stock-taking exercise, however, revealed a high level of variation and 
inconsistency in the definition and use of such tools by donors and NGOs.  The MLD 
has developed Public Audit and Public Hearing guidelines and has now finalized an 
implementation strategy for accountability procedures (GoN/MLD 2067vs). However, 
only a few organizations were found to utilize them. The Association for International 
NGOs has developed social audit guidelines, but has not made them mandatory for its 
members.
70
 Donors and INGOs tend to use their own tools and processes – each of which 
are defined and applied in different ways. For example, Helvetas, uses the term public 
hearing to refer to multi-stakeholder discussions about community needs and priorities 
conducted during project planning phase. A public review is a participatory method of 
                                                     
70
 In an interview, Ramesh Adhikari of ActionAid stated that there were various definitional and conceptual 
problems with the guidelines prepared by AIN, and that ActionAid had submitted inputs, hoping that they would 
revise the drafts that had been circulated. 
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monitoring progress during the implementation of the project and public audit is the 
participatory method of evaluating project commitments after its completion. These 
definitions and understandings vary considerably from the way that the government and/or 
other NGOs use the same terms. 
120. Furthermore, while many donor agencies require the implementation of social 
accountability approaches in the projects they support, these are not always applied 
to their own activities or extended to their partner organizations. For example, 
ActionAid systematically conducts social audits of its own organization and requires its 
local NGO partners to do likewise. Save the Children Nepal requires its partners to 
conduct social audits while Helvetas Nepal applies social accountability tools at the project 
level, but does not make such requirements of its partners. While numerous bilateral and 
multilateral donors support and require social accountability practices at the project level, 
they seldom apply principles of downwards accountability in the context of their own 
budgets and programs. 
121. Key elements for social accountability do exist in Nepal– including citizens’ legal access 
to information, opportunities to voice opinions, needs and concerns and a history of strong 
associational practices.  Donor attention to date has focused mostly on raising awareness of 
citizen rights and supporting advocacy. It is now important to expand support to 
operationalizing the Right to Information Act, developing accountability-oriented research 
capacities, strengthening and channeling of citizens’ voices and establishing mechanisms 
for constructive dialogue with state actors.  Despite the long-standing problem of donor 
coordination – evident in the multiple definitions of terminologies used – there have been 
successful initiatives to help the government become more affective and accountable.  
They demonstrate the potential for the success of social accountability interventions, 
despite socio-cultural obstacles and the difficult political transition period.  
 
 
SECTION V - AN ANALYSIS OF CONDITIONS FOR SOCIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PRAN’S THREE FOCAL AREAS 
 
122. While the PRAN will support strategies for the general promotion of social accountability 
across all sectors there are three priority thematic areas: public financial management, 
municipal governance and community-based monitoring and evaluation of basic public 
services.  An analysis of the conditions of social accountability in these three areas 
follows.  
 
a. Public Financial Management   
 
123. The institutional basis of public financial management (PFM) in Nepal is centered 
around the Ministry of Finance, its Budget Division, and the Financial Comptroller 
General’s Office.  A Taxpayer Office, the spending units of central ministries and other 
agencies are also a part of the system. At the local level, line agency offices, the District 
Development Fund, Village Development Fund, and the District Treasury Control Office 
play central roles in the PFM system. Accounting and auditing of local bodies are 
maintained as per the Local Self-Governance Act and the Local Bodies Financial 
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Administration Regulation, and central-level audits are carried out by the Office of the 
Auditor General.  
 
124. The 2009-2011 Nepal Interim Strategy of the World Bank noted a number of 
weaknesses in the field of PFM. Prominent issues included: lagging payment arrears, 
limited tax collections, lack of effectiveness of both internal and external audits and the 
need to accelerate movement towards internationally accepted accounting and auditing 
standards.  Assessments have revealed that while an advanced set of laws, regulations and 
processes exist, actual PFM practices indicate “gaps in the control framework, constraints 
on implementation and large fiscal activities outsides the scope of the central government 
budget” (World Bank 2007b:15).  The government’s own 2008 Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability Assessment (PEFA) noted that fiduciary risk was “high.” 
Proposed steps to address this risk included: the establishment of a PEFA steering 
committee and a PEFA Secretariat for the implementation of the PEFA Action Plan; 
continued strengthening of the Public Procurement Monitoring Office; capacity building of 
the Office of the Auditor General and the establishment of PEFA implementation units in 
fifteen ministries (NPPR 2009).    
 
125. Identified shortcomings with regard to the budget include an expansionary budget, 
very low capital formation, increasing recurrent expenditures and weaknesses in 
implementation capacity due to the deteriorating law and order situation and the late 
approval of plans (World Bank 2010: 19).  More specific concerns include:  no advance 
preparation of sectoral target/indicators; budget allocation not linked with sectoral targets 
and priorities; specific projects included in the budget without a detailed study, and a 
concentration of capital expenditure at the last trimester of the budget year (NPPR 2009: 
23).  Monitoring and evaluations are seen to be particularly weak.  This stems from low 
commitment to monitoring and evaluation, the absence of a monitoring and evaluation 
policy, lack of budgeting for such activities (across government operations), insufficient 
capacity building efforts and a lack of integrated information systems established at the 
center to link with line agencies and districts (NPPR 2009: 24).  On the positive side, a 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) has been introduced in order to promote 
sound, policy-based budgets.  
 
126. At the national level, the absence of an Auditor General (due to the inability of 
political parties to agree on a candidate) for almost four years has affected already 
weak oversight mechanisms.  Years of political instability have resulted in feeble 
external oversight on budget preparation, especially between 2002 and 2006 when there 
was no parliament.  While the Public Accounts Committee of the CA/legislature has 
resumed work, the last-minute passing of this year’s budget via an ordinance (therefore 
allowing for no real inquiry or debate on the budget or the MTEF in Parliament) again 
accentuates the difficulties of enforcing external scrutiny in the prolonged period of 
political uncertainty. Both annual audit reports and scrutiny have historically focused on 
“irregularities” rather than the identifying and correcting of systemic issues. Furthermore, 
there is little evidence of follow-up on the irregularities identified by the Auditor General 
(World Bank 2007b: 16).   
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127. The lack of public access to information about national and local-level government 
accounts and contracts further reduces the potential for external scrutiny and audit.  
What information is made public is incomplete and lacks user-friendliness (World Bank 
2007b: 88). Overall, public demand for information on public finances is weak, linked 
to a lack of expertise on financial and budgetary analysis among CSOs.  As a result, 
independent monitoring of the budget at the national level is extremely limited.  The 
announcement of the budget is usually given front page coverage alongside interviews 
with individual economists and experts on the ramifications of the budget. However, there 
are no sustained analyses of the budget through its cycles.  Relatively little attention has 
been given to building the capacity of civil society to monitor public budgets.  Some 
initiatives have included: a review of the national budget by the Society for Economic 
Journalists – Nepal in 200671, a training program for CSOs on budget issues by the 
Citizens’ Poverty Watch Forum in the same year72  and recent calls in the media for 
enhanced independent budget analysis as a key component of good governance (Bhurtel 
2010).   These have all been sporadic interventions.  More comprehensive analyses have 
been undertaken by Freedom Forum in the preparation of the Nepal report for the 
international Open Budget Initiative.  However, according to Krishna Sapkota, Program 
Coordinator at Freedom Forum, in 2006 and 2008 the country reports were not made 
public and the planned second stage of advocacy based on the analyses were not 
undertaken for various reasons.  This resulted in a lost opportunity to increase public 
debates on these issues.  
 
128. At the local level, effective PFM, participatory governance and accountability are 
constrained from the outset by the lack of meaningful decentralization – especially 
fiscal decentralization – that has actually taken place, despite public commitments.73  In 
2005-2006, 92 percent of total public expenditures took place at the central government 
level, with only eight percent transferred to local authorities.  Furthermore, the central 
government collected 95 percent of all national revenue, with only five percent collected at 
the local level (ADB 2009a: 13).  While local bodies do have the authority to tax, the 
major taxes such as VAT, income tax and excise duties are under the jurisdiction of the 
central government (World Bank 2007b: 91). According to a 2009 ADB assessment, the 
central government retains a “very high” decision-making role with regard to public sector 
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  http://www.sejon.com.np/?page_id=6 accessed October 22, 2010 
72
  http://www.internationalbudget.org/pdf/newsletter10.pdf accessed October 22, 2010 
73
  Fiscal transfers from the center are the principal source of revenue of all local bodies in Nepal. They are 
divided into conditional grants and unconditional grants. Unconditional grants to local bodies are given 
according to a Minimum Conditions/Performance Measures (MC/PM) system. The system seeks to reward local 
bodies that have performed well on select indicators with greater resources. The basic pre-condition to receive 
funds is compliance with the minimum conditions. Once these are met, allocation under the MC/PM system is 
formula-based.  In terms of “Minimum Conditions” – there are 15 indicators in four working areas, while for 
“Performance Measures” there are 40 indicators (Local Body Fiscal Commission 2009).  Importantly, the 
minimum conditions include social accountability indicators.  For example, they stipulate that a social audit and 
public hearing must be undertaken within four months of the completion of projects. Other frameworks for 
budgeting include Expanded Block Guidelines DDC (2065) which earmark 30% of the total DDC budget for 
projects to benefit women and disadvantaged groups, of which at least half is to be spent on women and 
children.  The DDC is responsible for planning, implementing and monitoring participatory development 
programs in the district, based on VDC plans and development programs.  The DDC holds monthly meetings 
with all VDCs and annual meetings with district line offices. 
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spending, with expenditure shares in poorer regions depending on personal influence 
(ADB 2009a Annex II: 26).   Among local bodies, Kathmandu and other larger 
municipalities have strong institutional bases; but this is not true across the board.  Two-
thirds of all municipalities would not be able to survive without central grants and 
programs (ADB 2009a Appendix II: 31).   Furthermore, the nature of budget 
implementation mechanisms at the district level is complex, with the funds and goods 
passing through many layers and different paths before they reach service delivery units.
74
 
While district approval of all budgets of development-related line agencies in the district is 
required, districts authorities have no say in the choice of programs or allocations that are 
driven by the central line agencies (ADB 2009a Annex II: 43).   Under the current system, 
therefore, the DDCs are not made more autonomous, but function as a “financial 
intermediary” with no authority, merely serving to make the disbursement process more 
complicated (World Bank 2007: 95).    
 
129. According to a governance risk assessment (ADB 2009b)75, PFM issues in local bodies 
are characterized by: excessive involvement of political parties in the selection and 
implementation of projects; increasing levels of mismanagement and a lack of 
capacity to manage PFM protocols including revenue generation.  Budgets were found 
not to be in line with actual revenue generation, with programs selected according to the 
support of political leaders and pressure groups despite revenue constraints.  The link 
between annual budgets and annual plans was not clear.  Furthermore, many budgets were 
not passed on time. Weak financial management systems were evident in most local 
bodies, hindering their ability to link capital budgets to a multi-year perspective of project 
financing in line with periodic plans.  The lack of predictability of government grants 
(despite the Minimum Conditions/Performance Measures system) has resulted in an 
overall inability to engage in multi-year financial planning.  The assessment found that 
financial plans were not in line with overall development goals and that the budget 
monitoring as a measure of financial performance did not take place.  Auditing weaknesses 
were evident, with stocks of unsettled accounts dating back several years in a number of 
locations. A lack of transparency in local level financial management was also evident.  
While budgets were published on municipal boards, “key fiscal aspects such as 
documented annual budget reports, in-year budget execution reports, year-end financial 
statements and external audit reports are not generally publicized by most municipalities” 
(ADB 2009b: 21).    
130. Local bodies appear to follow the Public Procurement Act but weaknesses were 
evident. These included: general lack of a proper procurement plan and specific 
procurement manuals; a lack of awareness of the new amendments and no separate 
procurement units with trained procurement officers (ADB 2009b:27). The limited degree 
of integration of procurement plans into financial management systems at the local level 
was also evident.  Many problems related to transparency and corruption in procurement 
                                                     
74
  For example, funds are transferred to the respective district agencies for primary schoolteachers, agriculture 
extension workers and livestock personnel.  In terms of basic health services, most districts the DDC sends 
funds to the District Health office, but in some, funds are released from the DDF to the VDF who then makes 
them available to local institutions (World Bank 2007: 94). 
75
  The following borrows from the finding of the ADB 2009 assessment: 21-30.  
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are apparent: (i) the ratio of bids submitted to documents distributed is very low, usually 
with submissions just meeting mandatory requirements, (ii) collusion is rampant with 
successful bids very close to the budgetary provisions; (iii) the practice of technical audits 
is nominal and there is low level of monitoring of procurement works; (iv) threats, 
intimidation, and extortion are common practices; and (v) bribes and corruption are 
accepted and taken for granted (ADB 2009b: 27). The Public Procurement Act of 2007 
provides for a blacklisting of violators, but enforcement is weak.  
131. The weaknesses apparent in terms of PFM at the local level need to be situated 
within the larger context of structural weaknesses now exacerbated by transitional 
political instabilities.   One obstacle is the limited institutional capacity of the MLD, 
responsible for the oversight of the local bodies. MLD lacks staff, skills, mandates and 
capacity to both monitor local bodies and implement a rapidly expanding program of 
activities.  For example, even when districts have undertaken internal audits, those reports 
are rarely reviewed (ADB 2009b: 20).   PFM reviews have highlighted the continuing need 
for better support from the center – including more budget predictability in budget 
preparation and implementation, simpler guidelines delivered on time from the center, 
greater clarity in sectoral responsibilities and the formalization of the budget formulation 
cycle specifying timing and responsibilities for all actors involved in the process (World 
Bank 2007: 94). 
 
132. Lack of capacity is also a key issue at local levels.  For example, VDC and municipal 
secretaries have almost identical financial management responsibilities, regardless of size 
and capacity.  These include maintaining up-to-date accounts, records of income, 
expenditure, projects and properties; managing expenditures; arranging for audits of 
accounts and clearance of audit queries; and managing staff (ADB 2010  Annex II: 31).    
Over the last decade, the workload of VDCs has increased four or five-fold (ADB 2010 
Annex II: 54).  Originally designed (as a one-person office) to manage small expenditures, 
most VDC offices now lack the capacity to effectively manage increased government 
transfers and grants to the local level (ADB 2010 Annex II: 35).  The Local Development 
Officer (LDO) office which is supposed to work as the secretary of the whole DDC 
(planning, coordinating and monitoring all programs and activities of the district) is 
usually only able to monitor the inputs and outputs of DDC activities because of capacity 
constraints (ADB 2010 Annex II: 54).  
 
133. In addition to these structural weaknesses, the lack of local level elections and the 
appointment of local bureaucrats assisted by the APM, has rendered ineffective 
existing accountability mechanisms at the local level.  Accountability mechanisms 
include: a committee (under the chairpersonship of the member of Parliament for the 
district, with the DDC chairperson, DDC member and other relevant employees) to 
supervise and monitor the implementation of DDC plans; external audits (VDC auditors 
are appointed by the DDCs, the municipal council appoints a registered auditor on the 
recommendation of the Accounts Committee and the DDC uses the services of the Auditor 
General) and  Accounts Committees (which review financial reports and give directions 
for the settlement of irregularities and the organization of social audits for all community-
managed local development activities) (World Bank 2007b: 98).  As noted before, in the 
absence of elected officials, it is the civil servants of the MLD, assisted by the All-Party 
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Mechanism, who  are invested with the authority of elected officials according to MLD 
provisions for monitoring and reviewing in the interim period.   With local authorities 
accountable to their central line agencies, and politicians accountable to their parties, 
neither of these two groups have an incentive to adopt good governance practices or to 
respond to citizens needs.   
 
134. At the community level, much more emphasis has been given to participatory 
planning than to budget monitoring. However, some initiatives have been undertaken.  
Box 4 describes the example of the Citizens’ Action Program (Nagarik Aawaz) 
implemented by the Federation of Water and Sanitation Users in Nepal (FEDWASUN) 
in coordination with WaterAid Nepal, that aims to improve governance in the water and 
sanitation sector by means of citizens’ action and budget tracking. 
 
Box 4 – Promoting accountable public financial management in the water and sanitation sector 
 
Since 2005, the Federation of Water and Sanitation Users in Nepal (FEDWASUN) in coordination 
with WaterAid Nepal. has been implementing a Citizens’ Action Program (Nagarik Aawaz)   in 
Ilam, Makawanpur, Dhading, Baglung Pyuthan and Baitadi districts of Nepal, with plans to expand 
to other districts in 2011. The focus is on helping to make service providers accountable, 
responsive and provide services in sustainable and equitable manner. In Ilam, the project analyzed 
the budgets and implementation status of state and non-state actors working in the district within 
the drinking water and sanitation sector. Findings were made  public by means of a radio program 
as well as community discussions and public hearings.   Positive results included citizen’s 
becoming aware that government rules require that 20 percent of the government budget be 
allocated to water and sanitation which led to the consequent raising of the district ’s budget for 
the sector from three to twelve percent. Furthermore 17 case studies were undertaken, focusing on 
questions of financial transparency raised by the community.. This revealed various ongoing 
irregularities, such as state officials asking for percentage cuts from budgets.   Achievements 
included public commitments from relevant offices on the implementation of rules and economic 
transparency. For both the public hearings and the stakeholder discussions, a wide-range of 
stakeholders were invited, including the drinking water office, VDC, DDC administrative offices, 
education,  municipality, NGOs in the sector, excluded groups etc.
76
  This enabled meaningful 
participation as well building constructive relations with local body authorities. 
 
 
135. Obstacles to such initiatives stem from the general reluctance of state actors to 
divulge information, the consequent basic lack of knowledge of government 
budgetary allocations, the absence of demand for such information and the low 
capacity of organizations to analyze the budget.  Given the donor-dependent nature 
of NGOs and civil society, the lack of historical attention given by donors to civil 
society oversight of budgetary concerns is both an obstacle and an opportunity.   
Some initiatives have recently started.  For example, WaterAid Nepal, based on its 
experience with budget advocacy, has recently produced a “budget primer” to equip civil 
society advocates with basic practical tools for analyzing the budget analysis and engaging 
in the four phases of the budget cycle.  While intended for those working in the water and 
sanitation sector, the primer is relevant to the larger audience of civil society advocates 
working with communities (WaterAid 2010). 
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  Ilam Field Notes 2010.  
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b. Municipal Governance 
136. Seventeen percent of the population of Nepal live in urban areas.77  These include: one 
metropolis (Kathmandu), four sub-metropolises (Biratnagar, Lalitpur, Pokhara, and 
Birganj), and 53 municipalities.
78
  As at the district level and VDC level, municipalities 
have the power to collect taxes (including: land, property and house taxes; taxes on certain 
natural resources and commodities; tolls, and; various user chargers) and pass local 
budgets.
 79
  They have been assigned expenditure responsibilities including education, sub-
health posts, agriculture extension and small roads.   
 
137. Participatory governance at the local level is circumscribed by the unfinished process 
of decentralization. Consequently, the governance of municipalities, as with other 
local bodies, is complicated by the dominance of central bodies and their line 
agencies, as well as the overall economic dependence on central transfers as noted in 
the previous section.  The institutional framework for urban planning and 
management is unclear and complex.
80
  The National Planning Commission the Ministry 
of Physical Planning and Works (MPPW) and the MLD are all directly involved in the 
urban sector.  Under the MPPW, the Department of Urban Development and Building 
Construction and the Department of Water Supply and Sewerage are implementing 
agencies and the Town Development Fund (TDF) has been set up as an autonomous 
agency. The TDF provides financial (grants and loans) and technical support for 
infrastructure (water, drainage, sewerage, solid waste management etc) as well as revenue 
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  The current rate of urbanization is 4.9%, which is four times the population growth rate (1.28%) (ADB 2010: 
5).  Urbanization is unevenly distributed; 52% of the total urban population is in nine of the largest urban areas 
(ADB 2010 : 6). 
78
 A metropolis  (Mahanagarpalika) is defined as a municipality with a minimum population of 300,000, annual 
revenue of at least NRs400 million, and facilities including electricity, drinking water, communications, paved 
roads, specialized health services, at least one university and other higher educational institutions in different 
fields, and international sporting events. Similarly, a sub-metropolis (upa-mahanagarpalika) is a municipality 
with a minimum population of 100,000, annual revenue of NRs100 million, electricity, drinking water, 
communications, paved roads, education and health services of a high standard, general infrastructure for 
national and international sporting events, public parks, and a city hall. Municipalities (nagarpalika) are defined 
as having annual revenue of NRs5 million for the Tarai and NRs 0.5 million for the hill and/or mountain region 
together with minimum urban facilities such as electricity, drinking water, roads, and communications. Criteria 
such as population density, occupational structure and nodal function as to relates to urban-led rural regional 
development, has never been used in designating urban areas (ADB 2010: 5).  
 
79
 Resource-sharing mechanisms are in place at the local level.  DDC levies and taxes on minor natural 
resources are to be shared with municipalities and VDCS; while the VDCs and municipalities levy and collect 
malpot (land tax) that is to be shared with their respective DDC.  However, this does not function in practice. In 
2007-2008,  only a few VDCS were found to have transferred revenue to the DDC and none of the 
municipalities had given the required 25 percent of the malpot collection to the DDC (ADB 2010a: v).  
Municipalities as a whole enjoy comparatively better financial and administrative autonomy compared to DDCs 
and VDCs and are less likely to coordinate their activities with these other local bodies (Brownell and Rai 2002: 
44). 
80
  In terms of the future federal structure and the complications it will bring into governing dynamics, it is 
important to note that the municipalities are unevenly distributed among the proposed provinces in the current 
CA drafts.   Jadan and Sherpa provinces do not have a single municipality, while Limbuwan has one and 
Tamuwan, Tamsaling, Sunkoshi, Karnali and Magarat have two each (Martin Chautari 2010: 10).   
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generating activities in municipalities (ADB 2010b: 37).  The MLD has a Municipal 
Management division with its own secretary and three sections – Municipal Management, 
Municipal Planning and Environment Management. 
81
  Different line agencies of other 
ministries also implement their own work.  Thus, although the Local Self-Governance 
Act empowers municipalities to prepare their own plans and programs, in practice a 
multitude of other actors intervene.  For example, the MPPW is responsible for the 
policy measures, projects and programs related to urban infrastructure development. 
Among other institutions, both the DWSS, and the Department of Local Infrastructure 
Development and Agricultural Roads of the MLD are involved in the provision of water 
supply and sanitation services.  The multiplicity of agencies involved, different 
implementation modalities and the absence of a central coordination mechanism has made 
overall municipal planning and programming challenging.   According to an ADB report, 
coordination between the MLD and MPPW as well as other ministries providing urban 
utility services, is one of the three main challenges within the urban sector. 
82
  This 
challenge is also highlighted in the draft National Urban Policy recently approved by the 
cabinet (ADB 2009b: 39). 
 
138. As noted above, the MLD as the central oversight ministry for local bodies, has long 
been critiqued for its weak capacity. The MLD’s own evaluation of its role in the 
context of Managing for Development Results identifies it own capacity issues as: weak 
linkages between periodic and annual plans; weak monitoring and reporting systems, and 
the non-utilization of feedback into planning and other aspects of decision-making.
83
 The 
MLD’s growing responsibilities and workload have exacerbated these issues and have also 
impacted delivery.
84
  
 
139. Officially, municipalities are divided into wards.  Each ward elects a five member Ward 
Committee consisting of one ward chairperson, one woman member, and three ward 
members.  The Municipal council is composed of these elected Ward Committees and (6 
to 20) additional members nominated by the council, representing disadvantaged groups 
and women.  However, these elected bodies with their inclusive provisions, functioned for 
only three years.  Presently, in the absence of local elected bodies, all executive and 
decision-making responsibilities are in the hands of the centrally appointed Executive 
Officer, assisted by the APM in an advisory role.  A recent World Bank study found 
that, in general, the APM plays a powerful and interventionist role at the municipal 
level, and that neither the Executive Officer nor the un-elected members of the APM 
(who answer to their parties) are accountable to citizens (Adhikari and Sijapati 2010: 
19, 22). Unsurprisingly, the absence of elective representatives, who would be accountable 
                                                     
81
   Within the MLD itself, it has been argued that rural policies and programs overshadow urban issues within 
MLD (Brownell and Rai 2002:35).  
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  The other two challenges are unplanned urban growth and the lack of manpower and infrastructure.  
83
 Ministry of Local Development.  Managing for development results.  
http://www.npc.gov.np/mfdr/?tour=m_ld accessed November 25, 2010. 
 
84
 For example, the Department of Local Infrastructure Development and Agricultural Roads was originally 
meant to construct roads according to the Agriculture Perspective Plan.  However, it is now to provide technical 
support and monitor and evaluate infrastructure projects development projects of the local bodies. 
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to citizens, has resulted in a high level of corruption (especially in terms of contractors and 
tenders), the spread of clientelism and nepotism, the overall capture of the planning 
process by political parties, and the distribution of projects according to political party 
patronage purposes.   (Adhikari and Sijapati 2010: 23-28). More specifically, as noted 
above, the accountability mechanisms provided for by the Local Self-Governance Act rely 
upon the village, municipal and district level councils, committee system and audit 
committees which currently do not function as intended.     
 
140. There is widespread perception of  lack of accountability in the current municipality 
arrangements, with little recourse for citizens. Reviews have found that planning and 
monitoring, especially in smaller municipalities, are weak due to a lack of qualified staff.  
While quarterly progress reporting and public audits are common practice in all 
municipalities, these are limited only to projects funded from central resources and non-
devolved sectors. Municipalities do not initiate independent evaluations of their own 
performance (ADB 2010a appendix II: 35).  Respondents noted a clear deterioration in the 
provision of services without elected officials. For example, field research found that while 
residents Mechinagar municipality had given up land for the building of a road (thereby 
holding up the 25-30% cost input from residents), the municipality had yet to allocate 
budget for the road, despite prior commitments.   A member of the Nawadip Tole 
Development Committee noted,  “What the municipality gives is not known, only what the 
municipality should give is known,” highlighting the lack of information and transparency.  
 
141. The interim governing mechanism has also affected social accountability initiatives.  
Although citizen charters are required as part of the Minimum Conditions and Performance 
Measure, and were said to be “strictly implemented” by interviewed municipality 
department officers in the MLD, findings and reports from the field reveal different 
scenarios.
85
 A study of the Kathmandu municipality office in 2007 revealed that only 50% 
of those seeking municipal services  knew of Citizen Charters and only 40% knew a help 
desk existed (INLOGOS 2064vs). As a result of the interim governing arrangements and 
current political instability, mechanisms intended to promote transparency and citizen 
participation (such as ministerial websites, suggestion boxes and citizen charters) have had 
little impact (Adhikari and Sijapati 2010: 23-24).    
 
142. A key obstacle, related to all of the above, is the lack of information. While the MLD 
has introduced the Participatory Municipal Planning process - building upon the successful 
experiences of the UNDP funded Rural Urban Partnership Programme -   there are clear 
information gaps enabling political party capture of processes.   For example, in Leknath 
municipality, the municipality staff claimed that all information about ward and 
municipality plans was disseminated through the media, with the budget published in 
council booklets.  However, in the course of focus group discussions, members of 
community associations (that were able to provide detailed breakdowns for the six lakhs 
they were allocated) were surprised to hear that the total budget of the municipality was 11 
crore.  The head of the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) and member 
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  Citizen charters were first introduced by the government in 1998 via the “Guideline for making Effective the 
Governmental Services (Acharya 2010: 16). After being piloted in twelve municipalities in 2005 (under the 
RUPP), it is now mandatory for all government offices to have Citizen Charters. 
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of the Mechinagar municipality periodic planning committee claimed that it was only after 
he became a member of the committee that he found out the municipality had various 
amounts of resource allocations for Janajatis.  
 
143. The fact that civil society organizations and municipal authorities continue to engage 
with each other in various capacities represents an important opportunity.  Of CSOs 
working in the urban sector, User Groups and Tole Lane Organizations (TLOs) are 
particularly important.  User groups are official actors in the local governance; the 
LGSA and the Local Government Financial Administration Regulations 1999 require that 
all local bodies give priority to User Groups in projects that cost less than Rs. 6.5 million.  
Generally consisting of members from the locality where the project is being implemented, 
the User Groups take responsibility for project implementation and management (Adhikari 
and Sijapati 2010: 12).  The Local Self-Governance Act stipulates that User Groups 
include at least 30 percent women, with one in a leading position, and that the participation 
of Janajatis and Dalits be encouraged (Adhikari and Sijapati 2010: 13). The municipality is 
geographically divided into community organizations – the Tole-Lane Level Organizations 
(TLO) - with membership of each TLO comprising the households falling within the 
assigned boundaries.  TLOs were conceptualized as part of the key civil society 
mobilization process aimed at facilitating decentralized urban planning and management as 
well as improving rural-urban linkages, local resource mobilization, poverty alleviation 
and empowerment of women and community at large.  Affirmative action policies exist to 
ensure a significant representation of disadvantaged groups in TLO leadership (Adhikari 
and Shrestha 2007: 4).   
144. It is mandatory under the Local Self-Governance Act for local bodies to prepare 
periodic plans
86
  according to a participatory planning process.  The Act calls for a 
multi-stakeholder Steering Committee made up of: representatives from local bodies, ward 
offices, government agencies, political parties/leaders, marginalized groups, civil society, 
the private sector, NGOs, TLOs, intellectuals, prominent citizens, professional bodies and 
the planning team.  This provision has allowed the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, and a range of other CBOs and CSOs, to contribute to the 
planning processes of municipalities. In terms of process, each municipal ward office 
convenes an annual meeting to formulate a ward development plan based on the needs and 
priorities identified and presented by TLOs. Each ward has a budget from the municipality 
of Rs1 lakh, sufficient for small infrastructure projects and maintenance, and priority is 
given to the demands of poor and excluded households.  TLO Coordination Committees 
exist to strengthen and unify TLOs (Adhikari and Shrestha 2007:9).   According to the 
UNDP, the TLOs now function as decentralized structures of the municipality - 
undertaking planning, the prioritization of development activities and the delivery certain 
services for the municipality.   A recent study of six municipalities revealed that the 
majority of projects were done by User Groups – which served to foster community 
participation, improve monitoring, reduce corruption and enhance quality (Adhikhari and 
Sijapati 2010: 25-26).   
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  The MLD has prepared a “Municipal periodic plan preparation manual,” approved by the National Planning 
Commission, with technical and financial support of GTZ and its Urban Development through Local Efforts 
program. 
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145. There are challenges to these forms of participatory governance activities and civic 
engagement.  The provision of the Local Government Financial Administration 
Regulation that projects less than Rs 6.5 million be given to User Groups is not always 
respected.  The limited capacity of User Groups, has resulted in an increasing trend of 
User Groups sub-contracting work in contravention of rules (Adhikari and Sijapati 2010: 
26).  Furthermore, the politicization of User Groups and TLOs (i.e. political parties  
installing members into these groups) is on the rise (Adhikhari and Sijapati 2010: 26).   
According to one civil society member in Jhapa, while all toles have TLOs, they have 
become increasingly politicized and “one has to look to see who is in the committee, to see 
how much it can be trusted”.    
146. Of the organizations working with municipalities, the Municipal Association of Nepal 
(MuAN) is key. Established in 1992 and officially constituted in 1994, all 58 
municipalities in Nepal are members of MuAN and represented in its General Assembly.
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The stated main aim of MuAN is “to work for overall development and common interest 
of municipal governments in the spirit of decentralization and good governance.” With 
their national and local level networks, history of policy level engagements and 
membership of past and present officials in their organization, MuAN is an important 
stakeholder and key partner for social accountability initiatives. Further information about 
the MuAN is provided in Box 5. 
Box 5 – The Municipal Association of Nepal 
The MuAN works at different levels and has a three-fold strategy which includes: empowering 
municipalities at the local level; creating an enabling legal and regulatory framework for local 
self-governance and good urban governance the national level; and networking with other 
municipal associations and networks at the international level.
88
 The fact that MuAN has been 
recognized by the government and included in several policy and steering committees -  including 
the Local Bodies Fiscal Commission; the Decentralization Implementation and Monitoring 
Committee;  in the Metropolitan Act Preparation committee and the National Development Council  
- is a testament to its capacity effectiveness (GTZ/UDLE 2006: 121).   In the absence of local 
elected officials, MuAN is currently working with the Association of District Development 
Committees in Nepal and the National Association of Village Development Committees in Nepal to 
empower local governments.  Of their current undertakings, their national level study on local 
government structures in the new federal Nepal is key.  According to MuAN Executive Secretary 
Kalanidhi Devkota, until elections at the local level take place, their strategy will focus on studying 
the new forms of municipalities, increasing the capacities of municipalities (via orientations, 
trainings, study visits, etc.) and documenting and disseminating the good practices of 
municipalities.  
Source: Interview with Kalandihi Devkota; MuAN website: 
http://www.muannepal.org.np/muan_introduction.php 
c. Community-based Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Services  
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 According to MuAN’s constitution, all municipal mayors, deputy mayors and ward chairpersons are eligible 
to join the General Assembly. A 21 member Working Committee is elected for two and a half  years, and a 
seven member Secretariat, formed from the Working Committee, runs the office full time. 
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  http://www.muannepal.org.np/muan_introduction.php accessed 30 September 2010 
67 
 
147. The implementation of the Local Self-Governance Act was initiated in 2001 with the 
decentralization of: basic health care (up to the level of sub-health posts), primary 
education, agricultural extension and postal services. In 2003-2004, the last was 
abandoned and small rural infrastructure (including drinking water and rural roads) was 
decentralized through the Local Infrastructure Development policy (2061vs) by shifting 
the District Technical Office to the DDC.  Like municipalities, DDC and VDCs have the 
power to approve taxes and pass local budgets. 
148. As noted above in the case of the municipalities, there is duplication and ambiguity in the 
division of responsibilities between local bodies and the central government. Twenty-three 
Acts that predate and contradict the Local Self-Governance Act have as yet to be corrected 
(ADB 2009a Annex II: 45).    The central government has not yet handed over district 
level development sector line agencies to DDCs and, in practice, retains strong 
control over the decentralized sectors. For example, most health posts have not been 
decentralized.  Only 14 out of 75 districts have handed over health posts to local 
management, leaving 61 still controlled by the center (ADB 2009a: 14).   In terms of local 
infrastructure, the project mode of financing has meant that planning and decision-making 
continue to reside with project approval committees in Kathmandu (ADB 2009a: 14).  
Agricultural extension budgets are prepared at the local level, but the department’s 
regional office continues to determine content due to the lack of local technical 
competence (ADB 2009a: 14).   The Ministry of Education, which is a policy-making 
body, is still involved in school administration, and the Department of Education continues 
to play an implementing role via District Education Offices, which are supposed to provide 
technical support for effective implementation butare engaged in administrative work.   In 
the education sector, therefore, a management structure has been built which ensures 
central control over decentralized provisions (UNESCO n.d.: 28).
89
 Lack of clarity also 
results in frequent interventions into the jurisdiction of the lower level bodies –for 
example, DDC interference into VDC and municipal affairs - thus creating tensions and 
affecting working relationships among local bodies (ADB 2009a Annex II: 55).  
 
149. Despite the absence of elected local authorities, established processes for 
participatory development planning provide an important opportunity for citizen 
engagement in decision-making and enhanced social accountability at local level.  As 
described above, the Local Self-Governance Act requires local bodies to employ a 
participatory, bottom-up planning process. The detailed 14-step process (designed with 
support from UNDP) starts at grassroots community level and includes: participatory 
needs identification, prioritization, resources estimation, feasibility study, etc.  
Participatory planning begins at the level of the village council (or at the ward level in the 
case of municipalities). The participation of women, Dalits and Janajatis is mandatory. At 
district level, there are provisions for varying degrees of involvement of associational 
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  There was no available date on the report which is currently available on the web.  However, the UNDP Asia 
Pacific Regional centre website notes that in 2007,  the UNDP Asia-Pacific Regional Center, United Nations 
Capital Development Fund, UNICEF and UNESCO undertook a joint initiative on “Improving Local Service 
Delivery for the MDGs.”  The website notes that the Nepal report has been completed, but provides no links or 
dates.  Of the two Nepal based centers which undertook the study – the Foundation for Human Development 
(FHD) and Research Inputs Development Action (RIDA) - the latter has stated on its website that it undertook 
the study from the period October 2008 to March 2009.  
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groups in the various committees convened by the DDC to scrutinize sectoral proposals 
and in the Integrated Planning Committee.
90
   
 
150. While the participatory development planning process is an important platform for 
citizen engagement, it is limited by a number of important constraints and obstacles. 
Principal obstacles to meaningful participatory governance include: the control extended 
by line ministries, the detailed guidelines imposed by the center, the “upwards” 
accountability of government staff to their line agencies and the lack of “downwards” 
accountability mechanisms. A recent review of social mobilization processes in Nepal 
found that “line agencies were not interested in the [participatory] plans or guided by it in 
terms of their activities” (Jha et al. 2009: 90).  While VDC plans presume that there will be 
coordination with line agencies, the same review found that there is significant resistance 
to being ‘told what to do’ by a village level plan and incentives for line agencies are not 
bottom up or oriented to people using their services
91
 (Jha et al 2009: 91).  The different 
planning and budget cycles for line agencies and local bodies result in line agencies having 
sent in their programs and budgets while local body planning processes are still underway.  
There is thus no integrated planning process and DDC councils rubber-stamp line-agency 
programs and projects.  The result is often not an articulated local development vision, but 
“a compilation of micro-projects, with little coordination and integration between 
DDC/VDC projects and line ministry programs” (World Bank 2007b: 94).   Local-level 
participatory planning is further undermined by resource constraints, the weak use of the 
plans by the central government, and in the current absence of elected officials, by the 
major roles taken by bureaucrats and political and local elite. A situation where citizen 
engagement in the planning processes leads to no discernable influence or outcomes runs 
the risk of resulting in “increased frustration with government on the part of ordinary 
citizens and greater likelihood of violent conflict over perceived injustice in the allocation 
of public resources and lack of transparency and effectiveness in their use” (Jha 2009: 108, 
111).   
 
151. Similarly, while local bodies and public service providers are legally required to 
implement social accountability practices (such as posting Citizen Charters and 
conducting social audits), very often these mechanisms are not effectively applied in 
practice.  For example, VDCs have been criticized for not holding public audits on time, 
or not at all, or conducting them only in a perfunctory manner – for example, inviting only 
friends and allies to hearings and distorting public audits with false information.  Similarly, 
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  The VDC Grant Operational Manual of 2065 (2008) require that a multi-stakeholder Integrated Planning 
Committee (IPC) be formed. A limitation is that civil society members of the committee (representing local 
NGOs, community organizations, indigenous people’s organizations, school management committees, etc.) are 
nominated by the VDC, rather than selected by their constituent groups (Jha et al 2009: 127). 
91
  In the education sector, for example, while a bottom-up planning process has been conceptualized through 
the participatory formulation and implementation of school implementation plans (SIPs), the SIPs are not 
consolidated in village and district level plans and the contribution of DDC and VDCs to the school level is low 
and often unaccounted for (UNESCO n.d. 51). Similarly in the forestry sector, bottom- up planning involving 
CFUGS conflict with the centralized nature of the forest bureaucracy regimented with set activities and targets.  
This leaves little room for customization according to local realities.  Further, the focus of DFOs, due to 
accountability lines, is on meeting set targets from the center and not responding to the plans made at the local 
level (Thoms 2004: 155-156).  
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it has been argued that Citizen Charters have become “toothless” and distorted in practice 
as VDC secretaries are absent and there are no enforcement mechanisms to hold service 
providers accountable (Jha et al 2009:  93). Social audits have reportedly been conducted 
in around 70% of community schools, but did not function as expected, possibly due to the 
poor quality questionnaire and lack of adequate preparation and facilitation (World Bank 
2010b: 16).   
 
152. As discussed above, the failure to effectively implement these mechanisms is linked to 
a number of factors including: lack of clear guidelines, dearth  of dedicated resources, 
limited capacity and inadequate training provisions and lack of relevant technical support. 
In many cases, government officials and bureaucrats do not have  an understanding of the 
purpose and utility of these mechanisms as well as the technical knowledge and skills to 
implement them in a meaningful way. The current dearth of incentives, rewards and 
enforcement mechanisms also serve to diminish both the will and capacity of authorities to 
implement these processes,  
 
153. There are, however, successful examples of CSOs working directly with local 
authorities to reinforce and complement the implementation of existing governmental 
mechanisms (such as the participatory planning process, Citizen Charters and public 
audit requirements). Such initiatives have achieved important results and have succeeded 
in simultaneously: enhancing social accountability, improving public service delivery, 
empowering citizens and strengthening citizen-state relations.   For example, as described 
in Box 6, the Womens’ Welfare Association in Palpa, has used social accountability tools 
(such as civic education, public audits and public hearings) to complement and reinforce 
government participatory planning processes and the use of Citizen Charters. Similarly, as 
described in Box 7, the NGO Lumanti has worked closely with both municipal officials 
and citizen user groups to improve accountability, governance and service delivery in the 
water sector.  
 
Box 6 - Enhancing accountability while strengthening citizen-state relations in Palpa 
 
The Womens’ Welfare Association in Palpa places emphasis on building an understanding of the 
basics of democracy and raising awareness of both the rights and duties of citizens. The 
Association stresses the importance of information-sharing and communication in strengthening 
citizen-state relations. Close collaboration from the outset with the government and political 
parties has been a crucial aspect of their strategy. For example, before their work on the public 
audit of a health post, they approached the District Health Officer to discuss the initiative with him 
and seek guidance on which health post to work with.   Their advocacy on Citizen Charters, has 
allowed citizens to come prepared with the relevant papers to the VDC office and has empowered  
villagers to refuse to pay additional fees, by referring to the Citizen Charter and the costs it makes 
public.  Their social audit of a sub-health post has helped citizens to understand which medicine- 
are available free of cost and has led to public commitments by health post staff to keep to office 
hours.  In terms of working with VDC secretaries in public hearings, as one facilitator explained, 
“once one secretary undertook the process, it was hard for others to say no”.  This highlights the 
importance of successful examples serving as catalysts for change, as well as building the 
confidence of concerned stakeholders that change can take place.  
 
Source: Tansen field notes, 2010 
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Box 7 - Community-based monitoring and evaluation of drinking water services 
 
Lumanti is a NGO working to alleviate urban poverty, working closely especially in squatter 
settlements.  In Itahari Muncipality, with the support of Water Aid, Lumanti initiated an Integrated 
Drinking Water, Health and Environmental Sanitation Promotion Program. The program works 
closely with municipal officials and focuses on community-based monitoring and evaluation to 
strengthen meaningful citizen participation and empowerment at the local level.  Work is 
undertaken at three levels  – by the User Committee (at community level), the Implementation 
Committee (which includes the municipality, the Line Ministry Drinking Water Division Office, 
Lumanti and the TLO development committee) and the Coordination Committee (functioning as a 
board for the specific program). The user committee begins by identifying the community’s drinking 
water and sanitation needs and submitting a proposal to Lumanti. Once the proposal is approved, a 
bank account is opened in the name of the User Committee which has primary responsibility for 
execution. The Implementation Committee monitors progress, helps to find solutions for any 
problems that arise and ensures effective coordination between the User Committee and local 
officials. As part of the program, there is a Health Volunteer in every community and a Health 
Advocate on every board . The program also enables the primary stakeholders’ to get actively 
involved in interventions by taking the lead in tracking and analyzing progress towards jointly 
agreed results and deciding on necessary action during implementation.  At the end of the project, 
the User Committee gives an account of the activities, budgets and resources utilized and once a 
social audit is completed, all the information is made available on a public hoarding board erected 
in a public place.  
 
Source: Itahari field notes, 2010 
 
 
154. Long-standing systemic issues of PFM at all levels, the unfinished process of 
decentralization as well as the lack of elected bodies at the local level contour conditions 
for social accountability in PRAN’s three focal areas of public financial management, 
municipal governance and the community-based monitoring and evaluation of public 
services.   The retention of centralized control limits the extent to which participatory 
governance can actually function at the local level, and there is a risk that that increased 
citizen engagement with no discernable impact on outcome will led to frustration and 
conflict in the long-run.  However, the historical weaknesses of monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms and the dearth of initiatives in engaging citizens in budget monitoring, 
however, offers an opportunity for citizens long concerned with issues of corruption.  
Community based monitoring initiatives, while limited, have been productive although 
their effectiveness has been circumscribed by the lack of elected officials and currently 
functioning non-citizen centered lines of accountability.   
 
 
 SECTION VI – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
a. Conclusions 
 
155. State institutions in Nepal at all levels have not viewed their responsibilities to 
citizens as central and, to date, social accountability remains limited.  Networks of 
patronage have served to undermine efforts to restructure state and citizen relations, with 
the transitional period further strengthening the power of political party elites at the 
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expense of institutional structures. It is clear that, without attention to political party 
reform and the institutionalization of a bureaucracy that has in place performance based 
incentives, rewards and punishments, efforts at strengthening accountability institutions 
such as the Office of the Auditor General and the Parliamentary Accounts Committee will 
be only partially successful. Government capacity to respond to social accountability 
initiatives is hampered by basic staffing issues (including the lack of VDC secretaries to 
fulfill all posts), lack of requisite skills and capacities as well as lack of political will.  The 
climate of impunity and weak rule of law, and the resulting lack of sanctions, make it 
difficult  to enforce social accountability  
 
156. In order to address current structural weaknesses, short term priorities include: clarifying 
the division of labor between political parties and civil servants; operationalizing the Right 
to Information Act; and, appointing necessary VDC secretaries.  Interim accounts 
committees for local bodies should also be created (for example, with former members of 
these committee).   Medium and long term priorities include: implementing 
decentralization provisions; strengthening national oversight institutions; and, introducing 
performance-based evaluation in all ministries.  
 
157. Although the Nepali state has historically been exclusionary and unaccountable and even 
though the country still faces enormous governance challenges linked to recent conflict, 
ongoing political instability, underdevelopment, insecurity and corruption, the current 
transition towards peace and democracy offers great opportunity for positive change.  The 
promise of a New Nepal, commitments from all the major political parties to deepen 
democracy, and voices for change from the population as a whole serve as a foundation for 
the restructuring of state-citizen relations.  A progressive framework of laws and policies, 
a rich history of associational life and a vibrant media sector further provide an enabling 
environment for social accountability in Nepal.   
 
158. The concentration of political power in the hands of political party leaders, their current 
inability to provide strong cohesive leadership as well as heightened unaccountability at 
the national and local levels paradoxically offer entry points.  Levels of dissatisfaction and 
frustration are high and with judicious guidance can be channeled towards the creation of 
new forms of productive, participatory and accountable relations between citizens and the 
state. Networks of corruption, patronage and criminality have heightened awareness of the 
fundamental unaccountability of both political parties and civil servants. There is an 
opportunity here to transform newfound citizen awareness and voice into active demand 
for the implementation and monitoring of laws and reforms in these two sectors.   While 
there is no culture of transparency in the government, nor has there ever been systematic or 
regular attempts to access information.  The overall lack of initiatives in the past to 
demand relevant public information and to inform and educate citizens about issues of key 
public concern is both an obstacle and an opportunity.  
159. While the chances of a return to conflict are low, there is a key risk that country will head 
into further political crisis if the Constitution is not written by May 2011 – a very real 
likelihood given the delays in the agreement on key remaining constitutional agendas.   
Even if the deadline is met, the nature of the first draft, the period of time allocated for 
public consultations and perceptions of how feedback is or is not incorporated, will further 
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affect the legitimacy of the Constitution that is to be promulgated.  Excluded groups have 
long threatened to reject the Constitution should their demands not be met.    
b.  Recommendations  
160. At this current critical juncture in Nepal’s political development, there is both clear 
opportunity and urgent need for enhanced citizen empowerment and social 
accountability. The following are some key recommendations for creating more 
enabling conditions, institutions, relationships and capacities for enhanced social 
accountability in Nepal. 
a)  Take practical steps to enhance citizens’ demand for and access to relevant public 
information.  
i) At local level, give priority to ensuring that access to information directly relevant to 
citizens’ immediate well-being is enhanced.  This includes, for example, making publicly 
available information on local-level planning, budgets and expenditures, as well as details 
on decentralized services (including entitlements and fees). 
ii) At both national and local levels, conduct campaigns to raise awareness of information 
rights, and educate citizens about how and where to access public information. For 
example, encourage and support all CSOs working at the local level to incorporate “public 
information” and “citizen rights and responsibilities” components into their current 
programs, ideally in collaboration with local level state actors.   
iii) Undertake similar information campaigns to educate government officials/bureaucrats and 
NGOs about their obligations and responsibilities under the Right to Information Act.   
iv) Support joint learning and skills-building events for key actors (such as the National 
Information Commission, public information officers, the media, research organizations, 
NGOs and CSOs) in order to enhance both “supply” and “demand-side” capacity for public 
information dissemination while, at the same time, strengthening working relationships 
between these different actors.  
v) In collaboration with these same actors, support the identification and introduction of (both 
formal and informal) incentives and sanctions to promote enhanced transparency and public 
information sharing.  
b) Develop the capacities of CSOs, at all levels, to empower citizens, facilitate more productive 
citizen-state relationships and promote social accountability approaches. 
i) At the local level, train and support CBOs and CSOs to help ordinary citizens to: 
speak/advocate on their own behalf, apply social accountability approaches and tools at the 
community level, and establish working relationships with local bodies in order to help the 
state become more effective and accountable. Pay special attention to enhancing the 
capacity of these organizations to function as facilitators between citizens and government 
authorities, to nurture emerging community leaders to become drivers of change for state-
citizen relations and to empower excluded groups.  
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ii) At the national level, enhance the capacity of CSOs to understand public/government 
issues, undertake independent research and analysis, disseminate research findings broadly 
in the public arena and implement social accountability approaches that are people-centered 
and evidence-based.  
iii) Encourage and support collaboration and alliance building among different forms of CSOs 
(e.g. community groups, advocacy NGOs, research organizations and media) for social 
accountability purposes. Place special emphasis on those organizations and networks that 
have the capacity to reach out to marginalized groups and to establish linkages between 
local and national level actors (e.g. federations of user groups such as FECOFUN and 
NEFIN).  
iv) Invest in enhanced budget literacy among ordinary citizens and CSOs and support skills 
building for budget analysis, advocacy and tracking at local and national levels.  
c) Encourage and support CSOs and donor organizations, to become models of social 
accountability. 
i) In order for CSOs to play an effective role in holding the government accountable, they 
must themselves become transparent, accountable and legitimate actors. Support expanded 
efforts by the CSO community to enhance transparency and accountability across the 
sector. Encourage CSOs to systematically make their financial information publicly 
available and easily accessible and to standardize the use of social accountability tools such 
as social audits. All donors should encourage and require transparent reporting procedures 
and make readily available in various formats (not just websites) the funds they give to 
their CSO partners.  
 
ii) Encourage and offer support and technical assistance CSOs to enhance their internal 
democratic governance, participatory decision-making and “downwards reporting” to their 
members, targeted beneficiaries and the public at large. 
 
iii) Encourage and assist donor organizations to set an example by applying social 
accountability principles and practices in the context of their own operations. 
d) Work with civil society and state actors to expand and enhance existing government-mandated 
social accountability requirements and practices. 
i) Develop common definitions, standards and guidelines for social accountability practices 
already mandated by the state (such as participatory planning processes, citizen charters, 
public audits and social audits).  
ii) Organize campaigns to ensure that relevant state actors at local and national level, and the 
public at large, are aware of their rights and responsibilities with regard to these practices 
and understand their purpose and expected outcomes.  
iii) Document and disseminate examples of successful social accountability initiatives, in order 
to build confidence and demonstrate the benefits of such approaches.  
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iv) Advocate for the provision of adequate resources, training, technical assistance and follow-
up to ensure that mandated social accountability practices are implemented in a meaningful 
and effective manner. 
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Annex 2 
List of People Interviewed and Interview Questions 
 
1. Govindra Prasad Acharya, Program Officer, Civic Education Unit, ActionAid Nepal 
(Palpa) 
2. Bindu Acharya, Facilitator, Women’s Welfare Association (Palpa) 
3. Raju Adhikari, Journalist, Nagarik Daily (Jhapa) 
4. Ramesh Adhikari,  Policy Unit, ActionAid (Kathmandu) 
5. Anuvav Ajit, Long Term Observer, Carter Center Nepal (Kathmandu) 
6. Madhav Aryal, Journalist, Kantipur (Palpa) 
 
7. Pramod Aryal, Finance Officer,  Municipal Association of Nepal (MuAN) (Kathmandu) 
8. Ramesh Kumar Aryal, Program Coordinator, Radio Madan Pokhara, (Palpa) 
9. Lok Raj Baral, Executive Chairperson, Nepal Center for Contemporary Studies 
(Kathmandu)    
10. Yub Raj Bashyal, Programme Coordinator, Women’s Welfare Association (Palpa) 
11. J.P. Bhujel, Solve (Dhankuta) 
12. Bhim Bhurtel, Chairperson, Nepal South Asia Center (NESAC) (Kathmandu) 
13. Rajesh Bidrohi, Chairperson, Federation of Nepali Journalists (FNJ) (Sunsari) 
14. Devendra Bishwakarma, Human Rights Forum Nepal (Ilam) 
15. Nona Bishwarkarma, Dalit Ekhta Samaj, Dhankuta 
16. Rajendra Bhattarai, Editor, Sundhakpur Dainik (Ilam) 
17. Renu Chand, Constituent Assembly member, UCPN-Maoist (Kathmandu) 
18. Arjun Kumar Dahal, Engineer, Itahari Muncipality (Itahari) 
19. Kali Das, Chairperson, Federation of Community Forest Users Nepal (FECOFUN) (Kaski) 
20. Kalanidhi Devkota, General Secretary, Municipal Association of Nepal (MuAN) 
(Kathmandu) 
21. Binod Dhakal, OXFAM (Kathmandu) 
22. Binod Prasad Dhakal, Secretary and Director, Institute of Local Governance (Kathmandu) 
23. Suvash Dharnal, Managing Director, SAMATA (Kathmandu) 
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24. Pan Bahadur Gharti, Chairperson, Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) 
(Kaski) 
25. Chop Lal Giri, Social Resources Development Center (SRCD), Palpa 
26. Sarita Giri, CA member, Sadbhavana Party - (Ananda-Devi) (Kathmandu) 
27. Indira Ghimire, District Secretary, Federation of Drinking Water and Sanitation Users in 
Nepal (FEDWASUN), Ilam  
28. Somat Ghimire, Chair,  Community Development Organization (Kathmandu) 
29. Henny Hansen, Advisor, Building Local Democracy Advisor, ActionAid/MS Nepal (Palpa) 
30. Phulmaya Jawegu, Secretary, National Network of Indigenous Women (Ilam) 
31. Dinesh Karki, Chairperson, NGO Federation (Sunsari) 
32. Dipendra Karki, Focal Person, Mechinagar Municipality 
33. Ganesh Bahadur Karki, General Secretary, Federation of Community Forest Users Nepal 
(FECOFUN) (Kathmandu) 
34. Dalbikram Khadel, Officer, Local Bodies Assistance Section, MLD 
35. Gopal Khadka, Vice-Chairperson, NGO Federation (Kaski) 
36. Kedar Khadka, Chairperson, ProPublic (Kathmandu) 
37. Surya Khadka, Lumanti (Itahari) 
38. Indra Kuwar, member, Chettri Society (Kaski) 
39. CK Lal, Journalist and Political Analyst 
40. Balkrishna Mabhuhang, Chairperson, Center for Ethnic and Alternative Development 
Studies  (CEADs), Kathmandu 
41. Basudev Singjali Magar, Chairperson, Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities 
(NEFIN), Mechinagar Committee 
42. Ashish Magar, Nepal Magar Sangh (Palpa) 
43. Devendra Magar, Journalist (Palpa) 
44. Prasad Mainali, Chairperson, Mechi Bus Business Association (Jhapa) 
45. Tulsi Marashini,  Officer, Municipality Management Section, MLD 
46. Dil Bahadur Nepali, Regional Member, Dalit NGO Federation (DNF) (Kaski) 
47. Januka Oli, Secretary, Thople Biran Community Forest (Jhapa) 
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48. Keshavraj Panday, Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI) 
(Jhapa) 
49. Shekhar Parajuli, Long Term Observer, Carter Center Nepal (Kathmandu) 
50. Durga Pokharel, Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) representative, Palpa 
51. Mithila Pokharel, Paralegal Committee (Sunsari)  
52. Kul Prasad Rai, Chairperson, NGO Federation (Dhankuta) 
53. Nagendra Rai, Chairperson, Federation of Nepali Journalist (FNJ) (Dhankuta) 
54. Parvathi Rai, Chairperson, NEFIN ( Dhankuta) 
55. Mukti Rijal , Director,  Institute of Governance and Development (Kathmandu) 
56. Santosh Rijal, INSEC representative (Dhankuta) 
57. Krishna Sapkota, Freedom Forum (Kathmandu) 
58. Ashok Kumar Shahi, former Mayor (1997-2002), Tansen Municipality  (Palpa)  
 
59. Soundaryawati Shakya, Chairperson, National Indigenous Women Federation (Palpa) 
 
60. Yamanath Sharma, Under Secretary, Fiscal Commission Secretariat, MLD (Kathmandu) 
 
61. Rabin Lal Shrestha, Research and Advocacy Manager, WaterAid Nepal (Kathmandu) 
 
62. Kishan Shrestha, Solve (Dhankuta) 
63. Durga Sob, President, Feminist Dalit Organization (FEDO) (Kathmandu) 
64. Dilip Subba, Natural Resources Protection Society (Jhapa) 
65. Shankar Subba, Secretary,  Lawyers Association for Human Rights of Nepalese Indigenous 
Peoples (LAHURNIP) (Kathmandu) 
66. Jhalak Subedi, editor, Mulyankhan Magazine 
67. Dhankumari Sunwar, Member, National Women’s Commission (Kathmandu)  
68. Kiran Sunwar, Chairperson, Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) (Ilam)  
69. Surendra Goleh Tamang, Chairperson, Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities 
(NEFIN) (Sunsari) 
70. Anjana Thamil, Chairperson, National Indigenous Women Federation (Dhankuta)  
71. Arjun Thapa, VDC Secretaries Protection Forum (Ilam) 
72. Ashish Thapa, Executive Director, Transparency International Nepal (Kathmandu) 
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73. Gum Bahadur Thapa, Chairperson , Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) 
(Palpa) 
 
74. Lily Thapa, Director, Women for Human Rights (Kathmandu) 
75. Radhika Thapa, Member, Nawadip Tol Development Committee (Jhapa) 
76. Nadhanath Trithal, Propublic (Dhankuta) 
77. Pramod Tuladhar, Program Director,  Association of Community Radio Broadcasters 
(ACCORAB) (Kathmandu) 
78. Bishnu Raj Upreti, Conflict Specialist, Regional Coordinator, National Center for 
Competence in Research (NCCR) North-South 
79. Dharma Uprety, Forest Action (Kathmandu) 
80. Rajan Wanthwa, Spokesperson, Khumbuwan National Front (Sunsari) 
81. Ashok Wanthwa, Representative, Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC) (Ilam) 
 
Key questions for interviewing civil society leaders/intellectuals/focus groups (including 
NGOs/excluded groups)/general citizens on issues of governance and accountability: 
 
 What is the state of citizen-state relations today and why?  
 
 Is it important for citizens to obtain public information? What types of information and 
why? 
 
 Do you think citizens can access information from the government/NGOs/ other 
sources? How and why?   What are your main sources of information?  What are the 
main barriers to information? 
 
 How would you describe citizen/civil society relationships with government officials 
(of varying levels), and why? Please give examples. 
 
 
 How would you describe citizen/civil society relationships with political party leaders 
(of varying levels), and why? Please give examples 
 
 Can you voice your priorities and concerns?  How and why?  Does asking as an 
individual or group make a difference? Why?  
 
 Does working in groups/associations help to voice priorities and concerns? Which 
groups have helped you in the past? Why and how? Are you involved in such groups? 
What percentage of people in this area do you think are involved in such groups? 
 
 How much do you know about the budgets and priorities of local 
government/NGOs/donors? And why?  
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 What kind of interventions have been effective in helping you to voice your concerns? 
 
 What kind of development interventions do you think have been effective in getting the 
government to act on your concerns?  
 
 What do you think needs to change in order for your concerns to be heard and the 
government to act on them?  
 
 Do you have opportunities to regularly dialogue with government officials?  Why and 
how? 
 
 What do you think being a “good citizen” means?   
 
 In your view, what are the responsibilities and relationships that government officials 
should have with citizens? 
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Annex III 
Summary of 2010 Global Integrity Report for Nepal 
 
Nepal: Integrity Indicators Scorecard 
Overall Score: 67 (+/- 1.77) - Weak  
Overall Implementation Gap: 34  
 
Category I Civil Society, Public Information and Media 80  Strong  
I-1 Civil Society Organizations 91  Very Strong  
I-2 Media 79  Moderate  
I-3 Public Access to Information 71  Moderate  
        
Category II Elections 58  Very Weak  
II-1 Voting & Citizen Participation 78  Moderate  
II-2 Election Integrity 79  Moderate  
II-3 Political Financing 17  Very Weak  
        
Category III Government Accountability 57  Very Weak  
III-1 Executive Accountability 54  Very Weak  
III-2 Legislative Accountability 50  Very Weak  
III-3 Judicial Accountability 52  Very Weak  
III-4 Budget Processes 73  Moderate  
        
Category IV Administration and Civil Service 63  Weak  
IV-1 Civil Service Regulations 51  Very Weak  
IV-2 Whistle-blowing Measures 50  Very Weak  
IV-3 Procurement 76  Moderate  
IV-4 Privatization 75  Moderate  
        
Category V Oversight and Regulation 75  Moderate  
V-1 National Ombudsman 78  Moderate  
V-2 Supreme Audit Institution 80  Strong  
V-3 Taxes and Customs 81  Strong  
V-4 State-Owned Enterprises 68  Weak  
V-5 Business Licensing and Regulation 67  Weak  
        
Category VI Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law 68  Weak  
VI-1 Anti-Corruption Law 67  Weak  
VI-2 Anti-Corruption Agency 73  Moderate  
VI-3 Rule of Law 69  Weak  
VI-4 Law Enforcement 63  Weak  
 
The Global Integrity Report assesses strengths and weaknesses of national-level anti-corruption 
systems.  Using 300 actionable indicators, the report examines the existence, effectiveness, and 
citizen access to key governance and anti-corruption mechanisms.  It can be accessed at 
www.globalintegrity.org 
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Civil Society,  Public Information and Media                                                                                               
The 2010 Global Integrity Report for Nepal revealed that for the category “Civil Society,  Public 
Information and Media,” indicators were “strong.”  CSO s were rated as “very strong”– with anti-
corruption/governance CSOs legally protected, free to accept funding and required to disclose 
sources of funding.  Public access to information is rated “moderate.”  Citizens have a legal right to 
access information, although the government has not been forthcoming with information.  The 
media was also rated “moderate”: the freedom of speech and media is guaranteed and citizens can 
form print and radio and television entities and can freely access the internet.  The media is also 
able to freely report on corruption and print media companies are required to publicly disclose 
ownership.   However, both state and other media forms are not free of political biases and CPN-
Maoists were cited as curbing free speech.   
 
Elections 
For the category “Elections,” overall indicators were said to be “very weak.”  Within this category, 
“Voting and Citizen Participation” and “Election Integrity” both received “moderate” rating with 
suffrage and political participation rights for all citizens, legal framework for regular elections, an 
election monitoring agency and national and international observers able to monitor events.  
However, the transparency and effectiveness of the election systems (particularly voter registration) 
has been questioned and the Election Commission suffers from internal weaknesses and reporting 
deficiencies and has not been very effective in penalizing election malpractices.   The third 
component in this category “Political Financing” was rated as “very weak.”  There are no limits to 
individual or corporate donations to political parties or total political party expenditures.  Legal 
requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties and for independent auditing of 
financial irregularities exist and the Election Commission is mandated to monitor the financing of 
political parties.  However, there are no requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual 
political candidates, or independent auditing of their campaign finances.  Internal weaknesses and 
lack of political will has resulted in the Election Commission unable and unwilling to carry out 
credible investigations.   Political parties do not disclose financial support and expenditure data and 
there is no system of individual candidates doing so either.Government Accountability 
The “Government Accountability” category  has also received a “very weak” rating.  Within this 
grouping,  Executive, Legislative and Judicial Accountability is cited as “very weak” with “Budget 
Processes” stated as being moderate.  In terms of the accountability of the Executive,  while the 
chief executive generally has to give reasons for policy decisions, in terms of practice this does not 
occur.  The judiciary can review the executives actions  and the executive and minister-level 
officials can be prosecuted from crimes they commit.  However, in the past, prosecuted ministers 
have all been vindicated, resulting in questions on actual implementation.  Furthermore, in practice 
official government functions are not kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling 
political party. The law requires heads of state and government, and ministerial-level officials and 
the members of the legislature and judiciary to file regular asset disclosure forms and regulations 
governing gifts and hospitality.  However, implementation of these laws are weak or ineffective.  
Officials flout these provisions and the National Vigilance Center tasked with monitoring asset 
disclosure has not been able to be effective due to international institutional weaknesses and a lack 
of political will.   Because by law all asset disclosures are to be kept confidential, there are no laws 
for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure of any of these three branches and citizens are 
unable to access such information.   
 
For the accountability of the legislature, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature and 
citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents. Members of the legislature are 
subject to criminal proceedings, regular asset disclosure is required and regulations governing gifts 
and hospitality exist.  However, as in the executive branch, implementation is weak and no system 
for the audit of national legislative branch asset disclosures exists.    For the judiciary, transparent 
91 
 
and professional processes exist and are followed for the appointment of national-level judges and 
they can be held accountable for their actions. While there is a Judicial Council to investigate 
breaches of procedure and abuses of power, political interference and corruption are stated as being 
prevalent within the judicial system.  There are no restrictions on members from the executive, 
legislature or judiciary entering private sector after leaving the government. In terms of the budget, 
the legislature can amend the budget, all public expenditures require legislative approval and there 
is a Public Accounts Committee to provide oversight of public funds.   However, the capacity of 
legislature to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes is questioned as is the non-
partisan nature of the committee. Furthermore, the government and political parties seldom act 
upon the issues and recommendations put forward by the Public Accounts Committee.   Lastly, the 
budget making process does not necessarily ensure the public’s participation with limited pre-
budget debates 
 
Administration and Civil Service 
The category of “Administration and Civil Service” was given a “weak” rating .   The sub-
categories of “Civil Service Regulations” and “Whistle-blowing Measures” were “very weak” 
while “Procurement” and “Privatization” were “Moderate.”   In terms of the civil service, laws and 
regulations exist for an impartial and independent civil service and the prevention of nepotism, 
cronyism and patronage. There are also independent redress mechanisms and regulations 
prohibiting civil servants convicted of corruption from future government employment. In practice, 
most civil servants are politically influenced and political interests supersede in appointments.  All 
civil servants are required to fill asset disclosure forms and there are rules governing gifts and 
hospitality.  As in the above, monitoring has been weak, and laws prohibit independent auditing and 
citizens’ access to such information.  There are no restrictions on civil servants’ post-government 
private sector employment.    
 
For “Whistle-blowing Measures,” there are no specific laws, although other laws indirectly deal 
with the protection of informers, and protection measures exist within the Right to Information Act.  
The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority is mandated to act on complaints of 
public sector corruption and both it and the National Vigilance Center are covered by special 
provisions in the Appropriations Bill to ensure adequate allocation of funds.  They both suffer from 
institutional weaknesses and investigations are said to be slow.   For procurement, there is a Public 
Procurement Act and a Public Procurement Monitoring office regulating conflict of interest and 
professional training for public procurement officials and as civil servants, their assets and incomes 
are monitored.  Major procurements require competitive bidding and   companies guilty of major 
violations of procurement regulations are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids. 
However, implementation remains a large problem. Major public procurements are by law required 
to be advertized and citizens can access public procurement regulations.   In terms of privatization, 
all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.  There are regulations addressing 
conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization (via the Good Governance 
Act of 2007 and the Civil Servant Regulations 2009) and citizens can access privatization 
regulations.  The government is not legally bound to announce the results of privatization decisions.   
 
Oversight and Regulation 
The category of “Oversight and Regulation” received “moderate” ratings overall.  In terms of the 
sub-categories, the ratings are as follows: “The National Ombudsman” is “moderate,” the “Supreme 
Audit Institution” and “Taxes and Customs” are “Strong” while “State-Owned Enterprises” and 
“Business Licensing and Regulation” are “weak.”  Nepal does not have an Ombudsman but does 
have the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority and the National Vigilance 
Center.  There are  legal protections from political interference for the body, protection for the 
Chief Commissioner of the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority from removal 
without relevant justification and the Commission makes its reports publicly available and 
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accessible to citizens.  However, political influence is said to be factor within the anti-graft body 
and it cannot impose penalties on offenders, other than for refusal to submit asset disclosures.  
Furthermore, stringent follow-up mechanisms are absent and impunity of high-profile government 
officials is rampant.  The country’s anti-corruption institutions lack consistency in approach and 
clear areas of jurisdiction, resulting in frequently over-lapping functions.  
 
 In terms of auditing, the Office of the Auditor General exists as the national supreme audit 
institution and it is protected from political interference and the head can only be removed via an 
impeachment process in Parliament.  The Office does make reports public and available to citizens, 
although this was not practiced from 2002-2006  as there was no parliament.  The audit agency is 
able to initiate its own investigations.  However, the audits findings are seldom implemented, partly 
because of the lack of political will. National agencies exist for taxes (the Internal Revenue 
Department) and customs (Customs department for customs, Excise Offices under the Internal 
Revenue Department).  While tax laws are generally enforced uniformly and without 
discrimination, uniform enforcement of customs and excise laws are said to be affected by 
inadequate rules, procedures and inconsistent practices.   
 
There is no separate agency that oversees state-owned companies as the government itself controls 
them.  There are no legal protections against political interference, and chiefs of these agencies are 
said to be mostly party-supporters and oversight on state-owned business is limited. Citizens can 
legally access the information, but the “Yellow Book” published annually by the Ministry of 
Finance detailing the financial conditions of state-owned companies, is said to contain suspect data.   
While the auditing is done by according to international accounting standards, the third-party 
auditor has to rely on information provided by companies, and bribes are said to be generally 
offered.  In terms of “Business Licensing and Regulation,” legally business licenses are available to 
all citizens, and there are complaint mechanisms if requests are denied.  There are regulatory 
requirements to meet public health, environmental and safety standards but inspections and overall 
enforcement is weak, unless there are specific complaints.  
 
Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law 
The last category of the Global Integrity Report is “Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law.” It is rated 
overall as “weak.”  Of the four internal groupings, only the “Anti-Corruption Agency” is rated as 
“moderate”; “Anti-Corruption Law,” “Rule of Law” and “Law Enforcement” are all “weak.”  Anti-
corruption law criminalizes attempted corruption, the offering and receiving of a bribe, using public 
resources for private gain, money laundering and conspiracy to commit a crime.   There are no 
specific anti-extortion laws (cases have been filed under the Public Offense Act), or laws against 
using confidential state information for private gain.  Nepal has a number of agencies that deal with 
anti-corruption, the most important being the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority.  
There are laws to protect it from political interference, the Chief Commissioner is protected from 
unjustified removal and staff appointments are considered relatively fair and professional.  
However, as the absence of a Chief Commissioner for a number of years reveals due to the lack of 
consensus among political parties, the agency is not free of political influence.  The Commission 
does make regular public reports, but parliamentary issues have resulted in delays in making them 
public in recent years.   Furthermore, while the Commission has sufficient powers in its mandate, 
the investigation and enforcement of judgments and findings are weak, and while it has the full 
authority to independently initiate investigations, this depends on the will power of the chief and 
other commissioners.  Internal constraints, as well as political influence result in delayed action on 
complaints and the lack of whistle-blower protection has resulted in most complaints being filed 
anonymously.  
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In terms of “Rule of Law,” citizens have equal access to the justice system,  people earning the 
median yearly income and small retail businesses can afford to bring a legal suit.  However, delays 
in decision-making which raises costs and other “hidden costs” often discourages people from filing 
lawsuits and appeals.  In a country like Nepal, geographical access to courts also imposes 
constraints.  There is a general right of appeal, although as the judicial process in Nepal is lengthy 
as whole, these take time to be resolved.  Judgments in the criminal system follow written laws, 
although law enforcement is weak and there long-standing issues of non-cooperation of police in 
the execution of judicial decisions.   The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by law, 
national-level judges are protected from removal without justification and judges are safe when 
adjudicating corruption cases.  However, the Nepali judiciary has been criticized for increased 
levels of corruption, inconsistency in interpretation of laws and frequent delays in delivery 
judgments.  While “the Supreme Court is generally seen as being free of government influence,... 
lower courts are especially vulnerable to political pressure and are widely known to be corrupt.”   
The effectiveness of law enforcement in Nepal is affected by nepotism, patronage and large 
political influence which override established professional criteria.   Independent mechanisms for 
citizens to complain about police action exist, including the National Human Rights Commission.   
However, complaints do not get due response in a timely manner and the Commission’s directives 
are often ignored by the executive branch.  The Commission for the Investigation of Abuse and 
Authority has the authority to investigate and prosecute corruption by law enforcement officials and 
law enforcement officials are not immune to criminal proceedings.  However, “[i]mmunity from 
prosecution is so deeply entrenched that it has been virtually institutionalized in Nepal.” 
 
 
 
 
 
